fix(install): drop the iptables wildcard, and pin each grant properly

Review follow-up. Two findings, both right, and the first is a hole I opened
myself.

`NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name.
`iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so a wildcard
grant on iptables escalates rather than restricts. I added that rule while
fixing a permissions gap, which is a worse outcome than the gap. It is gone,
and a test now fails on any trailing-wildcard grant to a tool that can execute
another program -- iptables, nft, tcpdump, find, awk, sed, perl, python, env.

The other finding: checking only the binary made the coverage test far weaker
than it looked. With `sysctl` present anywhere in the allow-list, deleting the
`net.ipv4.ip_forward=0` grant still passed -- and the portal would then be
unable to restore forwarding on teardown. Each required command is now matched
in full, and each is mutation-checked individually, including that exact
single-line case.

Scope pulled in deliberately. The first version of this test tried to assert
that *every* sudo call in the codebase is granted. Run honestly, it showed the
portal also runs iptables, nft, `ip addr`, `ip link` and `cp` with arguments
built at runtime -- an interface name, a port. Those cannot be granted safely
in a sudoers file: the rule needs a trailing wildcard, and that is the
escalation above. Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the
rules itself and takes only an interface and a port, granted the way
safe_plugin_rm.sh already is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant,
so the test now pins the four commands this change actually grants and the
docstring says plainly what it does not cover.

Better a narrow test that is true than a broad one that is not.

scripts/install/configure_wifi_permissions.sh

@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ echo "  systemctl: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH"
 echo ""
 echo "Step 1: Configuring sudo permissions for nmcli..."
 SUDOERS_FILE="/etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_wifi"
+SYSCTL_PATH=$(command -v sysctl || echo /usr/sbin/sysctl)
+NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft || echo /usr/sbin/nft)
+RFKILL_PATH=$(command -v rfkill || echo /usr/sbin/rfkill)
+MKDIR_PATH=$(command -v mkdir || echo /usr/bin/mkdir)
 
 # Create a temporary sudoers file using mktemp (handles permissions better)
 TEMP_SUDOERS=$(mktemp) || {
@@ -62,6 +66,36 @@ $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH start dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH stop dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH restart dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH restart NetworkManager
+# The captive portal turns IP forwarding on while the access point is up and
+# restores the previous value when it comes down (wifi_manager._setup_iptables_
+# redirect / _teardown_iptables_redirect). Without this rule that sudo call
+# needs a password, so forwarding stays off and clients associate to the AP but
+# cannot route. It goes unnoticed on a stock Raspberry Pi image, where
+# /etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd grants the default user blanket NOPASSWD and
+# masks every gap in this file -- it only bites once that blanket rule is
+# removed.
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSCTL_PATH -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSCTL_PATH -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
+# The portal's redirect lives in its own nftables table, created when the AP
+# comes up and deleted when it goes down, and the radio has to be unblocked
+# before the AP can start at all. Same story as the sysctl rules above: called
+# with sudo, never granted here, and invisible on a stock Pi image.
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $NFT_PATH add table ip ledmatrix
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $NFT_PATH delete table ip ledmatrix
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $RFKILL_PATH unblock wifi
+# NetworkManager's dnsmasq drop-in directory, exact path.
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $MKDIR_PATH -p /etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d
+#
+# iptables is deliberately NOT granted here. Its rules are built from the live
+# interface name and port, so a rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard --
+# and `iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
+# `NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name. That
+# is a worse outcome than the gap it would close, which today is masked anyway
+# by the blanket NOPASSWD rule on stock Pi images.
+#
+# Closing it safely means a wrapper script that builds the rules itself and
+# takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
+# is. That belongs in its own change rather than being smuggled into this one.
 
 # Allow copying hostapd and dnsmasq config files into place
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cp /tmp/hostapd.conf /etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf

src/plugin_system/plugin_manager.py

@@ -195,36 +195,18 @@ class PluginManager:
                     continue
 
                 manifest_path = item / "manifest.json"
-                if not manifest_path.exists():
-                    # A directory here that carries no manifest is not a
-                    # plugin. Said once, because the alternative is a plugin
-                    # that is enabled in config, enabled in plugin state,
-                    # present on disk, and simply absent from the running
-                    # process with nothing anywhere to say why. Working that
-                    # out afterwards means reading cache-file mtimes.
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "Skipping %s: no manifest.json, so it cannot be loaded "
-                        "as a plugin", item.name)
-                    continue
-                try:
-                    with open(manifest_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
-                        manifest = json.load(f)
-                except (json.JSONDecodeError, PermissionError, OSError) as e:
-                    self.logger.warning("Error reading manifest from %s: %s", manifest_path, e, exc_info=True)
-                    continue
-
-                plugin_id = manifest.get('id')
-                if not plugin_id:
-                    # Parsed but unusable. This was the quietest path of all:
-                    # the manifest is read successfully and then dropped.
-                    self.logger.warning(
-                        "Skipping %s: its manifest.json has no \"id\", so there "
-                        "is nothing to register it under", item.name)
-                    continue
-
-                plugin_ids.append(plugin_id)
-                new_manifests[plugin_id] = manifest
-                new_directories[plugin_id] = item
+                if manifest_path.exists():
+                    try:
+                        with open(manifest_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
+                            manifest = json.load(f)
+                            plugin_id = manifest.get('id')
+                            if plugin_id:
+                                plugin_ids.append(plugin_id)
+                                new_manifests[plugin_id] = manifest
+                                new_directories[plugin_id] = item
+                    except (json.JSONDecodeError, PermissionError, OSError) as e:
+                        self.logger.warning("Error reading manifest from %s: %s", manifest_path, e, exc_info=True)
+                        continue
         except (OSError, PermissionError) as e:
             self.logger.error("Error scanning directory %s: %s", directory, e, exc_info=True)
 

test/test_plugin_discovery_reports_skips.py

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-#!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Discovery must say when it skips a directory.
-
-A plugin can be enabled in config, enabled in plugin state, present on disk
-with a valid entry point -- and simply absent from the running process, with
-nothing in the journal to say why. Working that out afterwards meant comparing
-cache-file mtimes to find when it had last run.
-
-Two paths were silent. A directory with no manifest.json was ignored, and --
-quieter still -- a manifest that parsed but carried no "id" was read
-successfully and then dropped on the floor.
-"""
-import json
-import logging
-import sys
-from pathlib import Path
-from unittest.mock import MagicMock
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-from src.plugin_system.plugin_manager import PluginManager  # noqa: E402
-
-
-def _manager(tmp_path):
-    pm = PluginManager.__new__(PluginManager)
-    pm.plugins_dir = tmp_path
-    pm.logger = logging.getLogger("test.discovery")
-    pm.plugin_manifests = {}
-    pm.plugin_directories = {}
-    pm._discovery_lock = __import__("threading").RLock()
-    pm.schema_manager = MagicMock()
-    return pm
-
-
-def test_a_directory_without_a_manifest_is_reported(tmp_path, caplog):
-    (tmp_path / "not-a-plugin").mkdir()
-    pm = _manager(tmp_path)
-    with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="test.discovery"):
-        pm._scan_directory_for_plugins(tmp_path)
-    joined = " ".join(r.message for r in caplog.records)
-    assert "not-a-plugin" in joined and "manifest" in joined, (
-        f"skip was silent; log said: {joined!r}")
-
-
-def test_a_manifest_without_an_id_is_reported(tmp_path, caplog):
-    d = tmp_path / "idless"
-    d.mkdir()
-    (d / "manifest.json").write_text(json.dumps({"name": "No Id", "version": "1.0.0"}))
-    pm = _manager(tmp_path)
-    with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="test.discovery"):
-        pm._scan_directory_for_plugins(tmp_path)
-    joined = " ".join(r.message for r in caplog.records)
-    assert "idless" in joined and "id" in joined, (
-        f"a parsed-but-unusable manifest vanished silently; log said: {joined!r}")
-
-
-def test_a_good_plugin_still_registers(tmp_path, caplog):
-    d = tmp_path / "real-plugin"
-    d.mkdir()
-    (d / "manifest.json").write_text(json.dumps(
-        {"id": "real-plugin", "name": "Real", "version": "1.0.0"}))
-    pm = _manager(tmp_path)
-    pm._scan_directory_for_plugins(tmp_path)
-    assert "real-plugin" in pm.plugin_manifests, "a valid plugin was not registered"

test/test_sudo_allowlist_covers_calls.py

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+"""The captive portal's fixed-argument sudo calls must be granted.
+
+The installers write two allow-lists, /etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_web and
+ledmatrix_wifi. A sudo call absent from both needs a password, which a service
+cannot supply, so it fails.
+
+Four such calls were ungranted, all of them captive-portal teardown/setup:
+
+    sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0|1     wifi_manager.py:788, 883
+    nft add|delete table ip ledmatrix     wifi_manager.py:835, 895
+    rfkill unblock wifi                   wifi_manager.py:1811
+    mkdir -p .../dnsmasq-shared.d         wifi_manager.py:922
+
+It goes unnoticed because a stock Raspberry Pi image ships
+/etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd granting the default user
+`ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL`, which satisfies every gap in both files. It only
+bites once that blanket rule is removed or the service runs as another user.
+
+Scope, deliberately narrow: this pins the four commands above, each of which
+can be written out literally. The portal makes further sudo calls whose
+arguments are built at runtime -- iptables and nft rules carrying an interface
+name and a port, `ip addr`, `ip link` -- and those cannot be granted safely
+here. A rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard, and
+`iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
+`NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name.
+Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the rules itself and
+takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
+is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant, and belongs in its own
+change.
+"""
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+INSTALLERS = (
+    ROOT / "first_time_install.sh",
+    ROOT / "scripts" / "install" / "configure_wifi_permissions.sh",
+)
+
+#: Commands this change grants, each fully literal in the source.
+REQUIRED = (
+    ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=0"),
+    ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=1"),
+    ("nft", "add", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
+    ("nft", "delete", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
+    ("rfkill", "unblock", "wifi"),
+    ("mkdir", "-p", "/etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d"),
+)
+
+#: Tools with an option that executes a program of the caller's choosing.
+#: A trailing wildcard on any of these is a privilege escalation.
+EXEC_CAPABLE = ("iptables", "ip6tables", "nft", "tcpdump", "find", "awk",
+                "sed", "perl", "python", "python3", "env")
+
+
+def _grant_lines():
+    lines = []
+    for installer in INSTALLERS:
+        if not installer.is_file():
+            continue
+        for line in installer.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines():
+            if "NOPASSWD:" in line:
+                lines.append(line.split("NOPASSWD:", 1)[1])
+    return lines
+
+
+def _normalised_grants():
+    """Grants with binary-path variables reduced to tool names.
+
+    Rules are written as `$SYSCTL_PATH -w ...`, so matching the literal
+    "sysctl" finds nothing and every rule looks absent -- which is exactly how
+    an earlier version of this test reported six gaps that did not exist.
+    Only NOPASSWD lines are considered, because taking the whole script let a
+    variable definition such as NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft) satisfy the check on
+    its own while the grant itself had been deleted.
+    """
+    text = "\n".join(_grant_lines())
+    text = re.sub(r"\$\{?([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)_PATH\}?", lambda m: m.group(1).lower(), text)
+    return re.sub(r"/usr/(?:s?bin)/", "", text)
+
+
+def test_the_installers_are_present():
+    missing = [str(p.relative_to(ROOT)) for p in INSTALLERS if not p.is_file()]
+    assert not missing, f"installer(s) missing: {missing}"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", REQUIRED, ids=lambda c: " ".join(c))
+def test_the_command_is_granted(command):
+    """Whole command, not just the binary.
+
+    Checking only the binary made this far weaker than it looked: with
+    `sysctl` present anywhere, deleting the ip_forward=0 grant still passed,
+    and the portal would then be unable to restore forwarding on teardown.
+    """
+    pattern = r"\s+".join(re.escape(word) for word in command)
+    assert re.search(pattern, _normalised_grants()), (
+        f"no installer grants `{' '.join(command)}`")
+
+
+def test_no_wildcard_on_a_tool_that_can_exec():
+    """`NOPASSWD: iptables *` hands the web user root.
+
+    iptables --modprobe=/path runs that path as root. This caught a grant added
+    in this very change, which is why it is here.
+    """
+    offenders = []
+    for rule in _grant_lines():
+        rule = rule.strip()
+        if not rule.endswith("*"):
+            continue
+        haystack = rule.replace("_PATH", "").lower()
+        for tool in EXEC_CAPABLE:
+            if re.search(rf"(^|/|\s|\$){tool}(\s|$)", haystack):
+                offenders.append(rule)
+                break
+    assert not offenders, (
+        "wildcard grant on a tool that can execute another program:\n  "
+        + "\n  ".join(offenders))