Files
LEDMatrix/scripts/generate_report.py
T
66f9950a30 chore(ci): add security-audit tooling scripts (workflow files pushed separately) (#414)
* chore(ci): add security-audit workflow and plugin security-proof scripts

- scripts/prove_security.py, audit_plugins.py, generate_report.py --
  automated checks (dangerous eval()/exec() calls, dependency scanning,
  report generation) for plugins.
- .github/workflows/security-audit.yml + bandit.yaml -- CI wiring for
  the above plus gitleaks secret scanning and bandit static analysis.
- .github/workflows/tests.yml -- pytest matrix across Python 3.10-3.12.

Also fixes two Codacy findings while these files are freshly landing:
- prove_security.py: dropped a pointless f-string prefix with no
  placeholders.
- security-audit.yml: pinned gitleaks/gitleaks-action to a full commit
  SHA (matching this repo's existing pinning convention in test.yml)
  instead of the floating v2 tag.

Split out of the original chore/dead-code-removal commit, which had
accidentally bundled this in alongside unrelated dead-code deletions.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KEZK1P1Q1fu5pcuVrkrCFZ

* chore: drop workflow files -- pushed separately (needs workflow OAuth scope)

* fix(security-tooling): address PR review findings across bandit.yaml, audit_plugins.py, generate_report.py, prove_security.py

bandit.yaml:
- Removed scripts/prove_security.py's file-level exclusion. Ran bandit
  directly to get ground truth: the real false positive is B105 (dict key
  "PASS" misread as password-like), not the eval/exec pattern the old
  comment claimed. Added a targeted # nosec B105 there, and found+fixed
  the identical pattern already present in generate_report.py.
- Left the repo-wide B607 skip as-is: confirmed via AST scan that properly
  narrowing it touches 100+ bare-name subprocess call sites across
  wifi_manager.py, store_manager.py, permission_utils.py, app.py, and
  start.py -- none of which are part of this PR. Out of proportion to fix
  here; flagged as a dedicated follow-up.

scripts/audit_plugins.py:
- SyntaxError/OSError while scanning a plugin file now report CRITICAL
  (blocking) instead of WARNING/INFO -- a file that couldn't be parsed or
  read was never actually checked for danger, so it must not silently
  pass the audit.
- --plugin <name> now tracks whether the requested plugin was found across
  all PLUGIN_BASE_DIRS and exits 1 with a clear error if not, instead of
  silently scanning zero plugins and reporting success.
- The AST visitor now tracks import aliases (import subprocess as sp;
  from builtins import eval as e) and resolves them before checking
  against dangerous APIs, closing a straightforward evasion of every
  PLUGIN-001 through PLUGIN-005 check. Verified against both aliased and
  unaliased evasion patterns.

scripts/generate_report.py:
- _md_table_row now escapes pipe characters and normalizes newlines in
  every cell, so scanner-controlled content (a matched secret, a bandit
  issue_text) can't corrupt the Markdown table structure.
- _load now distinguishes "artifact missing/malformed" from "valid empty
  result": each summarizer returns an availability flag, and main() now
  reports INCOMPLETE (not PASSED) with exit code 1 when any artifact is
  unavailable, instead of silently folding it in as 0 findings.
- Gitleaks suppression now uses exact-match placeholder values (pulled
  from the actual config_secrets.template.json) plus a template-path
  allowlist, replacing broad substring checks that could hide a real
  secret containing something like "example.com" as part of its value.

scripts/prove_security.py:
- T1b (dangerous plugin calls): a file that fails to parse/read now
  reports CRITICAL with the exception details instead of being silently
  swallowed by `except (SyntaxError, OSError): pass`.
- T6 (Docker hardening): base images must now be pinned to an @sha256
  digest; a specific tag like python:3.12 is mutable and is now correctly
  flagged as unpinned, not just missing tags or :latest.
- T2a (API surface): no config mechanism for enforcing local-only access
  exists in this codebase today (app.py hardcodes host='0.0.0.0'), so the
  "environment-aware" check as described isn't buildable without adding
  new config infrastructure -- out of scope here. Applied the achievable
  part: upgraded from INFO to WARNING, since enforcement can never
  currently be confirmed.
- T1a (zip-slip): replaced the whole-file substring check with an AST
  walk that finds every extract()/extractall() call and confirms an
  is_relative_to() guard + "Zip-slip detected" log precede it in the same
  function. Verified it still passes on the real store_manager.py (both
  the per-member and validate-then-bulk-extract call sites) and correctly
  flags a synthetic unguarded extractall().
- T3a (hardcoded secrets): violation details no longer include the
  matched credential text -- only file, line, pattern type, and a
  redacted SHA-256 fingerprint, so a real finding doesn't get published
  into CI logs/artifacts/PR comments with wider exposure than the
  original leak. Verified with a synthetic secret that no raw content
  reaches the output.

Validated: all four files compile; bandit scans all three scripts clean
(2 legitimate targeted suppressions, 0 unaddressed findings); each new/
changed code path exercised directly (alias evasion, unmatched --plugin,
missing/malformed/valid-empty artifacts, digest-pinning, zip-slip
guard/no-guard, secret redaction); full audit_plugins.py -> prove_security.py
-> generate_report.py pipeline run end-to-end producing a correct report.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KEZK1P1Q1fu5pcuVrkrCFZ

* fix(security-tooling): address follow-up review findings on PR #414

scripts/generate_report.py:
- Added an explicit `object` type annotation to _md_sanitize_cell's value
  parameter -- it deliberately accepts any stringifiable value (calls
  str(value) unconditionally), so `object` reflects its actual contract
  more accurately than leaving it untyped.

scripts/prove_security.py:
- Dockerfile FROM-line parsing: renamed the comprehension variable `l` to
  `line` (ambiguous single-letter name). More importantly, fixed a real
  false-positive: `FROM --platform=<platform> <image>` was reading the
  --platform= flag itself as the image token, so a properly digest-pinned
  image behind a platform flag was incorrectly reported as unpinned.
  Verified against platform+digest, platform+tag-only, and digest+AS-alias
  Dockerfiles.

scripts/audit_plugins.py:
- Consolidated visit_Call's dangerous-API detection: previously, alias
  resolution only covered ast.Name calls for eval/exec/compile and
  ast.Attribute calls for subprocess/os.system, missing from-imported
  subprocess/os functions called as bare names (from subprocess import
  run as prun; prun(cmd, shell=True) or from os import system as s;
  s(cmd)). Added _resolve_call_target() to resolve both call shapes to a
  single fully-qualified target, then run all five PLUGIN-00x checks
  against that one resolved value. Verified against 10 evasion
  combinations (from-import aliases, direct/attribute calls, aliased
  module imports) and confirmed zero false positives on benign os/
  subprocess usage without shell=True.

Validated: all three files compile, bandit scans clean (same 2 legitimate
suppressions as before, 0 new findings), audit_plugins.py/prove_security.py
re-run against the real repo with no regressions from the prior fix pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KEZK1P1Q1fu5pcuVrkrCFZ

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 14:33:17 -04:00

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Security Report Generator
Aggregates JSON output from all CI security audit jobs into a single
Markdown report suitable for PR comments and artifact storage.
Expected artifact layout (from actions/download-artifact@v4):
<artifact-dir>/
sast-results/
bandit-results.json
semgrep-results.json
dependency-audit-results/
pip-audit-results.json
safety-results.json
secrets-scan-results/
gitleaks-results.json
security-proofs-results/
security-proofs-results.json
plugin-audit-results/
plugin-audit-results.json
Usage:
python scripts/generate_report.py --artifact-dir audit-artifacts/ --output report.md
python scripts/generate_report.py --artifact-dir audit-artifacts/ --output report.md --verbose
"""
import argparse
import json
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from datetime import datetime, timezone
PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
# Gitleaks matches exactly equal to one of these (not a substring match -- a
# real secret that merely contains one of these words as part of its actual
# value must still be reported) are known template placeholders.
_GITLEAKS_SUPPRESS_EXACT_VALUES = {
"YOUR_YOUTUBE_API_KEY",
"YOUR_YOUTUBE_CHANNEL_ID",
"YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN",
}
# Findings in these files are suppressed regardless of value -- they are
# template/example files that are expected to only ever contain placeholders.
_GITLEAKS_SUPPRESS_PATHS = [
"config_secrets.template.json",
"config.template.json",
]
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Helpers
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _load(path: Path) -> tuple[dict | list | None, str | None]:
"""Load a JSON artifact file.
Returns (data, error): error is None on success (data is whatever was
parsed, which may legitimately be an empty list/dict for a clean scan);
otherwise error is a human-readable reason the artifact is unavailable,
distinguishing "missing/malformed artifact" from "valid empty result" so
callers don't silently treat a broken CI job as a clean pass.
"""
if not path.exists():
return None, f"artifact not found: {path}"
try:
return json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")), None
except (json.JSONDecodeError, OSError) as exc:
return None, f"could not read/parse {path}: {exc}"
def _md_sanitize_cell(value: object) -> str:
"""Escape/normalize a value so scanner-controlled content (a matched
secret, a bandit issue_text, a file path) can't alter the Markdown
table's structure: pipes would add bogus columns, newlines would break
out of the row (or forge a fake header/separator line)."""
text = str(value)
text = text.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace("|", "\\|")
text = text.replace("\r\n", " ").replace("\n", " ").replace("\r", " ")
return text
def _md_table_row(*cells: str) -> str:
return "| " + " | ".join(_md_sanitize_cell(c) for c in cells) + " |"
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Per-tool summarizers
# Returns: (markdown_lines: list[str], critical_count: int, available: bool)
# `available=False` means the artifact was missing or malformed -- distinct
# from a valid scan that simply found nothing -- so the caller can report
# INCOMPLETE instead of silently counting it as a clean pass.
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _summarize_bandit(artifact_dir: Path) -> tuple[list[str], int, bool]:
data, error = _load(artifact_dir / "sast-results" / "bandit-results.json")
if error:
return [f"_bandit results unavailable: {error}_"], 0, False
results = data.get("results", [])
high = [r for r in results if r.get("issue_severity") == "HIGH"]
medium = [r for r in results if r.get("issue_severity") == "MEDIUM"]
low = [r for r in results if r.get("issue_severity") == "LOW"]
lines = [
f"**Bandit**: {len(high)} HIGH · {len(medium)} MEDIUM · {len(low)} LOW"
]
if high:
lines += [
"",
"| Severity | File | Line | Issue |",
"| --- | --- | --- | --- |",
]
for r in high[:10]:
fname = Path(r.get("filename", "")).name
lines.append(_md_table_row(
"HIGH", f"`{fname}`",
str(r.get("line_number", "?")),
r.get("issue_text", "")
))
if len(high) > 10:
lines.append(f"_… and {len(high) - 10} more HIGH findings_")
return lines, len(high), True
def _summarize_pip_audit(artifact_dir: Path) -> tuple[list[str], int, bool]:
data, error = _load(artifact_dir / "dependency-audit-results" / "pip-audit-results.json")
if error:
return [f"_pip-audit results unavailable: {error}_"], 0, False
# pip-audit JSON format: {"dependencies": [{"name": ..., "vulns": [...]}]}
vulns: list[dict] = []
for dep in data.get("dependencies", []):
for v in dep.get("vulns", []):
vulns.append({"package": dep.get("name", "?"), **v})
lines = [f"**pip-audit**: {len(vulns)} vulnerabilities found"]
if vulns:
lines += ["", "| Package | ID | Fix |", "| --- | --- | --- |"]
for v in vulns[:10]:
fix = v.get("fix_versions", ["none"])
fix_str = ", ".join(fix) if fix else "none"
lines.append(_md_table_row(
v.get("package", "?"),
v.get("id", "?"),
fix_str,
))
# Treat known vulnerabilities as warnings, not critical (they may be unavoidable)
return lines, 0, True
def _summarize_gitleaks(artifact_dir: Path) -> tuple[list[str], int, bool]:
data, error = _load(artifact_dir / "secrets-scan-results" / "gitleaks-results.json")
if error:
return [f"_gitleaks results unavailable: {error}_"], 0, False
if not isinstance(data, list):
data = []
real_findings = []
suppressed = 0
for finding in data:
secret_val = str(finding.get("Secret", "") or finding.get("Match", ""))
file_name = Path(finding.get("File", "")).name
if (secret_val in _GITLEAKS_SUPPRESS_EXACT_VALUES
or file_name in _GITLEAKS_SUPPRESS_PATHS):
suppressed += 1
else:
real_findings.append(finding)
lines = [
f"**Gitleaks**: {len(real_findings)} finding(s) "
f"({suppressed} suppressed as template placeholders)"
]
if real_findings:
lines += ["", "| Rule | File | Line | Description |", "| --- | --- | --- | --- |"]
for f in real_findings[:10]:
fname = Path(f.get("File", "")).name
lines.append(_md_table_row(
f.get("RuleID", "?"),
f"`{fname}`",
str(f.get("StartLine", "?")),
f.get("Description", ""),
))
critical = len(real_findings) # any real secret is critical
return lines, critical, True
def _summarize_security_proofs(artifact_dir: Path) -> tuple[list[str], int, bool]:
data, error = _load(artifact_dir / "security-proofs-results" / "security-proofs-results.json")
if error:
return [f"_security proofs results unavailable: {error}_"], 0, False
if not isinstance(data, list):
data = []
critical = [r for r in data if r.get("severity") == "CRITICAL"]
warnings = [r for r in data if r.get("severity") == "WARNING"]
passed = [r for r in data if r.get("severity") == "PASS"]
skipped = [r for r in data if r.get("severity") == "SKIP"]
lines = [
f"**Security Proofs**: "
f"{len(passed)} PASS · {len(warnings)} WARN · "
f"{len(critical)} CRITICAL · {len(skipped)} SKIP",
"",
]
_icon = {"PASS": "✅", "INFO": "️", "WARNING": "⚠️", # nosec B105 - severity labels, not credentials
"CRITICAL": "🚨", "SKIP": "⏭️"}
for r in data:
icon = _icon.get(r.get("severity", ""), "❓")
lines.append(
f"- {icon} **{r.get('test_id', '?')}**: {r.get('message', '')}"
)
if r.get("details") and r.get("severity") in ("CRITICAL", "WARNING"):
lines.append(f" - _{r['details']}_")
return lines, len(critical), True
def _summarize_plugin_audit(artifact_dir: Path) -> tuple[list[str], int, bool]:
data, error = _load(artifact_dir / "plugin-audit-results" / "plugin-audit-results.json")
if error:
return [f"_plugin audit results unavailable: {error}_"], 0, False
summary = data.get("summary", {})
findings = data.get("findings", [])
critical_findings = [f for f in findings if f.get("severity") == "CRITICAL"]
warning_findings = [f for f in findings if f.get("severity") == "WARNING"]
lines = [
f"**Plugin Audit**: {data.get('plugins_scanned', '?')} plugins scanned — "
f"{summary.get('critical', 0)} CRITICAL · {summary.get('warnings', 0)} WARNINGS"
]
if critical_findings:
lines += ["", "| Plugin | File | Line | Rule | Message |",
"| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |"]
for f in critical_findings[:10]:
fname = Path(f.get("file", "")).name
lines.append(_md_table_row(
f.get("plugin_id", "?"),
f"`{fname}`",
str(f.get("line", "?")),
f.get("rule", "?"),
f.get("message", ""),
))
if warning_findings and not critical_findings:
lines.append(f"\n_{len(warning_findings)} warning(s) found — see artifact for details_")
return lines, summary.get("critical", 0), True
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Main
# ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def main() -> int:
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
description="Generate consolidated security audit report",
formatter_class=argparse.RawDescriptionHelpFormatter,
)
parser.add_argument("--artifact-dir", required=True,
help="Directory containing downloaded CI artifacts")
parser.add_argument("--output", "-o", required=True,
help="Output Markdown file path")
parser.add_argument("--verbose", "-v", action="store_true")
args = parser.parse_args()
artifact_dir = Path(args.artifact_dir)
timestamp = datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M UTC")
bandit_lines, bandit_crit, bandit_ok = _summarize_bandit(artifact_dir)
pip_audit_lines, pip_audit_crit, pip_audit_ok = _summarize_pip_audit(artifact_dir)
gitleaks_lines, gitleaks_crit, gitleaks_ok = _summarize_gitleaks(artifact_dir)
proofs_lines, proofs_crit, proofs_ok = _summarize_security_proofs(artifact_dir)
plugins_lines, plugins_crit, plugins_ok = _summarize_plugin_audit(artifact_dir)
unavailable_tools = [
name for name, ok in [
("bandit", bandit_ok), ("pip-audit", pip_audit_ok),
("gitleaks", gitleaks_ok), ("security-proofs", proofs_ok),
("plugin-audit", plugins_ok),
] if not ok
]
total_critical = bandit_crit + pip_audit_crit + gitleaks_crit + proofs_crit + plugins_crit
if unavailable_tools:
# A missing/malformed artifact means that tool's checks never
# actually ran -- this must not be reported as a clean PASS just
# because the *artifacts that did load* found nothing.
overall = "INCOMPLETE ⚠️"
elif total_critical > 0:
overall = "ACTION REQUIRED 🚨"
else:
overall = "PASSED ✅"
def section(title: str, lines: list[str]) -> str:
return f"### {title}\n\n" + "\n".join(lines) + "\n"
incomplete_note = (
f"\n_⚠️ Incomplete: results unavailable for {', '.join(unavailable_tools)} "
f"— see the corresponding section(s) below for details_\n"
if unavailable_tools else ""
)
report = f"""## 🔒 Security Audit — {overall}
_Generated: {timestamp}_
{incomplete_note}
| Critical | High/Warn | Overall |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| {'🚨 ' + str(total_critical) if total_critical else '✅ 0'} | ⚠️ see below | {overall} |
---
{section('SAST — Bandit', bandit_lines)}
{section('Dependencies — pip-audit', pip_audit_lines)}
{section('Secrets — Gitleaks', gitleaks_lines)}
{section('LEDMatrix Security Proofs', proofs_lines)}
{section('Plugin Security Audit', plugins_lines)}
---
_Total critical findings: **{total_critical}**_
"""
output_path = Path(args.output)
output_path.write_text(report, encoding="utf-8")
if args.verbose:
print(f" Report written to: {output_path}")
print(f" Status: {overall}")
print(f" Critical findings: {total_critical}")
print(f" bandit={bandit_crit} pip-audit={pip_audit_crit} "
f"gitleaks={gitleaks_crit} proofs={proofs_crit} plugins={plugins_crit}")
if unavailable_tools:
print(f" Unavailable: {', '.join(unavailable_tools)}")
if unavailable_tools:
return 1
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())