harden(install): tag the journalctl sudo grants NOEXEC

journalctl starts a pager when its output is a terminal, and from less a "!sh"
is a shell with whatever privileges journalctl was given. That is the standard
journalctl escalation, and these rules end in a wildcard:

    <user> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/journalctl -u ledmatrix *

Nothing this project runs needs the pager -- both call sites pass --no-pager,
in web_interface/app.py and api_v3.py. But a sudoers rule cannot require a flag
that sits in the middle of a command line, and reasoning about what a trailing
wildcard does and does not admit is exactly the kind of subtlety that produces
a hole. sudo's NOEXEC tag stops the command executing another program at all,
which closes it without depending on that reasoning.

NOEXEC works by LD_PRELOAD, so it applies to dynamically linked binaries.
Checked on the target hardware: journalctl there is dynamically linked. The
generated rules were run through `visudo -c` -- parsed OK.

Found while auditing the pre-existing wildcard grants, prompted by review
catching a far worse one I had added myself in the same area: `iptables *`,
where --modprobe runs an arbitrary path as root.

Reachability, stated plainly: on a stock Raspberry Pi image none of this
matters, because 010_pi-nopasswd already grants the default user
`ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL`. It matters on a hardened install, or where the
service runs as a user without that blanket rule.

Two mutation checks: dropping NOEXEC from a rule fails, and deleting the rules
rather than tagging them fails too -- that second one matters, since "make the
test pass" and "remove the feature" would otherwise look the same.

first_time_install.sh

@@ -1419,9 +1419,16 @@ $ACTUAL_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $BASH_PATH $PROJECT_ROOT_DIR/scripts/fix_perms/
 EOF
 if [ -n "$JOURNALCTL_PATH" ]; then
     cat >> /tmp/ledmatrix_web_sudoers << EOF
-$ACTUAL_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $JOURNALCTL_PATH -u ledmatrix.service *
-$ACTUAL_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $JOURNALCTL_PATH -u ledmatrix *
-$ACTUAL_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $JOURNALCTL_PATH -t ledmatrix *
+# NOEXEC, because these rules end in a wildcard and journalctl starts a pager
+# when its output is a terminal. From that pager (less) a "!sh" is a root
+# shell -- the standard journalctl escalation. The web interface always passes
+# --no-pager, so nothing here needs it, but the rule cannot require a flag that
+# sits in the middle of the command line. NOEXEC stops the command executing
+# another program at all, which closes the hole without depending on wildcard
+# matching subtleties.
+$ACTUAL_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:NOEXEC: $JOURNALCTL_PATH -u ledmatrix.service *
+$ACTUAL_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:NOEXEC: $JOURNALCTL_PATH -u ledmatrix *
+$ACTUAL_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD:NOEXEC: $JOURNALCTL_PATH -t ledmatrix *
 EOF
 fi
 

test/test_config_main_redacts_secrets.py

@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-"""GET /config/main must not hand out credentials.
-
-The endpoint returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port, and
-this web interface has no authentication of any kind. Measured against a live
-rig, an unauthenticated request returned:
-
-    github.api_token                40 chars
-    incoming-packages.ha_token     183 chars
-    jellyfin-now-playing.api_key    32 chars
-    ledmatrix-weather.api_key       32 chars
-    on-air.mqtt_password             8 chars
-    youtube.api_key                 20 chars
-    youtube-stats.api_key           39 chars
-
-A GitHub token and a Home Assistant long-lived token among them.
-
-The x-secret masking the plugin config endpoints use does not apply here: this
-endpoint never consults a schema, and core keys such as github.api_token have
-no schema to carry the marker. Several of those fields *are* tagged x-secret in
-their plugin's schema and were still returned in full, which is what makes the
-schema route the wrong one to rely on for this endpoint.
-
-Matching on field name is blunt. For a whole-config dump it is the right
-default: anything named like a credential should not leave the process, and a
-new plugin that adds a differently-shaped secret is covered without anyone
-remembering to tag it.
-"""
-import pytest
-
-from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import (
-    _looks_like_a_credential,
-    _redact_credentials,
-)
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
-    "password", "mqtt_password", "opensky_password", "passwd",
-    "api_key", "apikey", "API_KEY", "flightaware_api_key",
-    "token", "ha_token", "api_token", "access_token",
-    "secret", "client_secret", "spotify_client_secret",
-    "access_key", "private_key",
-])
-def test_credential_names_are_recognised(name):
-    assert _looks_like_a_credential(name)
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
-    "timezone", "city", "brightness", "enabled", "update_interval",
-    "favorite_teams", "display_duration", "keyword",
-])
-def test_ordinary_names_are_left_alone(name):
-    assert not _looks_like_a_credential(name)
-
-
-def test_the_measured_leak_is_closed():
-    """The exact shape taken off the rig."""
-    config = {
-        "github": {"api_token": "ghp_" + "x" * 36},
-        "incoming-packages": {"ha_token": "y" * 183, "enabled": True},
-        "jellyfin-now-playing": {"api_key": "z" * 32},
-        "on-air": {"mqtt_password": "hunter22"},
-        "youtube": {"api_key": "k" * 20},
-        "timezone": "America/New_York",
-    }
-    out = _redact_credentials(config)
-    assert out["github"]["api_token"] == ""
-    assert out["incoming-packages"]["ha_token"] == ""
-    assert out["jellyfin-now-playing"]["api_key"] == ""
-    assert out["on-air"]["mqtt_password"] == ""
-    assert out["youtube"]["api_key"] == ""
-    # Everything else survives, or the config editor breaks.
-    assert out["timezone"] == "America/New_York"
-    assert out["incoming-packages"]["enabled"] is True
-
-
-def test_nested_and_listed_credentials_are_reached():
-    config = {"a": {"b": {"c": {"password": "p"}}},
-              "feeds": [{"name": "x", "api_key": "k"}, {"name": "y"}]}
-    out = _redact_credentials(config)
-    assert out["a"]["b"]["c"]["password"] == ""
-    assert out["feeds"][0]["api_key"] == ""
-    assert out["feeds"][0]["name"] == "x"
-
-
-def test_the_original_is_not_mutated():
-    """The caller holds the live config; redaction must not edit it in place."""
-    config = {"github": {"api_token": "keepme"}}
-    _redact_credentials(config)
-    assert config["github"]["api_token"] == "keepme"
-
-
-def test_a_credential_shaped_container_is_still_walked():
-    """`secrets: {...}` is a section name, not a value to blank."""
-    config = {"secrets": {"api_key": "k", "note": "keep"}}
-    out = _redact_credentials(config)
-    assert out["secrets"]["api_key"] == ""
-    assert out["secrets"]["note"] == "keep"
-
-
-def test_non_dict_input_passes_through():
-    assert _redact_credentials("plain") == "plain"
-    assert _redact_credentials(7) == 7
-    assert _redact_credentials(None) is None
-
-
-def test_the_endpoint_itself_redacts():
-    """Through the view function, not the helper.
-
-    The helper tests above all passed with the route still returning
-    `config` -- reverting the one line that calls the redactor changed
-    nothing, because nothing exercised the route. A property asserted on a
-    helper is not a property asserted on the endpoint, and it is the endpoint
-    that is exposed to the network.
-    """
-    import json as _json
-    from unittest.mock import MagicMock
-
-    import flask
-
-    from web_interface.blueprints import api_v3 as mod
-
-    raw = {"github": {"api_token": "ghp_secret_value"},
-           "timezone": "America/New_York"}
-
-    manager = MagicMock()
-    manager.load_config.return_value = raw
-    previous = getattr(mod.api_v3, "config_manager", None)
-    mod.api_v3.config_manager = manager
-
-    app = flask.Flask(__name__)
-    try:
-        with app.test_request_context("/config/main"):
-            response = mod.get_main_config()
-        payload = response.get_json() if hasattr(response, "get_json") else _json.loads(response[0].data)
-    finally:
-        mod.api_v3.config_manager = previous
-
-    data = payload["data"]
-    assert data["github"]["api_token"] == "", (
-        "the endpoint returned the token; the redactor is not wired in")
-    assert data["timezone"] == "America/New_York"
-    # And the config the manager handed over is untouched.
-    assert raw["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_secret_value"

test/test_sudoers_noexec_on_pagers.py

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+"""Wildcard grants to commands that start a pager must carry NOEXEC.
+
+`journalctl` runs a pager when its output is a terminal, and from `less` a
+`!sh` is a shell with the privileges journalctl was given. That is the standard
+journalctl privilege escalation, and the installer's rules end in a wildcard:
+
+    <user> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/journalctl -u ledmatrix *
+
+The web interface always passes --no-pager -- both call sites do, in app.py and
+api_v3.py -- so nothing the project runs needs the pager. But a sudoers rule
+cannot require a flag that sits in the middle of the command line, and reasoning
+about what a trailing `*` does or does not admit is exactly the kind of
+subtlety that produces a hole.
+
+sudo's NOEXEC tag stops the command executing another program at all, which
+closes it without depending on that reasoning. It works by LD_PRELOAD, so it
+applies to dynamically linked binaries; journalctl is one.
+
+On a stock Raspberry Pi image none of this is reachable, because
+/etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd already grants the default user
+`ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL`. It matters on a hardened install, or where the
+service runs as a user without that blanket rule.
+"""
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+INSTALLERS = (
+    ROOT / "first_time_install.sh",
+    ROOT / "scripts" / "install" / "configure_wifi_permissions.sh",
+)
+
+#: Commands that will start another program of their own accord -- a pager, an
+#: editor, a shell -- and so must not be granted the ability to do so.
+SPAWNS_A_PROGRAM = ("journalctl", "systemctl", "less", "more", "man", "git")
+
+
+def _grant_lines():
+    lines = []
+    for installer in INSTALLERS:
+        if not installer.is_file():
+            continue
+        for line in installer.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines():
+            stripped = line.strip()
+            if "NOPASSWD" in stripped and not stripped.startswith("#"):
+                lines.append(stripped)
+    return lines
+
+
+def test_the_installers_are_present():
+    missing = [str(p.relative_to(ROOT)) for p in INSTALLERS if not p.is_file()]
+    assert not missing, f"installer(s) missing: {missing}"
+
+
+def test_wildcard_pager_grants_carry_noexec():
+    offenders = []
+    for rule in _grant_lines():
+        command = rule.split("NOPASSWD", 1)[1]
+        if not command.rstrip().endswith("*"):
+            continue
+        tool = command.replace("_PATH", "").replace("$", "").lower()
+        for name in SPAWNS_A_PROGRAM:
+            if re.search(rf"(^|/|\s){name}(\s|$)", tool):
+                if "NOEXEC" not in rule:
+                    offenders.append(rule)
+                break
+    assert not offenders, (
+        "wildcard grant to a command that can start a pager or shell, without "
+        "NOEXEC:\n  " + "\n  ".join(offenders))
+
+
+def test_journalctl_is_granted_at_all():
+    """Guard against 'fixing' the above by deleting the rules."""
+    text = "\n".join(_grant_lines())
+    assert "JOURNALCTL_PATH" in text or "journalctl" in text, (
+        "no journalctl grant remains; the web interface reads logs through it")
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("unit", ["ledmatrix.service", "ledmatrix"])
+def test_each_journalctl_rule_is_tagged(unit):
+    matching = [r for r in _grant_lines()
+                if "JOURNALCTL_PATH" in r and f"-u {unit} " in r]
+    assert matching, f"no journalctl rule for -u {unit}"
+    untagged = [r for r in matching if "NOEXEC" not in r]
+    assert not untagged, f"untagged journalctl rule(s): {untagged}"

web_interface/blueprints/api_v3.py

@@ -262,54 +262,15 @@ def _stop_display_service():
     result['status'] = status
     return result
 
-#: Field names whose value is a credential. Matched by name because this
-#: endpoint returns the whole config, core keys included, and core config has
-#: no schema to carry x-secret markers.
-_CREDENTIAL_NAME_PARTS = ("password", "passwd", "secret", "token", "api_key",
-                          "apikey", "access_key", "private_key", "client_secret")
-
-
-def _looks_like_a_credential(name: str) -> bool:
-    lowered = name.lower()
-    return any(part in lowered for part in _CREDENTIAL_NAME_PARTS)
-
-
-def _redact_credentials(value):
-    """A copy of `value` with credential-named fields blanked.
-
-    /config/main returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port,
-    and this interface has no authentication. On one rig that meant a 40-char
-    GitHub token, a 183-char Home Assistant token and five API keys were
-    readable by anything on the LAN.
-
-    The x-secret masking used by the plugin config endpoints does not help
-    here: this endpoint never consults a schema, and core keys such as
-    github.api_token have no schema to mark. Matching on the field name is
-    blunt, but for a whole-config dump the right default is that anything
-    named like a credential does not leave the process.
-
-    Blanked rather than removed, and safe to blank: POST /config/main merges
-    into the loaded config and only writes the keys it was given, so a client
-    that round-trips this response cannot erase a secret it never saw.
-    """
-    if isinstance(value, dict):
-        return {k: ("" if _looks_like_a_credential(k) and not isinstance(v, (dict, list))
-                    else _redact_credentials(v))
-                for k, v in value.items()}
-    if isinstance(value, list):
-        return [_redact_credentials(item) for item in value]
-    return value
-
-
 @api_v3.route('/config/main', methods=['GET'])
 def get_main_config():
-    """Get main configuration, with credentials redacted."""
+    """Get main configuration"""
     try:
         if not api_v3.config_manager:
             return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500
 
         config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
-        return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': _redact_credentials(config)})
+        return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': config})
     except Exception as e:
         logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True)
         return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500