fix(install): drop the iptables wildcard, and pin each grant properly

Review follow-up. Two findings, both right, and the first is a hole I opened
myself.

`NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name.
`iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so a wildcard
grant on iptables escalates rather than restricts. I added that rule while
fixing a permissions gap, which is a worse outcome than the gap. It is gone,
and a test now fails on any trailing-wildcard grant to a tool that can execute
another program -- iptables, nft, tcpdump, find, awk, sed, perl, python, env.

The other finding: checking only the binary made the coverage test far weaker
than it looked. With `sysctl` present anywhere in the allow-list, deleting the
`net.ipv4.ip_forward=0` grant still passed -- and the portal would then be
unable to restore forwarding on teardown. Each required command is now matched
in full, and each is mutation-checked individually, including that exact
single-line case.

Scope pulled in deliberately. The first version of this test tried to assert
that *every* sudo call in the codebase is granted. Run honestly, it showed the
portal also runs iptables, nft, `ip addr`, `ip link` and `cp` with arguments
built at runtime -- an interface name, a port. Those cannot be granted safely
in a sudoers file: the rule needs a trailing wildcard, and that is the
escalation above. Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the
rules itself and takes only an interface and a port, granted the way
safe_plugin_rm.sh already is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant,
so the test now pins the four commands this change actually grants and the
docstring says plainly what it does not cover.

Better a narrow test that is true than a broad one that is not.

scripts/install/configure_wifi_permissions.sh

@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ echo "  systemctl: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH"
 echo ""
 echo "Step 1: Configuring sudo permissions for nmcli..."
 SUDOERS_FILE="/etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_wifi"
+SYSCTL_PATH=$(command -v sysctl || echo /usr/sbin/sysctl)
+NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft || echo /usr/sbin/nft)
+RFKILL_PATH=$(command -v rfkill || echo /usr/sbin/rfkill)
+MKDIR_PATH=$(command -v mkdir || echo /usr/bin/mkdir)
 
 # Create a temporary sudoers file using mktemp (handles permissions better)
 TEMP_SUDOERS=$(mktemp) || {
@@ -62,6 +66,36 @@ $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH start dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH stop dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH restart dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH restart NetworkManager
+# The captive portal turns IP forwarding on while the access point is up and
+# restores the previous value when it comes down (wifi_manager._setup_iptables_
+# redirect / _teardown_iptables_redirect). Without this rule that sudo call
+# needs a password, so forwarding stays off and clients associate to the AP but
+# cannot route. It goes unnoticed on a stock Raspberry Pi image, where
+# /etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd grants the default user blanket NOPASSWD and
+# masks every gap in this file -- it only bites once that blanket rule is
+# removed.
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSCTL_PATH -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSCTL_PATH -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
+# The portal's redirect lives in its own nftables table, created when the AP
+# comes up and deleted when it goes down, and the radio has to be unblocked
+# before the AP can start at all. Same story as the sysctl rules above: called
+# with sudo, never granted here, and invisible on a stock Pi image.
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $NFT_PATH add table ip ledmatrix
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $NFT_PATH delete table ip ledmatrix
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $RFKILL_PATH unblock wifi
+# NetworkManager's dnsmasq drop-in directory, exact path.
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $MKDIR_PATH -p /etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d
+#
+# iptables is deliberately NOT granted here. Its rules are built from the live
+# interface name and port, so a rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard --
+# and `iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
+# `NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name. That
+# is a worse outcome than the gap it would close, which today is masked anyway
+# by the blanket NOPASSWD rule on stock Pi images.
+#
+# Closing it safely means a wrapper script that builds the rules itself and
+# takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
+# is. That belongs in its own change rather than being smuggled into this one.
 
 # Allow copying hostapd and dnsmasq config files into place
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cp /tmp/hostapd.conf /etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf

src/logging_config.py

@@ -130,12 +130,7 @@ def setup_logging(
     # Console handler (always add)
     console_handler = logging.StreamHandler(sys.stdout)
     console_handler.setLevel(level)
-    # Under systemd, tag each line so the journal records the real severity
+    console_handler.setFormatter(formatter)
-    # rather than filing everything as informational. The file handler below
-    # keeps the plain formatter: the prefix is meaningful to journald and noise
-    # anywhere else.
-    console_handler.setFormatter(
-        JournalPriorityFormatter(formatter) if _under_systemd() else formatter)
     root_logger.addHandler(console_handler)
     
     # File handler (if specified)
@@ -150,54 +145,6 @@ def setup_logging(
             sys.stderr.write(f"Warning: Could not set up file logging to {log_file}: {e}\n")
 
 
-#: syslog priorities, which is what systemd parses from a "<N>" prefix on
-#: stdout. Mapped from Python's levels.
-_SYSLOG_PRIORITY = {
-    logging.CRITICAL: 2,   # LOG_CRIT
-    logging.ERROR: 3,      # LOG_ERR
-    logging.WARNING: 4,    # LOG_WARNING
-    logging.INFO: 6,       # LOG_INFO
-    logging.DEBUG: 7,      # LOG_DEBUG
-}
-
-
-class JournalPriorityFormatter(logging.Formatter):
-    """Wraps a formatter, prefixing each line with its syslog priority.
-
-    Under systemd everything this process writes to stdout lands in the journal
-    as PRIORITY=6, whatever the Python level was. Measured on a live rig: 55
-    ERROR lines and 13 WARNING lines in a day, every one of them recorded as
-    informational, so `journalctl -p err -u ledmatrix` returned nothing at all
-    while errors were being logged. Anyone triaging has to grep the message
-    text instead, which is both slower and wrong -- a search for "oom" matches
-    the radar logging "zoom=9".
-
-    systemd reads a leading "<N>" on each line and uses it as the priority
-    (sd-daemon(3)), so this needs no extra dependency. Multi-line records get
-    the prefix on every line, since the journal splits them and an unprefixed
-    continuation would fall back to the default.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, inner: logging.Formatter):
-        super().__init__()
-        self._inner = inner
-
-    def format(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> str:
-        text = self._inner.format(record)
-        prefix = f"<{_SYSLOG_PRIORITY.get(record.levelno, 6)}>"
-        return "\n".join(prefix + line for line in text.split("\n"))
-
-
-def _under_systemd() -> bool:
-    """True when stdout is the journal.
-
-    systemd sets JOURNAL_STREAM for services whose output it captures. Without
-    this check the "<N>" prefixes would show up as literal noise when the
-    program is run from a terminal, in the emulator, or in tests.
-    """
-    return bool(os.environ.get("JOURNAL_STREAM"))
-
-
 class PluginLoggerAdapter(logging.LoggerAdapter):
     """LoggerAdapter that stamps every record with its plugin_id.
 

test/test_journald_log_priority.py

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-"""Log lines must reach the journal with their real severity.
-
-Everything this process writes to stdout lands in the journal as PRIORITY=6,
-whatever the Python level was, because journald has no other signal. Measured
-on a live rig over 24 hours: 55 lines containing " - ERROR - " and 13
-containing " - WARNING - ", every one of them recorded as informational. So
-
-    journalctl -p err -u ledmatrix
-
-returned nothing while errors were being logged, and anyone triaging has to
-grep the message text instead. That is slower and it is wrong: a search for
-"oom" also matches the radar logging "zoom=9", which is exactly the false
-positive it produced during this audit.
-
-systemd reads a leading "<N>" on each stdout line and uses it as the priority
-(sd-daemon(3)), so this needs no extra dependency -- and it must only be
-applied when systemd is actually reading, or the prefixes become literal noise
-in a terminal, the emulator, and test output.
-"""
-import logging
-import os
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-import pytest
-
-from src.logging_config import JournalPriorityFormatter, _SYSLOG_PRIORITY, _under_systemd
-
-
-class _Plain(logging.Formatter):
-    def format(self, record):
-        return record.getMessage()
-
-
-def _record(level, msg="hello"):
-    return logging.LogRecord("t", level, "f.py", 1, msg, None, None)
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("level,expected", [
-    (logging.CRITICAL, 2),
-    (logging.ERROR, 3),
-    (logging.WARNING, 4),
-    (logging.INFO, 6),
-    (logging.DEBUG, 7),
-])
-def test_each_level_maps_to_its_syslog_priority(level, expected):
-    out = JournalPriorityFormatter(_Plain()).format(_record(level))
-    assert out.startswith(f"<{expected}>"), out
-    assert _SYSLOG_PRIORITY[level] == expected
-
-
-def test_error_and_info_are_distinguishable():
-    """The whole point: journalctl -p err must be able to tell them apart."""
-    fmt = JournalPriorityFormatter(_Plain())
-    assert fmt.format(_record(logging.ERROR))[:3] != fmt.format(_record(logging.INFO))[:3]
-
-
-def test_every_line_of_a_multiline_record_is_tagged():
-    """The journal splits them, and an untagged continuation loses its level.
-
-    A traceback is the case that matters -- it is the most important thing in
-    the log and the longest.
-    """
-    out = JournalPriorityFormatter(_Plain()).format(
-        _record(logging.ERROR, "Traceback:\nline one\nline two"))
-    lines = out.split("\n")
-    assert len(lines) == 3
-    assert all(line.startswith("<3>") for line in lines), lines
-
-
-def test_the_message_survives_intact():
-    out = JournalPriorityFormatter(_Plain()).format(_record(logging.WARNING, "disk full"))
-    assert out == "<4>disk full"
-
-
-def test_an_unknown_level_falls_back_to_info():
-    out = JournalPriorityFormatter(_Plain()).format(_record(25))
-    assert out.startswith("<6>")
-
-
-def test_prefixing_is_off_outside_systemd():
-    """Otherwise a terminal run, the emulator and pytest all show `<6>`."""
-    with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
-        assert not _under_systemd()
-    with patch.dict(os.environ, {"JOURNAL_STREAM": "8:12345"}):
-        assert _under_systemd()
-
-
-def test_setup_uses_the_wrapper_only_under_systemd():
-    from src.logging_config import setup_logging
-
-    for env, expect_wrapped in (({}, False), ({"JOURNAL_STREAM": "8:1"}, True)):
-        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
-            setup_logging()
-            handlers = [h for h in logging.getLogger().handlers
-                        if isinstance(h, logging.StreamHandler)]
-            assert handlers, "no stream handler installed"
-            wrapped = any(isinstance(h.formatter, JournalPriorityFormatter)
-                          for h in handlers)
-            assert wrapped is expect_wrapped, (
-                f"JOURNAL_STREAM={env}: wrapped={wrapped}, expected {expect_wrapped}")
-    logging.getLogger().handlers.clear()

test/test_sudo_allowlist_covers_calls.py

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+"""The captive portal's fixed-argument sudo calls must be granted.
+
+The installers write two allow-lists, /etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_web and
+ledmatrix_wifi. A sudo call absent from both needs a password, which a service
+cannot supply, so it fails.
+
+Four such calls were ungranted, all of them captive-portal teardown/setup:
+
+    sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0|1     wifi_manager.py:788, 883
+    nft add|delete table ip ledmatrix     wifi_manager.py:835, 895
+    rfkill unblock wifi                   wifi_manager.py:1811
+    mkdir -p .../dnsmasq-shared.d         wifi_manager.py:922
+
+It goes unnoticed because a stock Raspberry Pi image ships
+/etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd granting the default user
+`ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL`, which satisfies every gap in both files. It only
+bites once that blanket rule is removed or the service runs as another user.
+
+Scope, deliberately narrow: this pins the four commands above, each of which
+can be written out literally. The portal makes further sudo calls whose
+arguments are built at runtime -- iptables and nft rules carrying an interface
+name and a port, `ip addr`, `ip link` -- and those cannot be granted safely
+here. A rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard, and
+`iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
+`NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name.
+Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the rules itself and
+takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
+is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant, and belongs in its own
+change.
+"""
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+INSTALLERS = (
+    ROOT / "first_time_install.sh",
+    ROOT / "scripts" / "install" / "configure_wifi_permissions.sh",
+)
+
+#: Commands this change grants, each fully literal in the source.
+REQUIRED = (
+    ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=0"),
+    ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=1"),
+    ("nft", "add", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
+    ("nft", "delete", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
+    ("rfkill", "unblock", "wifi"),
+    ("mkdir", "-p", "/etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d"),
+)
+
+#: Tools with an option that executes a program of the caller's choosing.
+#: A trailing wildcard on any of these is a privilege escalation.
+EXEC_CAPABLE = ("iptables", "ip6tables", "nft", "tcpdump", "find", "awk",
+                "sed", "perl", "python", "python3", "env")
+
+
+def _grant_lines():
+    lines = []
+    for installer in INSTALLERS:
+        if not installer.is_file():
+            continue
+        for line in installer.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines():
+            if "NOPASSWD:" in line:
+                lines.append(line.split("NOPASSWD:", 1)[1])
+    return lines
+
+
+def _normalised_grants():
+    """Grants with binary-path variables reduced to tool names.
+
+    Rules are written as `$SYSCTL_PATH -w ...`, so matching the literal
+    "sysctl" finds nothing and every rule looks absent -- which is exactly how
+    an earlier version of this test reported six gaps that did not exist.
+    Only NOPASSWD lines are considered, because taking the whole script let a
+    variable definition such as NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft) satisfy the check on
+    its own while the grant itself had been deleted.
+    """
+    text = "\n".join(_grant_lines())
+    text = re.sub(r"\$\{?([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)_PATH\}?", lambda m: m.group(1).lower(), text)
+    return re.sub(r"/usr/(?:s?bin)/", "", text)
+
+
+def test_the_installers_are_present():
+    missing = [str(p.relative_to(ROOT)) for p in INSTALLERS if not p.is_file()]
+    assert not missing, f"installer(s) missing: {missing}"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", REQUIRED, ids=lambda c: " ".join(c))
+def test_the_command_is_granted(command):
+    """Whole command, not just the binary.
+
+    Checking only the binary made this far weaker than it looked: with
+    `sysctl` present anywhere, deleting the ip_forward=0 grant still passed,
+    and the portal would then be unable to restore forwarding on teardown.
+    """
+    pattern = r"\s+".join(re.escape(word) for word in command)
+    assert re.search(pattern, _normalised_grants()), (
+        f"no installer grants `{' '.join(command)}`")
+
+
+def test_no_wildcard_on_a_tool_that_can_exec():
+    """`NOPASSWD: iptables *` hands the web user root.
+
+    iptables --modprobe=/path runs that path as root. This caught a grant added
+    in this very change, which is why it is here.
+    """
+    offenders = []
+    for rule in _grant_lines():
+        rule = rule.strip()
+        if not rule.endswith("*"):
+            continue
+        haystack = rule.replace("_PATH", "").lower()
+        for tool in EXEC_CAPABLE:
+            if re.search(rf"(^|/|\s|\$){tool}(\s|$)", haystack):
+                offenders.append(rule)
+                break
+    assert not offenders, (
+        "wildcard grant on a tool that can execute another program:\n  "
+        + "\n  ".join(offenders))