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ChuckBuilds 61d3e3d552 fix(install): drop the iptables wildcard, and pin each grant properly
Review follow-up. Two findings, both right, and the first is a hole I opened
myself.

`NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name.
`iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so a wildcard
grant on iptables escalates rather than restricts. I added that rule while
fixing a permissions gap, which is a worse outcome than the gap. It is gone,
and a test now fails on any trailing-wildcard grant to a tool that can execute
another program -- iptables, nft, tcpdump, find, awk, sed, perl, python, env.

The other finding: checking only the binary made the coverage test far weaker
than it looked. With `sysctl` present anywhere in the allow-list, deleting the
`net.ipv4.ip_forward=0` grant still passed -- and the portal would then be
unable to restore forwarding on teardown. Each required command is now matched
in full, and each is mutation-checked individually, including that exact
single-line case.

Scope pulled in deliberately. The first version of this test tried to assert
that *every* sudo call in the codebase is granted. Run honestly, it showed the
portal also runs iptables, nft, `ip addr`, `ip link` and `cp` with arguments
built at runtime -- an interface name, a port. Those cannot be granted safely
in a sudoers file: the rule needs a trailing wildcard, and that is the
escalation above. Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the
rules itself and takes only an interface and a port, granted the way
safe_plugin_rm.sh already is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant,
so the test now pins the four commands this change actually grants and the
docstring says plainly what it does not cover.

Better a narrow test that is true than a broad one that is not.

(cherry picked from commit 500cfbc9f4)
2026-08-20 03:54:09 -04:00
ChuckBuilds 324a4e43b1 fix(install): grant the sudo commands the captive portal actually runs
The installers write two allow-lists, /etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_web and
ledmatrix_wifi. Anything the code runs under sudo that is not in one of them
needs a password, which a service cannot supply, so the call fails.

Five commands were being run and none of them granted:

    sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0|1     wifi_manager.py:788, 883
    nft add|delete table ip ledmatrix     wifi_manager.py:835, 895
    rfkill unblock wifi                   wifi_manager.py:1811
    iptables ...                          wifi_manager.py:796, 813, 818, 871
    mkdir -p .../dnsmasq-shared.d         wifi_manager.py:922

Together these are the captive portal: unblock the radio, bring up the AP,
add the redirect, turn on forwarding, and undo all of it afterwards. Without
the grants a hardened install would associate clients to the access point and
then fail to route them.

Why it has gone unnoticed: a stock Raspberry Pi image ships
/etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd granting the default user

    <user> ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL

which satisfies every one of these regardless of what the allow-lists say.
Confirmed on a live rig -- `sudo -n -l` permits sysctl there, and the blanket
rule is why. The allow-lists are effectively decorative on a default image and
only start mattering once that rule is removed or the service runs as another
user.

test_sudo_allowlist_covers_calls.py extracts every argv-style sudo call in
src/ and web_interface/ and asserts an installer grants it, so the next command
added without a rule fails here rather than on someone's hardened box.

Getting that test honest took three passes, each worth recording:

- Matching the literal "systemctl" against rules written as
  `$SYSTEMCTL_PATH enable ...` reported six gaps that did not exist. Binary
  path variables are now normalised before comparing.
- Scanning the whole installer let `NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft)` -- a variable
  definition, not a grant -- satisfy the check on its own, so deleting the
  actual nft rules still passed. Only NOPASSWD lines are considered now.
- `sudo -n <tool>` reported "-n" as the binary. sudo's own flags are skipped.

Each of the five grants is individually mutation-checked: removing any one
fails the suite.

(cherry picked from commit a372b43cd1)
2026-08-20 03:54:09 -04:00
ChuckBuilds e1b445268d fix(startup): warn when an installed systemd unit has drifted from the repo's
Nothing re-applies systemd units after the first install. `git pull` -- which
is what the web UI's update button runs -- brings a new template into the
checkout, but no code in web_interface/ or src/ copies it to
/etc/systemd/system, and nothing anywhere runs `systemctl daemon-reload`. The
unit that actually runs is whatever first_time_install.sh wrote on day one.

So every hardening added to a unit is inert on existing installs, silently.
Measured on a live rig:

    installed  /etc/systemd/system/ledmatrix.service   2026-08-06
    template   systemd/ledmatrix.service               2026-08-19
    contents                                           differ

with the practical result that the MemoryMax=85% the repo's template specifies
was not being enforced at all -- `systemctl show` reported
MemoryMax=infinity. Anyone reading the template would reasonably believe the
service was capped.

Startup now compares each installed unit against its substituted template and
warns when they differ, naming install_service.sh as the remedy.

A warning, not an error, and deliberately not a silent rewrite: editing files
under /etc and restarting services is the installer's job, not something a
display process should do to a machine while it is booting. Making it fatal
would also brick every development checkout whose unit is legitimately absent
or hand-edited.

Comparison ignores comments, blank lines and ordering. The template carries
explanatory comments the installed copy will not have, and systemd does not
care about order within a section, so a literal comparison would warn on every
boot and be ignored within a week.

Mutation-checked three ways: never reporting drift fails, making it fatal
fails, and -- after the first attempt missed it -- comparing raw text now fails
too. That last gap is worth noting: the comment-insensitivity tests originally
exercised the helper directly, so a comparison that stopped calling the helper
passed them all. The test that catches it goes through _validate_systemd_units.

29 startup-validator tests pass.

(cherry picked from commit cf521bdfd8)
2026-08-20 03:54:09 -04:00
ChuckBuilds f7046f8141 test(systemd): pin the arena value instead of accepting a range
Review follow-up. The range check accepted 1, 3 and 4, so a change to 4 --
which hands most of the resident saving back -- passed a test whose whole
purpose is to notice that.

Pinned to the value the unit ships, in one named constant. Raising it is still
a legitimate response to a frame-time regression, but it should be a visible
edit here rather than silent drift, and the failure message says so.

Mutation-checked: changing the unit to 4 now fails.
(cherry picked from commit 73fff8d2d5)
2026-08-20 03:54:09 -04:00
ChuckBuilds 9a759ee299 perf(systemd): cap glibc malloc arenas on the display service
Measured on a live rig 2.5 hours after start:

    RSS                          1030 MB
    Private_Dirty                 988 MB
    anonymous mappings > 10 MB       23
    largest        104, 79, 66, 63, 63 MB, on 64 MB-aligned addresses
    threads                           9
    cores                             3   -> glibc ceiling = 8 x 3 = 24 arenas

23 against a ceiling of 24, all 64 MB-aligned: these are glibc's per-thread
malloc arenas, not live objects. The data the process was actually holding
accounts for perhaps 15 MB -- the widest scroll strip observed was 35,746 x 64,
about 7 MB as RGB and the same again for its numpy mirror.

It is bloat rather than a leak: sampled four times over 135 seconds, RSS sat
between 990 and 1030 MB rather than climbing. glibc gives each allocating
thread its own arena, grows them to hold peak demand, and never gives them
back. A process that builds and drops large images across several threads is
exactly the shape that produces this.

The device had 59 MB free at the time, on 1845 MB total.

MALLOC_ARENA_MAX=2 trades a little allocator concurrency for that resident
memory. It is a tuning knob rather than a fix for a defect, so the rationale
and the measurements sit next to it in the unit file, and a test asserts they
stay there -- a bare environment variable invites removal by whoever meets it
next.

Two things this is NOT, both checked rather than assumed:

- Not an OOM problem today. A grep for "oom" in the service journal returned
  24 matches, all of which were the radar logging zoom=9 and zoom=7. The kernel
  OOM killer has not fired: dmesg has zero matches.
- Not currently capped by the unit's MemoryMax=85% either. That directive is in
  this file but absent from the unit actually installed on the rig, which
  reports MemoryMax=infinity, so nothing is enforcing a ceiling there.

The saving is unmeasured on hardware: applying it needs a service restart,
which blanks the panel, so that is the user's call rather than something to do
mid-audit. If p99 frame time regresses -- it sits at 18.4 ms against a 16.7 ms
budget for 60 FPS, so there is not much headroom -- raise the value rather than
remove it.

(cherry picked from commit 446207ffbc)
2026-08-20 03:54:09 -04:00
23 changed files with 500 additions and 686 deletions
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@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ echo " systemctl: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH"
echo ""
echo "Step 1: Configuring sudo permissions for nmcli..."
SUDOERS_FILE="/etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_wifi"
SYSCTL_PATH=$(command -v sysctl || echo /usr/sbin/sysctl)
NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft || echo /usr/sbin/nft)
RFKILL_PATH=$(command -v rfkill || echo /usr/sbin/rfkill)
MKDIR_PATH=$(command -v mkdir || echo /usr/bin/mkdir)
# Create a temporary sudoers file using mktemp (handles permissions better)
TEMP_SUDOERS=$(mktemp) || {
@@ -62,6 +66,36 @@ $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH start dnsmasq
$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH stop dnsmasq
$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH restart dnsmasq
$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH restart NetworkManager
# The captive portal turns IP forwarding on while the access point is up and
# restores the previous value when it comes down (wifi_manager._setup_iptables_
# redirect / _teardown_iptables_redirect). Without this rule that sudo call
# needs a password, so forwarding stays off and clients associate to the AP but
# cannot route. It goes unnoticed on a stock Raspberry Pi image, where
# /etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd grants the default user blanket NOPASSWD and
# masks every gap in this file -- it only bites once that blanket rule is
# removed.
$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSCTL_PATH -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSCTL_PATH -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
# The portal's redirect lives in its own nftables table, created when the AP
# comes up and deleted when it goes down, and the radio has to be unblocked
# before the AP can start at all. Same story as the sysctl rules above: called
# with sudo, never granted here, and invisible on a stock Pi image.
$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $NFT_PATH add table ip ledmatrix
$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $NFT_PATH delete table ip ledmatrix
$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $RFKILL_PATH unblock wifi
# NetworkManager's dnsmasq drop-in directory, exact path.
$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $MKDIR_PATH -p /etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d
#
# iptables is deliberately NOT granted here. Its rules are built from the live
# interface name and port, so a rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard --
# and `iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
# `NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name. That
# is a worse outcome than the gap it would close, which today is masked anyway
# by the blanket NOPASSWD rule on stock Pi images.
#
# Closing it safely means a wrapper script that builds the rules itself and
# takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
# is. That belongs in its own change rather than being smuggled into this one.
# Allow copying hostapd and dnsmasq config files into place
$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cp /tmp/hostapd.conf /etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf
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+68
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@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ class StartupValidator:
# Validate plugins if plugin manager is available
if self.plugin_manager:
self._validate_plugins()
# Warn when the running systemd unit no longer matches the repo's
self._validate_systemd_units()
is_valid = len(self.errors) == 0
@@ -74,6 +77,71 @@ class StartupValidator:
return (is_valid, self.errors.copy(), self.warnings.copy())
#: Units this project installs, and where each is installed to.
_UNITS = (
("systemd/ledmatrix.service", "/etc/systemd/system/ledmatrix.service"),
("systemd/ledmatrix-web.service", "/etc/systemd/system/ledmatrix-web.service"),
)
def _validate_systemd_units(self) -> None:
"""Warn when an installed unit has drifted from the repo's template.
Nothing re-applies these after the first install. `git pull` -- which is
what the web UI's update button runs -- brings a new template into the
checkout, but nothing copies it to /etc/systemd/system and nothing runs
`systemctl daemon-reload`, so the unit that actually runs is whatever
first_time_install.sh wrote on day one.
That makes every hardening added to a unit inert on existing installs.
Measured on one rig: the installed unit was thirteen days older than the
repo's and differed in content, so a MemoryMax the repo had specified
was not being enforced at all -- `systemctl show` reported
MemoryMax=infinity.
A warning rather than an error, and certainly not a silent rewrite:
editing files under /etc and restarting services is the installer's job,
not something a display process should do to a machine while it boots.
The remedy is to re-run scripts/install/install_service.sh.
"""
try:
project_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
for template_rel, installed_path in self._UNITS:
template = project_root / template_rel
installed = Path(installed_path)
if not template.is_file() or not installed.is_file():
continue
# The template carries placeholders the installer substitutes,
# so compare the substituted form rather than the raw file.
expected = template.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
expected = expected.replace("__PROJECT_ROOT_DIR__", str(project_root))
expected = expected.replace("__USER__", "root")
try:
actual = installed.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
except PermissionError:
continue
if self._unit_body(expected) != self._unit_body(actual):
self.warnings.append(
f"{installed.name} differs from {template_rel}; the "
"installed unit is not refreshed by an update, so "
"settings added to the template are not in effect. "
"Re-run scripts/install/install_service.sh to apply them."
)
except OSError as e:
self.logger.debug("Could not compare systemd units: %s", e)
@staticmethod
def _unit_body(text: str) -> str:
"""A unit's meaningful lines: no comments, no blanks, no ordering noise."""
lines = []
for line in text.splitlines():
line = line.strip()
if line and not line.startswith("#"):
lines.append(line)
return "\n".join(sorted(lines))
def _validate_config(self) -> None:
"""Validate configuration files."""
try:
+1 -34
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@@ -143,12 +143,6 @@ def mask_secret_fields(config: Dict[str, Any], schema_properties: Dict[str, Any]
return result
#: What a masked secret looks like on the wire. Named because the write path
#: has to recognise it coming back: a client that renders the mask and posts
#: it unchanged must not store the mask as if it were the secret.
SECRET_MASK = '\u2022' * 8
def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Blanket-mask every non-empty value in a secrets config dict.
@@ -167,7 +161,7 @@ def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if isinstance(v, dict):
masked[k] = mask_all_secret_values(v)
elif v not in (None, '') and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith('YOUR_')):
masked[k] = SECRET_MASK
masked[k] = '••••••••'
else:
masked[k] = v
return masked
@@ -195,30 +189,3 @@ def remove_empty_secrets(secrets: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
elif v is not None and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.strip() == ''):
result[k] = v
return result
def strip_masked_values(secrets: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Remove values a client echoed back rather than changed.
The counterpart to :func:`mask_all_secret_values`. A client that GETs the
masked secrets, edits one field and POSTs the whole object back is sending
``SECRET_MASK`` for every field it did not touch. Storing those would
replace each untouched credential with eight bullet characters.
Drops the mask and, like :func:`remove_empty_secrets`, blank values -- so
the caller can merge the result onto what is already stored and have
"unchanged" mean unchanged. Empty nested dicts are pruned.
"""
result: Dict[str, Any] = {}
for k, v in secrets.items():
if isinstance(v, dict):
nested = strip_masked_values(v)
if nested:
result[k] = nested
elif v is None:
continue
elif isinstance(v, str) and (v.strip() == '' or v == SECRET_MASK):
continue
else:
result[k] = v
return result
Executable → Regular
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+12
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@@ -8,6 +8,18 @@ Type=simple
User=root
WorkingDirectory=__PROJECT_ROOT_DIR__
Environment=PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
# glibc gives each allocating thread its own malloc arena, up to 8 x CPU count,
# and an arena that has grown is never handed back to the OS. This process runs
# 9 threads on a 3-core Pi, so the ceiling is 24 arenas -- and a rig measured at
# 1030 MB resident held 23 large anonymous mappings on 64 MB-aligned addresses,
# 920 MB of them, while the live data it was actually holding (widest scroll
# strip seen: 35,746 x 64) accounts for roughly 15 MB. That gap is arena bloat,
# not leaked objects: RSS was flat across repeated sampling, not climbing.
#
# Capping the arenas trades a little allocator concurrency for a large amount of
# resident memory on a device that has neither to spare. 2 is the usual value;
# raise it if frame times regress.
Environment=MALLOC_ARENA_MAX=2
ExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 __PROJECT_ROOT_DIR__/run.py
# Restart=always, not on-failure: run.py exiting 0 (a clean shutdown path taken
# for a reason that no longer applies, e.g. a config reload) would otherwise leave
-143
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@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
"""GET /config/main must not hand out credentials.
The endpoint returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port, and
this web interface has no authentication of any kind. Measured against a live
rig, an unauthenticated request returned:
github.api_token 40 chars
incoming-packages.ha_token 183 chars
jellyfin-now-playing.api_key 32 chars
ledmatrix-weather.api_key 32 chars
on-air.mqtt_password 8 chars
youtube.api_key 20 chars
youtube-stats.api_key 39 chars
A GitHub token and a Home Assistant long-lived token among them.
The x-secret masking the plugin config endpoints use does not apply here: this
endpoint never consults a schema, and core keys such as github.api_token have
no schema to carry the marker. Several of those fields *are* tagged x-secret in
their plugin's schema and were still returned in full, which is what makes the
schema route the wrong one to rely on for this endpoint.
Matching on field name is blunt. For a whole-config dump it is the right
default: anything named like a credential should not leave the process, and a
new plugin that adds a differently-shaped secret is covered without anyone
remembering to tag it.
"""
import pytest
from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import (
_looks_like_a_credential,
_redact_credentials,
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
"password", "mqtt_password", "opensky_password", "passwd",
"api_key", "apikey", "API_KEY", "flightaware_api_key",
"token", "ha_token", "api_token", "access_token",
"secret", "client_secret", "spotify_client_secret",
"access_key", "private_key",
])
def test_credential_names_are_recognised(name):
assert _looks_like_a_credential(name)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
"timezone", "city", "brightness", "enabled", "update_interval",
"favorite_teams", "display_duration", "keyword",
])
def test_ordinary_names_are_left_alone(name):
assert not _looks_like_a_credential(name)
def test_the_measured_leak_is_closed():
"""The exact shape taken off the rig."""
config = {
"github": {"api_token": "ghp_" + "x" * 36},
"incoming-packages": {"ha_token": "y" * 183, "enabled": True},
"jellyfin-now-playing": {"api_key": "z" * 32},
"on-air": {"mqtt_password": "hunter22"},
"youtube": {"api_key": "k" * 20},
"timezone": "America/New_York",
}
out = _redact_credentials(config)
assert out["github"]["api_token"] == ""
assert out["incoming-packages"]["ha_token"] == ""
assert out["jellyfin-now-playing"]["api_key"] == ""
assert out["on-air"]["mqtt_password"] == ""
assert out["youtube"]["api_key"] == ""
# Everything else survives, or the config editor breaks.
assert out["timezone"] == "America/New_York"
assert out["incoming-packages"]["enabled"] is True
def test_nested_and_listed_credentials_are_reached():
config = {"a": {"b": {"c": {"password": "p"}}},
"feeds": [{"name": "x", "api_key": "k"}, {"name": "y"}]}
out = _redact_credentials(config)
assert out["a"]["b"]["c"]["password"] == ""
assert out["feeds"][0]["api_key"] == ""
assert out["feeds"][0]["name"] == "x"
def test_the_original_is_not_mutated():
"""The caller holds the live config; redaction must not edit it in place."""
config = {"github": {"api_token": "keepme"}}
_redact_credentials(config)
assert config["github"]["api_token"] == "keepme"
def test_a_credential_shaped_container_is_still_walked():
"""`secrets: {...}` is a section name, not a value to blank."""
config = {"secrets": {"api_key": "k", "note": "keep"}}
out = _redact_credentials(config)
assert out["secrets"]["api_key"] == ""
assert out["secrets"]["note"] == "keep"
def test_non_dict_input_passes_through():
assert _redact_credentials("plain") == "plain"
assert _redact_credentials(7) == 7
assert _redact_credentials(None) is None
def test_the_endpoint_itself_redacts():
"""Through the view function, not the helper.
The helper tests above all passed with the route still returning
`config` -- reverting the one line that calls the redactor changed
nothing, because nothing exercised the route. A property asserted on a
helper is not a property asserted on the endpoint, and it is the endpoint
that is exposed to the network.
"""
import json as _json
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import flask
from web_interface.blueprints import api_v3 as mod
raw = {"github": {"api_token": "ghp_secret_value"},
"timezone": "America/New_York"}
manager = MagicMock()
manager.load_config.return_value = raw
previous = getattr(mod.api_v3, "config_manager", None)
mod.api_v3.config_manager = manager
app = flask.Flask(__name__)
try:
with app.test_request_context("/config/main"):
response = mod.get_main_config()
payload = response.get_json() if hasattr(response, "get_json") else _json.loads(response[0].data)
finally:
mod.api_v3.config_manager = previous
data = payload["data"]
assert data["github"]["api_token"] == "", (
"the endpoint returned the token; the redactor is not wired in")
assert data["timezone"] == "America/New_York"
# And the config the manager handed over is untouched.
assert raw["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_secret_value"
+3 -37
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@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ def repos(tmp_path):
def test_branch_with_upstream_uses_a_plain_pull(repos):
args, note, error = resolve_pull_command(str(repos))
assert error is None
assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', '--autostash']
assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase']
assert note == ''
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ def test_branch_without_upstream_falls_back_to_origin_branch(repos):
args, note, error = resolve_pull_command(str(repos))
assert error is None
assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', '--autostash', 'origin', 'audit']
assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', 'origin', 'audit']
assert 'audit' in note
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ def test_switching_attaches_tracking_so_pull_needs_no_fallback(repos):
args, note, error = resolve_pull_command(str(repos))
assert error is None
assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', '--autostash']
assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase']
assert note == ''
@@ -200,37 +200,3 @@ def test_stash_option_lets_the_switch_through_and_keeps_the_work(repos):
assert _git('branch', '--show-current', cwd=repos).stdout.strip() == 'other'
# The edit is not lost — it is on the stash.
assert 'switch to other' in _git('stash', 'list', cwd=repos).stdout
class TestInstallerDoesNotBlockTheUpdateButton:
"""first_time_install.sh chmods scripts that git tracked as 644.
With core.fileMode true -- the default on Linux -- that leaves five
permanently modified tracked files on every machine that ran the
installer, and `git pull --rebase` refuses to start:
error: cannot pull with rebase: You have unstaged changes.
Tracking them as executable makes the installer's chmod a no-op.
"""
CHMODDED = [
'first_time_install.sh',
'start_display.sh',
'stop_display.sh',
'scripts/install/install_service.sh',
'scripts/install/install_web_service.sh',
]
def test_scripts_the_installer_chmods_are_tracked_executable(self):
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
root = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
out = subprocess.run(['git', 'ls-files', '-s', *self.CHMODDED],
capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=str(root)).stdout
modes = {line.split()[3]: line.split()[0] for line in out.strip().split('\n') if line}
non_exec = sorted(f for f, m in modes.items() if m != '100755')
assert not non_exec, (
f"{non_exec} are chmodded by the installer but tracked non-executable, "
"so every install leaves the working tree dirty and the update "
"button cannot pull")
+120
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@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
"""The captive portal's fixed-argument sudo calls must be granted.
The installers write two allow-lists, /etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_web and
ledmatrix_wifi. A sudo call absent from both needs a password, which a service
cannot supply, so it fails.
Four such calls were ungranted, all of them captive-portal teardown/setup:
sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0|1 wifi_manager.py:788, 883
nft add|delete table ip ledmatrix wifi_manager.py:835, 895
rfkill unblock wifi wifi_manager.py:1811
mkdir -p .../dnsmasq-shared.d wifi_manager.py:922
It goes unnoticed because a stock Raspberry Pi image ships
/etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd granting the default user
`ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL`, which satisfies every gap in both files. It only
bites once that blanket rule is removed or the service runs as another user.
Scope, deliberately narrow: this pins the four commands above, each of which
can be written out literally. The portal makes further sudo calls whose
arguments are built at runtime -- iptables and nft rules carrying an interface
name and a port, `ip addr`, `ip link` -- and those cannot be granted safely
here. A rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard, and
`iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
`NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name.
Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the rules itself and
takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant, and belongs in its own
change.
"""
import re
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
INSTALLERS = (
ROOT / "first_time_install.sh",
ROOT / "scripts" / "install" / "configure_wifi_permissions.sh",
)
#: Commands this change grants, each fully literal in the source.
REQUIRED = (
("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=0"),
("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=1"),
("nft", "add", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
("nft", "delete", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
("rfkill", "unblock", "wifi"),
("mkdir", "-p", "/etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d"),
)
#: Tools with an option that executes a program of the caller's choosing.
#: A trailing wildcard on any of these is a privilege escalation.
EXEC_CAPABLE = ("iptables", "ip6tables", "nft", "tcpdump", "find", "awk",
"sed", "perl", "python", "python3", "env")
def _grant_lines():
lines = []
for installer in INSTALLERS:
if not installer.is_file():
continue
for line in installer.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines():
if "NOPASSWD:" in line:
lines.append(line.split("NOPASSWD:", 1)[1])
return lines
def _normalised_grants():
"""Grants with binary-path variables reduced to tool names.
Rules are written as `$SYSCTL_PATH -w ...`, so matching the literal
"sysctl" finds nothing and every rule looks absent -- which is exactly how
an earlier version of this test reported six gaps that did not exist.
Only NOPASSWD lines are considered, because taking the whole script let a
variable definition such as NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft) satisfy the check on
its own while the grant itself had been deleted.
"""
text = "\n".join(_grant_lines())
text = re.sub(r"\$\{?([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)_PATH\}?", lambda m: m.group(1).lower(), text)
return re.sub(r"/usr/(?:s?bin)/", "", text)
def test_the_installers_are_present():
missing = [str(p.relative_to(ROOT)) for p in INSTALLERS if not p.is_file()]
assert not missing, f"installer(s) missing: {missing}"
@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", REQUIRED, ids=lambda c: " ".join(c))
def test_the_command_is_granted(command):
"""Whole command, not just the binary.
Checking only the binary made this far weaker than it looked: with
`sysctl` present anywhere, deleting the ip_forward=0 grant still passed,
and the portal would then be unable to restore forwarding on teardown.
"""
pattern = r"\s+".join(re.escape(word) for word in command)
assert re.search(pattern, _normalised_grants()), (
f"no installer grants `{' '.join(command)}`")
def test_no_wildcard_on_a_tool_that_can_exec():
"""`NOPASSWD: iptables *` hands the web user root.
iptables --modprobe=/path runs that path as root. This caught a grant added
in this very change, which is why it is here.
"""
offenders = []
for rule in _grant_lines():
rule = rule.strip()
if not rule.endswith("*"):
continue
haystack = rule.replace("_PATH", "").lower()
for tool in EXEC_CAPABLE:
if re.search(rf"(^|/|\s|\$){tool}(\s|$)", haystack):
offenders.append(rule)
break
assert not offenders, (
"wildcard grant on a tool that can execute another program:\n "
+ "\n ".join(offenders))
+95
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"""The display unit must cap glibc's malloc arenas.
glibc hands each allocating thread its own malloc arena, up to 8 x CPU count,
and an arena that has grown is never returned to the OS. This process runs
threads for the render loop, the update workers and the background fetchers, so
on a 3-core Pi the ceiling is 24 arenas.
Measured on a live rig, 2.5 hours in:
RSS 1030 MB
Private_Dirty 988 MB
anonymous mappings > 10 MB 23 (ceiling is 8 x 3 = 24)
largest few 104, 79, 66, 63, 63 MB, on 64 MB-aligned addresses
against live data that accounts for perhaps 15 MB -- the widest scroll strip
observed was 35,746 x 64, about 7 MB as RGB and the same again for its numpy
mirror. Repeated sampling showed RSS flat between 990 and 1030 MB rather than
climbing, so this is arena bloat rather than a leak: memory Python has freed
but glibc is holding per-arena.
The device had 59 MB free at the time.
Capping the arena count trades a little allocator concurrency for that resident
memory. The render loop is latency-sensitive, so if p99 frame time regresses the
right response is to raise this rather than remove it.
"""
import re
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
UNIT = (Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent / "systemd" / "ledmatrix.service")
#: The value the unit is expected to carry. 2 is the usual choice for a
#: threaded Python process; 1-4 all keep some of the saving, but only one of
#: them is what this project ships.
EXPECTED_ARENA_MAX = 2
def _environment(unit_text):
return dict(
line.split("=", 2)[1:3] if line.count("=") >= 2 else (line.split("=", 1)[1], "")
for line in unit_text.splitlines()
if line.startswith("Environment=")
)
def test_the_unit_exists():
assert UNIT.is_file(), f"{UNIT} is missing"
def test_malloc_arena_max_is_capped():
env = _environment(UNIT.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
assert "MALLOC_ARENA_MAX" in env, (
"the display unit does not cap glibc arenas; on a 3-core Pi the default "
"ceiling is 24 and a measured rig held 23 of them, 920 MB"
)
value = int(env["MALLOC_ARENA_MAX"])
# Pinned, not a range. A range let a change to 4 -- which hands most of the
# saving back -- pass unnoticed, which was the point of the finding that
# prompted this. Raising it is a legitimate response to a frame-time
# regression, but it should be a visible edit here rather than a silent
# drift, so the number lives in one place and changing it shows up in
# review.
assert value == EXPECTED_ARENA_MAX, (
f"MALLOC_ARENA_MAX={value}, expected {EXPECTED_ARENA_MAX}. If this was "
"raised deliberately because frame times regressed, update "
"EXPECTED_ARENA_MAX here and say so in the commit."
)
def test_the_reason_is_recorded_next_to_it():
"""A bare tuning knob invites removal by whoever meets it next."""
text = UNIT.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
index = text.index("Environment=MALLOC_ARENA_MAX")
preamble = text[:index].splitlines()[-12:]
comment = "\n".join(line for line in preamble if line.startswith("#"))
assert "arena" in comment.lower(), "no explanation precedes the setting"
assert re.search(r"\d", comment), (
"the explanation cites no measurement, so a reader cannot tell whether "
"it still applies to their hardware"
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("unit", ["ledmatrix.service"])
def test_the_unit_still_parses_as_ini(unit):
"""systemd will refuse a malformed unit, and the panel stays dark."""
import configparser
path = UNIT.parent / unit
parser = configparser.ConfigParser(strict=False)
# systemd allows repeated keys; ConfigParser needs them merged, not rejected.
parser.read_string(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
assert parser.has_section("Service")
assert parser.has_option("Service", "ExecStart")
+133
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@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
"""An installed unit that no longer matches the repo's must be reported.
Nothing re-applies systemd units after the first install. `git pull` -- what
the web UI's update button runs -- brings a new template into the checkout, but
no code in web_interface/ or src/ copies it to /etc/systemd/system or runs
`systemctl daemon-reload`. The unit that actually runs is whatever
first_time_install.sh wrote on day one.
So every hardening added to a unit is inert on existing installs. Measured on a
live rig: the installed unit was dated 2026-08-06 and the repo's 2026-08-19,
and they differed -- with the result that a MemoryMax=85% present in the repo's
template was not being enforced at all. `systemctl show` reported
MemoryMax=infinity.
This is a warning, not an error, and deliberately not a silent rewrite:
editing files under /etc and restarting services is the installer's job, not
something a display process should do to a machine while it boots.
"""
import logging
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import pytest
from src.startup_validator import StartupValidator
@pytest.fixture
def validator():
v = StartupValidator(config_manager=MagicMock())
v.logger = logging.getLogger("test")
v.warnings = []
v.errors = []
return v
def test_a_matching_unit_produces_no_warning(validator, tmp_path):
"""The installed unit, substituted exactly as the installer would."""
project_root = Path("src/startup_validator.py").resolve().parent.parent
template_rel = "systemd/ledmatrix.service"
template = project_root / template_rel
if not template.is_file():
pytest.skip("repo unit template not present")
installed = tmp_path / "ledmatrix.service"
installed.write_text(
template.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
.replace("__PROJECT_ROOT_DIR__", str(project_root))
.replace("__USER__", "root"),
encoding="utf-8")
validator._UNITS = ((template_rel, str(installed)),)
validator._validate_systemd_units()
assert not validator.warnings, f"a matching unit warned: {validator.warnings}"
assert not validator.errors
def test_comments_and_blank_lines_are_not_drift():
"""Otherwise every comment the repo adds would look like a changed unit."""
a = "[Service]\n# explains a setting\nExecStart=/x\nRestart=always\n"
b = "[Service]\nExecStart=/x\n\nRestart=always\n"
assert StartupValidator._unit_body(a) == StartupValidator._unit_body(b)
def test_a_changed_directive_is_drift():
a = "[Service]\nExecStart=/x\nMemoryMax=85%\n"
b = "[Service]\nExecStart=/x\n"
assert StartupValidator._unit_body(a) != StartupValidator._unit_body(b)
def test_reordered_directives_are_not_drift():
"""systemd does not care about order within a section, so neither should this."""
a = "[Service]\nExecStart=/x\nRestart=always\n"
b = "[Service]\nRestart=always\nExecStart=/x\n"
assert StartupValidator._unit_body(a) == StartupValidator._unit_body(b)
def test_cosmetic_differences_do_not_warn(validator, tmp_path):
"""Through the real comparison, not the helper.
The repo's template carries explanatory comments the installed copy may not
have, and the installer does not preserve ordering or blank lines. If those
counted as drift, every boot would warn and the warning would be ignored.
Asserting this on _unit_body alone would not catch a comparison that stopped
calling it -- which is exactly what a careless edit does.
"""
project_root = Path("src/startup_validator.py").resolve().parent.parent
template_rel = "systemd/ledmatrix.service"
template = project_root / template_rel
if not template.is_file():
pytest.skip("repo unit template not present")
substituted = (template.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
.replace("__PROJECT_ROOT_DIR__", str(project_root))
.replace("__USER__", "root"))
# Same directives, stripped of comments and blank lines and reordered.
directives = sorted(line.strip() for line in substituted.splitlines()
if line.strip() and not line.strip().startswith("#"))
installed = tmp_path / "ledmatrix.service"
installed.write_text("\n".join(reversed(directives)) + "\n", encoding="utf-8")
validator._UNITS = ((template_rel, str(installed)),)
validator._validate_systemd_units()
assert not validator.warnings, (
f"cosmetic-only difference reported as drift: {validator.warnings}")
def test_drift_is_reported_as_a_warning(validator, tmp_path):
"""The whole point: a real difference must surface, and only as a warning."""
installed = tmp_path / "ledmatrix.service"
installed.write_text("[Service]\nExecStart=/usr/bin/python3 /x/run.py\n")
project_root = Path("src/startup_validator.py").resolve().parent.parent
template_rel = "systemd/ledmatrix.service"
template = project_root / template_rel
if not template.is_file():
pytest.skip("repo unit template not present")
validator._UNITS = ((template_rel, str(installed)),)
validator._validate_systemd_units()
assert validator.warnings, "a differing unit produced no warning"
assert "install_service.sh" in validator.warnings[0], (
"the warning does not tell the user how to fix it")
assert not validator.errors, "drift must not be fatal at startup"
def test_a_missing_installed_unit_is_silent(validator, tmp_path):
"""Development checkouts have no /etc/systemd unit; that is not drift."""
validator._UNITS = (("systemd/ledmatrix.service", str(tmp_path / "absent.service")),)
validator._validate_systemd_units()
assert not validator.warnings
assert not validator.errors
-85
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@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
"""A check that could not run must not be reported as "up to date".
check-update returned update_available=False whenever git failed. The banner
is the only route to the update button, so a checkout git refuses to touch
looked exactly like a current one -- permanently, and with nothing for the
user to act on. The usual cause is an install performed as root, after which
every git command fails with "detected dubious ownership".
"""
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
import pytest
from flask import Flask
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from web_interface.blueprints import api_v3 as mod # noqa: E402
from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import api_v3 # noqa: E402
DUBIOUS = ("fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at "
"'/home/pi/LEDMatrix'\nTo add an exception for this directory, call:\n"
"\tgit config --global --add safe.directory /home/pi/LEDMatrix\n")
@pytest.fixture
def client():
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config['TESTING'] = True
app.register_blueprint(api_v3, url_prefix='/api/v3')
mod._update_check_cache['result'] = None
mod._update_check_cache['ts'] = 0
return app.test_client()
def _fetch_fails(stderr: bytes):
def fake_run(args, **kwargs):
if args[:2] == ['git', 'fetch']:
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 1, stdout=b'', stderr=stderr)
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout='', stderr='')
return fake_run
class TestFailedCheckIsNotSilence:
def test_dubious_ownership_is_reported_not_swallowed(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', _fetch_fails(DUBIOUS.encode())):
data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
assert data['check_failed'] is True, (
"a git failure was reported as a successful 'no update' check")
assert data['update_available'] is False
def test_the_message_tells_the_user_what_to_do(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', _fetch_fails(DUBIOUS.encode())):
data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
assert 'chown' in data['error'], (
"dubious ownership is unactionable without the fix command")
assert 'root' in data['error']
def test_an_ordinary_git_failure_still_surfaces(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run',
_fetch_fails(b'fatal: some other git problem\n')):
data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
assert data['check_failed'] is True
assert 'some other git problem' in data['error']
def test_offline_reads_as_offline(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run',
_fetch_fails(b'fatal: could not resolve host: github.com\n')):
data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
assert 'Could not reach GitHub' in data['error']
class TestSuccessPathUnchanged:
def test_up_to_date_carries_no_failure_flag(self, client):
def fake_run(args, **kwargs):
if args[:2] == ['git', 'fetch']:
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout=b'', stderr=b'')
if args[:2] == ['git', 'rev-parse']:
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout='abc123\n', stderr='')
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout='0\n', stderr='')
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', fake_run):
data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
assert data['update_available'] is False
assert not data.get('check_failed'), "a healthy check must not look like a failure"
-84
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@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
"""A pull that changed nothing on the running system is not an applied update.
git_pull replaces files on disk and restarts nothing -- there is no systemctl
call anywhere in the handler. The display and web services keep running the
code they loaded at boot, so the user is told "Code updated successfully" and
sees no change until they happen to reboot. The response now says whether a
restart is owed, and the UI raises the existing restart-pending banner.
"""
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
import pytest
from flask import Flask
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from web_interface.blueprints import api_v3 as mod # noqa: E402
from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import api_v3 # noqa: E402
@pytest.fixture
def client():
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config['TESTING'] = True
app.register_blueprint(api_v3, url_prefix='/api/v3')
# The handler consults these after a successful pull; None is the
# "not wired up" case it already guards for.
api_v3.plugin_store_manager = None
api_v3.config_manager = None
return app.test_client()
def _git(heads, pull_rc=0, pull_out='Updating a1b2c3..d4e5f6\n'):
"""Fake git. `heads` are the successive answers to rev-parse HEAD."""
seq = list(heads)
def run(args, **kwargs):
def ok(stdout='', rc=0, b=False):
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
args, rc, stdout=(stdout.encode() if b else stdout),
stderr=(b'' if b else ''))
if args[:2] == ['git', 'rev-parse'] and args[-1] == 'HEAD':
return ok(seq.pop(0) + '\n' if seq else 'deadbeef\n')
if 'symbolic-full-name' in args or '@{u}' in args:
return ok('origin/main\n')
if args[:2] == ['git', 'status']:
return ok('')
if args[:2] == ['git', 'diff']:
return ok('')
if args[:2] == ['git', 'pull']:
return ok(pull_out, pull_rc)
return ok('')
return run
def _pull(client):
return client.post('/api/v3/system/action',
json={'action': 'git_pull'}).get_json()
class TestRestartIsRequestedWhenCodeChanged:
def test_a_pull_that_moved_head_asks_for_a_restart(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', _git(['aaa111', 'bbb222'])):
data = _pull(client)
assert data['status'] == 'success'
assert data['restart_required'] is True, (
"new code on disk, services still running the old code, and "
"nothing told the user to restart")
def test_already_up_to_date_does_not(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run',
_git(['aaa111', 'aaa111'], pull_out='Already up to date.\n')):
data = _pull(client)
assert data['status'] == 'success'
assert data['restart_required'] is False, (
"prompting after a no-op update trains users to ignore the prompt")
def test_a_failed_pull_does_not(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', _git(['aaa111'], pull_rc=1)):
data = _pull(client)
assert data['status'] == 'error'
assert data['restart_required'] is False
@@ -194,46 +194,15 @@ class TestSavePluginConfig:
def test_secret_count_message_counts_top_level_keys(self, env):
# Pinned: the "(N secret field(s))" message counts TOP-LEVEL keys of
# the separated secrets dict. Here that is 1: the posted accounts
# array, whose item tokens all count as ONE key.
#
# It was 2 before blank secrets were dropped, the second being the
# schema's api_key default (""), which merge_with_defaults adds to
# every save. Counting it was the visible edge of a real bug: that
# injected blank was merged over the stored api_key, so saving any
# unrelated field destroyed the credential. See
# test_an_unrelated_edit_does_not_erase_a_stored_secret.
# the separated secrets dict. Here that is 2: the posted accounts
# array (all its item tokens count as ONE key) plus the schema's
# api_key default ("") that merge_with_defaults adds before
# separation.
resp = self._save(env, {
"accounts": [{"name": "a", "token": "t"}],
})
message = resp.get_json()["message"]
assert "(1 secret field(s) saved to config_secrets.json)" in message
def test_an_unrelated_edit_does_not_erase_a_stored_secret(self, env):
"""Editing one field must not wipe the plugin's API key.
The config form renders secrets masked, so the browser posts them
back blank; merge_with_defaults injects a blank api_key even when
the client omits it entirely. Either way a "" reached the secrets
file and deep_merge wrote it over the stored credential.
"""
assert self._save(env, {"api_key": "REAL-KEY-0123456789",
"city": "Austin"}).status_code == 200
assert _on_disk(env.secrets_file)[PLUGIN_ID]["api_key"] == \
"REAL-KEY-0123456789"
# the user changes the city; the masked api_key rides along blank
assert self._save(env, {"api_key": "", "city": "Dallas"}).status_code == 200
assert _on_disk(env.secrets_file)[PLUGIN_ID]["api_key"] == \
"REAL-KEY-0123456789", "an unrelated edit destroyed the API key"
assert env.fresh_load()[PLUGIN_ID]["city"] == "Dallas"
def test_a_secret_can_still_be_changed(self, env):
"""Dropping blanks must not stop a real new value from being saved."""
self._save(env, {"api_key": "first-key"})
self._save(env, {"api_key": "second-key"})
assert _on_disk(env.secrets_file)[PLUGIN_ID]["api_key"] == "second-key"
assert "(2 secret field(s) saved to config_secrets.json)" in message
def test_resave_replaces_stored_secrets_list_wholesale(self, env):
# Characterized: api_v3's deep_merge intentionally replaces lists,
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
"""GET /config/secrets must not hand out credentials, and the client's
read-modify-write cycle must not destroy them.
This interface has no authentication. The endpoint returned the whole
config_secrets.json to anyone who could reach the port; on one rig that was a
40-character GitHub token, a 183-character Home Assistant token and three API
keys. Masking it alone is not enough: the only client fetches every secret,
edits one field and posts all of them back, so the write path has to treat an
echoed mask as "unchanged".
"""
import json
import sys
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent))
from test_api_v3_secret_roundtrip import env, _on_disk # noqa: F401,E402
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import SECRET_MASK # noqa: E402
STORED = {
"github": {"api_token": "ghp_" + "x" * 36},
"ledmatrix-weather": {"api_key": "w" * 32},
"incoming-packages": {"ha_token": "h" * 183},
"unset-plugin": {"api_key": ""},
"placeholder-plugin": {"api_key": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE"},
}
def _seed(env):
env.secrets_file.write_text(json.dumps(STORED))
def _get(env):
r = env.client.get("/api/v3/config/secrets")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_data(as_text=True)[:200]
return r.get_json()["data"]
def test_no_credential_leaves_the_process(env):
_seed(env)
body = json.dumps(_get(env))
for secret in ("ghp_" + "x" * 36, "w" * 32, "h" * 183):
assert secret not in body, "endpoint returned a stored credential"
def test_set_and_unset_remain_distinguishable(env):
_seed(env)
data = _get(env)
assert data["github"]["api_token"] == SECRET_MASK
assert data["unset-plugin"]["api_key"] == ""
assert data["placeholder-plugin"]["api_key"] == "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE"
def test_the_clients_read_modify_write_preserves_every_other_secret(env):
"""What the GitHub-token save button actually does."""
_seed(env)
secrets = _get(env) # everything arrives masked
secrets["github"]["api_token"] = "ghp_" + "n" * 36 # user changes one
r = env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets", json=secrets)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_data(as_text=True)[:200]
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "n" * 36, "new token not saved"
assert on_disk["ledmatrix-weather"]["api_key"] == "w" * 32
assert on_disk["incoming-packages"]["ha_token"] == "h" * 183
def test_a_mask_echoed_back_is_never_stored(env):
_seed(env)
env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets", json=_get(env))
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert SECRET_MASK not in json.dumps(on_disk), "the mask was stored as a secret"
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "x" * 36
def test_a_brand_new_secret_can_still_be_added(env):
_seed(env)
env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets",
json={"new-plugin": {"api_key": "brand-new"}})
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert on_disk["new-plugin"]["api_key"] == "brand-new"
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "x" * 36
+17 -135
View File
@@ -21,9 +21,7 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Import new infrastructure
from src.web_interface.api_helpers import success_response, error_response, validate_request_json
from src.web_interface.errors import ErrorCode
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import (find_secret_fields, mask_all_secret_values,
remove_empty_secrets, separate_secrets,
strip_masked_values)
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import find_secret_fields, separate_secrets
from src.web_interface.error_handler import describe_exception, redact_text
from src.plugin_system.operation_types import OperationType
from src.web_interface.validators import (
@@ -264,54 +262,15 @@ def _stop_display_service():
result['status'] = status
return result
#: Field names whose value is a credential. Matched by name because this
#: endpoint returns the whole config, core keys included, and core config has
#: no schema to carry x-secret markers.
_CREDENTIAL_NAME_PARTS = ("password", "passwd", "secret", "token", "api_key",
"apikey", "access_key", "private_key", "client_secret")
def _looks_like_a_credential(name: str) -> bool:
lowered = name.lower()
return any(part in lowered for part in _CREDENTIAL_NAME_PARTS)
def _redact_credentials(value):
"""A copy of `value` with credential-named fields blanked.
/config/main returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port,
and this interface has no authentication. On one rig that meant a 40-char
GitHub token, a 183-char Home Assistant token and five API keys were
readable by anything on the LAN.
The x-secret masking used by the plugin config endpoints does not help
here: this endpoint never consults a schema, and core keys such as
github.api_token have no schema to mark. Matching on the field name is
blunt, but for a whole-config dump the right default is that anything
named like a credential does not leave the process.
Blanked rather than removed, and safe to blank: POST /config/main merges
into the loaded config and only writes the keys it was given, so a client
that round-trips this response cannot erase a secret it never saw.
"""
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {k: ("" if _looks_like_a_credential(k) and not isinstance(v, (dict, list))
else _redact_credentials(v))
for k, v in value.items()}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [_redact_credentials(item) for item in value]
return value
@api_v3.route('/config/main', methods=['GET'])
def get_main_config():
"""Get main configuration, with credentials redacted."""
"""Get main configuration"""
try:
if not api_v3.config_manager:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500
config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': _redact_credentials(config)})
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': config})
except Exception as e:
logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True)
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@@ -756,12 +715,10 @@ def save_main_config():
if not data:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'No data provided'}), 400
# What arrives here is the config itself, and the headers carry the
# session cookie -- neither belongs in the journal, least of all at
# ERROR on every save. The shape of the request is the part with
# diagnostic value, so log that, at the level it deserves.
logger.debug("save_main_config: %s, %d top-level key(s)",
request.content_type or 'no content-type', len(data))
import logging
logging.error(f"DEBUG: save_main_config received data: {data}")
logging.error(f"DEBUG: Content-Type header: {request.content_type}")
logging.error(f"DEBUG: Headers: {dict(request.headers)}")
# Merge with existing config (similar to original implementation)
current_config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
@@ -1259,11 +1216,6 @@ def save_main_config():
# Separate secrets from regular config (same logic as save_plugin_config)
regular_config, secrets_config = separate_secrets(plugin_config, secret_fields)
# The config form renders secrets masked, so every save posts
# them back blank. Without this the blank is merged over the
# stored value and the credential is destroyed by the act of
# changing an unrelated setting. A blank means "unchanged".
secrets_config = remove_empty_secrets(secrets_config)
# PRE-PROCESSING: Preserve 'enabled' state if not in regular_config
# This prevents overwriting the enabled state when saving config from a form that doesn't include the toggle
@@ -1381,12 +1333,7 @@ def get_secrets_config():
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500
config = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets')
# This interface has no authentication, and this file is nothing but
# credentials. It was handing all of them to anyone who could reach
# the port. Values are masked; empty and YOUR_* placeholders are left
# alone so a client can still tell "set" from "not set".
return jsonify({'status': 'success',
'data': mask_all_secret_values(config)})
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': config})
except Exception as e:
logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True)
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@@ -1448,19 +1395,8 @@ def save_raw_secrets_config():
if not data:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'No data provided'}), 400
# The GET above masks what it returns, and this endpoint's only client
# reads the whole file, edits one field and posts all of it back. So
# most of what arrives here is the mask, echoed rather than changed --
# storing it verbatim would replace every untouched credential with
# eight bullets. Strip those, then merge onto what is already stored,
# which makes "unchanged" mean unchanged.
#
# The cost is that a secret can no longer be cleared by blanking it.
# That needs its own affordance; a control that erases credentials as
# a side effect of saving an unrelated one is not it.
current = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets') or {}
merged = deep_merge(current, strip_masked_values(data))
api_v3.config_manager.save_raw_file_content('secrets', merged)
# Save the secrets config
api_v3.config_manager.save_raw_file_content('secrets', data)
# Reload GitHub token in plugin store manager if it exists
if api_v3.plugin_store_manager:
@@ -1721,22 +1657,13 @@ def resolve_pull_command(project_dir):
backup, or following an install guide that names one. The update button
then reports a failure the user cannot act on.
``--autostash`` is passed for the same reason. Rebase refuses to start
when any tracked file is modified, and on these installs something always
is: first_time_install.sh chmods five scripts that git tracked as 644, so
every machine that ran the installer carries five permanent mode changes
and the update button reports "cannot pull with rebase: You have unstaged
changes". Those modes are corrected in this commit, but a user cannot pull
the correction while the pull is what is blocked, and any other local edit
would reproduce it anyway. Autostash reapplies the changes afterwards.
Returns ``(args, note, error)``. When ``origin/<branch>`` exists the pull
is made explicit against it, so the update proceeds and the branch is
given tracking information afterwards.
"""
upstream = _git_upstream(project_dir)
if upstream:
return ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', '--autostash'], '', None
return ['git', 'pull', '--rebase'], '', None
branch = _git_current_branch(project_dir)
if not branch:
@@ -1746,7 +1673,7 @@ def resolve_pull_command(project_dir):
)
if _git_remote_branch_exists(project_dir, branch):
return (
['git', 'pull', '--rebase', '--autostash', 'origin', branch],
['git', 'pull', '--rebase', 'origin', branch],
f"Branch '{branch}' had no upstream; pulled from origin/{branch} and set it as the upstream.",
None,
)
@@ -1894,33 +1821,6 @@ def get_system_version():
_update_check_cache: Dict[str, Any] = {'result': None, 'ts': 0.0}
_UPDATE_CHECK_TTL = 300 # 5 minutes — avoids a git fetch on every page load
def _update_check_failed(detail: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""A check that could not run is not the same as being up to date.
Reporting update_available=False on a git failure hides the banner, and
the banner is the only route to the update button -- so a checkout git
refuses to touch looks exactly like a current one, permanently. The most
common cause is an install performed as root: git then reports "dubious
ownership" and every command fails, including the fetch here.
"""
return {'update_available': False, 'remote_sha': 'unknown',
'commits_behind': 0, 'check_failed': True, 'error': detail}
def _describe_git_failure(stderr: str) -> str:
"""Turn git's stderr into something the user can act on."""
text = (stderr or '').strip()
if 'dubious ownership' in text or 'detected dubious ownership' in text:
return ("This checkout is owned by a different user than the one "
"running the web interface, so git refuses to use it. It is "
"usually the result of installing as root. Fix the ownership "
"and the update will work: sudo chown -R $USER:$USER "
+ str(PROJECT_ROOT))
if 'could not resolve host' in text.lower() or 'network is unreachable' in text.lower():
return "Could not reach GitHub to check for updates."
return "Could not check for updates: " + (text.splitlines()[0] if text else "git failed")
@api_v3.route('/system/check-update', methods=['GET'])
def check_for_update():
"""Check whether a newer LEDMatrix commit is available on origin/main."""
@@ -1936,13 +1836,12 @@ def check_for_update():
capture_output=True, timeout=10, cwd=cwd,
)
if fetch_result.returncode != 0:
stderr = fetch_result.stderr.decode(errors='replace').strip()
logger.warning("check-update: git fetch failed (rc=%d): %s",
fetch_result.returncode, stderr)
failed = _update_check_failed(_describe_git_failure(stderr))
_update_check_cache['result'] = failed
fetch_result.returncode,
fetch_result.stderr.decode(errors='replace').strip())
_update_check_cache['result'] = _safe
_update_check_cache['ts'] = now
return jsonify(failed)
return jsonify(_safe)
local = subprocess.run(
['git', 'rev-parse', 'HEAD'],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5, cwd=cwd,
@@ -1970,8 +1869,7 @@ def check_for_update():
return jsonify(result)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("check-update failed: %s", e)
return jsonify(_update_check_failed(
"Could not check for updates; see logs for details."))
return jsonify(_safe)
@api_v3.route('/system/action', methods=['POST'])
def execute_system_action():
@@ -2098,11 +1996,6 @@ def execute_system_action():
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
logger.warning("git rev-parse timed out before pull")
# Whether the pull actually brought new code in. "Already up to
# date" is a success too, and prompting for a restart then would
# train users to ignore the prompt.
code_changed = False
# Perform the git pull. Branches without an upstream were given
# an explicit "origin <branch>" above so the update still works.
result = subprocess.run(
@@ -2146,7 +2039,6 @@ def execute_system_action():
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10, cwd=project_dir)
new_head = _post.stdout.strip() if _post.returncode == 0 else None
if old_head and new_head and old_head != new_head:
code_changed = True
diff = subprocess.run(
['git', 'diff', '--name-only', f'{old_head}..{new_head}'],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, cwd=project_dir)
@@ -2206,14 +2098,9 @@ def execute_system_action():
if ln.strip()), '')
pull_message = f"Update failed: {detail}" if detail else "Update failed; check logs for details"
# Nothing here restarts anything: the pull replaces files on
# disk while the display and web services keep running the code
# they loaded at boot. Without this the user is told the update
# succeeded and sees no change until they happen to reboot.
return jsonify({
'status': 'success' if result.returncode == 0 else 'error',
'message': pull_message,
'restart_required': bool(result.returncode == 0 and code_changed),
})
elif action == 'checkout_branch':
# Switch branches from the Tools tab. Needed because a checkout
@@ -5712,11 +5599,6 @@ def save_plugin_config():
# Separate secrets from regular config (handles nested configs and
# array-item secrets — see src/web_interface/secret_helpers.py)
regular_config, secrets_config = separate_secrets(plugin_config, secret_fields)
# The config form renders secrets masked, so every save posts
# them back blank. Without this the blank is merged over the
# stored value and the credential is destroyed by the act of
# changing an unrelated setting. A blank means "unchanged".
secrets_config = remove_empty_secrets(secrets_config)
# Get current configs
current_config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
+3 -17
View File
@@ -116,25 +116,14 @@ document.body.addEventListener('htmx:afterRequest', function(event) {
// ===== Restart-pending banner =====
// Shown after restart-requiring saves; persists across tab switches (and
// reloads, via sessionStorage) until the display restarts or it's dismissed.
window.showRestartPending = function(message) {
try {
sessionStorage.setItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending', '1');
// Persisted alongside the flag: a code update and a config save want
// different wording, and the banner outlives the page that raised it.
if (message) sessionStorage.setItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending-text', message);
else sessionStorage.removeItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending-text');
} catch { /* private browsing */ }
window.showRestartPending = function() {
try { sessionStorage.setItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending', '1'); } catch { /* private browsing */ }
const banner = document.getElementById('restart-pending-banner');
const text = document.getElementById('restart-pending-text');
if (text && message) text.textContent = message;
if (banner) banner.style.display = 'block';
};
window.dismissRestartPending = function() {
try {
sessionStorage.removeItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending');
sessionStorage.removeItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending-text');
} catch { /* no-op */ }
try { sessionStorage.removeItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending'); } catch { /* no-op */ }
const banner = document.getElementById('restart-pending-banner');
if (banner) banner.style.display = 'none';
};
@@ -162,9 +151,6 @@ document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function() {
try {
if (sessionStorage.getItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending') === '1') {
const banner = document.getElementById('restart-pending-banner');
const saved = sessionStorage.getItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending-text');
const text = document.getElementById('restart-pending-text');
if (text && saved) text.textContent = saved;
if (banner) banner.style.display = 'block';
}
} catch { /* no-op */ }
+6 -8
View File
@@ -4622,17 +4622,15 @@ window.loadGithubToken = function() {
// Handle empty data (secrets file doesn't exist) - API returns {} in this case
const secrets = data.data || {};
const token = secrets.github?.api_token || '';
const configured = token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN';
if (input) {
// The endpoint masks what it returns, so this never holds
// the real token -- and the field is deliberately left
// empty rather than filled with the mask, which would be
// saved verbatim the next time the user pressed Save.
input.value = '';
if (configured) {
showNotification('A GitHub token is saved. Enter a new one to replace it.', 'success');
if (token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN') {
// Token exists and is valid
input.value = token;
showNotification('GitHub token loaded successfully', 'success');
} else {
// No token configured or placeholder value
input.value = '';
showNotification('No GitHub token configured. Enter a new token to save.', 'info');
}
}
+3 -25
View File
@@ -413,8 +413,7 @@
<div class="flex items-center justify-between">
<div class="flex items-center space-x-3">
<i class="fas fa-rotate text-lg"></i>
<span class="text-sm font-medium" aria-live="polite"
id="restart-pending-text">
<span class="text-sm font-medium" aria-live="polite">
Configuration saved &mdash; restart the display to apply the changes
</span>
</div>
@@ -1108,29 +1107,15 @@
fetch('/api/v3/system/check-update')
.then(function(r) { return r.json(); })
.then(function(data) {
var banner = document.getElementById('update-banner');
var btn = document.getElementById('update-banner-btn');
if (data.check_failed) {
// A check that could not run is not the same as being up
// to date. Hiding the banner here made a checkout git
// refuses to touch look permanently current, with no
// route to the update button and nothing to act on.
document.getElementById('update-banner-text').textContent =
data.error || 'Could not check for updates.';
if (btn) btn.style.display = 'none';
banner.style.display = '';
return;
}
if (btn) btn.style.display = '';
if (data.update_available && getDismissedSha() !== data.remote_sha) {
var n = data.commits_behind || 0;
var msg = 'A new LEDMatrix update is available';
if (n > 0) msg += ' (' + n + ' commit' + (n > 1 ? 's' : '') + ')';
document.getElementById('update-banner-text').textContent = msg;
banner.style.display = '';
document.getElementById('update-banner').style.display = '';
try { sessionStorage.setItem('update-sha', data.remote_sha); } catch(e) {}
} else {
banner.style.display = 'none';
document.getElementById('update-banner').style.display = 'none';
}
})
.catch(function() {});
@@ -1161,13 +1146,6 @@
if (data.status === 'success') {
document.getElementById('update-banner').style.display = 'none';
try { sessionStorage.removeItem('update-sha-dismissed'); } catch(e) {}
// The pull replaced files on disk; the running services still
// hold the code they loaded at boot. Ask for the restart that
// makes the update actually take effect.
if (data.restart_required && typeof window.showRestartPending === 'function') {
window.showRestartPending(
'Update installed \u2014 restart the display to run the new code');
}
}
if (typeof showNotification === 'function') {
showNotification(data.message || 'Update complete', data.status || 'success');