Files
LEDMatrix/web_interface/blueprints/api_v3/misc.py
T
ChuckandClaude Opus 5 f6367d63ae security: triage the CodeQL backlog — 129 alerts, three of them live (#561)
* fix(web): escape quotes in every HTML escaper, not just & < >

The escapers are all `div.textContent = x; return div.innerHTML`. That
round-trip escapes &, < and > -- the only characters the HTML serializer
must escape in a text node -- and leaves quotes alone. Every widget then
interpolates the result into a quoted attribute value:

    value="${escapeHtml(v)}"   title="${escapeHtml(v)}"

so a value of `x" onmouseover="alert(1)` closes the attribute and adds an
event handler of its own. CodeQL reported this 83 times
(js/incomplete-html-attribute-sanitization) across the widget files.

It is one bug, not 83: the widgets each carry a standalone fallback that
did escape quotes, but they all prefer BaseWidget.escapeHtml when
window.BaseWidget exists -- which it always does in the shipped page -- so
the correct fallbacks were dead code and the incomplete shared one ran.
Fixed at each source instead of at the call sites.

app-shell.js already documented this exact gap in a comment and worked
around it by building DOM nodes by hand; that workaround stays (setting a
property cannot be got wrong), the comment is now accurate.

cache.html's delete button interpolated the cache key into
`onclick="deleteCacheFile('...')"`. Escaping cannot help there -- the
browser HTML-decodes the attribute before parsing it as JS, so `&#39;`
becomes a real `'` again -- so the key moves to a data-cache-key
attribute that the handler reads back.

url-input.js additionally wrote a value straight into an <a href> after
validating it against a schema-supplied protocol list, and that list
accepted any RFC 3986 scheme -- "javascript" included. Scriptable schemes
(javascript, data, vbscript, blob, filesystem) are now refused both when
the list is normalised and when a URL is checked against it, and the
render path routes its href through the same check instead of emitting
whatever was stored (js/xss-through-dom).

test/js/unit/test_html_escaping.js reads each escaper out of the shipped
file and runs it, so losing the quote handling again fails a test rather
than a scan.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): stop request-supplied names from reaching paths outside their base

Three of the py/path-injection alerts were live, not lint:

* GET /api/v3/plugins/<plugin_id>/static/<path:file_path> read any file
  whose resolved path *string-prefixed* the plugin directory. Flask's
  default converter forbids a slash but not dots, and
  get_plugin_directory('..') returned the parent of the plugins directory
  because it exists -- so every file under the project root then prefixed
  that directory, config/config_secrets.json included. The prefix check
  was also wrong on its own terms: with plugin dir "plugin-repos/foo",
  "../foo-evil/x" resolves to "plugin-repos/foo-evil/x", whose string does
  start with "plugin-repos/foo".

* POST /api/v3/plugins/of-the-day/json/delete interpolated the request
  body's file_id into f"{file_id}.json" and unlinked it, unvalidated. A
  file_id of "../../../../etc/something" deleted that file. This is the
  one finding in the batch that destroyed data rather than exposing it.

* POST /api/v3/cache/delete passed the body's key through
  CacheManager.clear_cache to DiskCache, which joined it as a filename and
  called os.remove. Same shape, same result. The guard goes in
  DiskCache.get_cache_path, the single choke point get/set/clear share, so
  every caller is covered rather than just this route. Real keys are the
  stems of files already flat in the cache directory -- that is how
  list_cache_files derives them -- so nothing legitimate is turned away.

The rest of the cluster (web_interface/app.py's asset route, the plugin
update handler, _get_plugin_version, the plugin-schema read in config.py)
was guarded in ways that held, but each had grown its own version of the
check. They now go through one helper, src/common/path_safety.py, which
returns the *sanitised value* rather than a verdict -- so a caller cannot
validate one string and open another, which is how the two real bugs
above were shaped.

Also: WiFiManager.connect_to_network took the SSID and password straight
from POST /api/v3/wifi/connect into nmcli's argv. There is no shell there,
so CodeQL's py/command-line-injection alert overstates the risk -- but
nmcli reads a leading "-" as an option, so an SSID of "--ask" asks nmcli
to run differently rather than to join a network. Both values are now
checked for shape (802.11's 32-octet SSID limit, WPA's 8-63 char
passphrase or 64-char hex key, no control characters, no leading dash)
before any subprocess runs.

test/test_path_traversal_guards.py asserts on the filesystem, not just
the status code: a handler that returns 403 and deletes the file anyway
would pass the weaker check. Twelve of its cases fail against the
unpatched code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): refuse a plugin id that is not a plain name, don't truncate it

pages_v3 and scripts/dev_server.py ran request ids through
os.path.basename and carried on with what came out, so "../weather"
rendered the config form for "weather". Nothing escaped the plugins
directory -- the relative_to guards held -- but the handler answered a
request nobody made, and validating one string while the filesystem sees
another is the shape both live traversals earlier in this branch had.

Same treatment as the rest: safe_path_component rejects rather than
truncates, resolve_under returns the path it checked, and the call sites
use what those return. The three handlers that had hand-rolled
resolve-and-relative_to blocks lose about twenty lines to the shared one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(web): say what the plugin web_ui iframe actually is

The docstring claimed the fragment runs "in a sandboxed iframe". The
iframe in plugin_config.html carries no sandbox attribute, so the
fragment runs with the interface's own origin. That is fine -- the file
belongs to an installed plugin, and an installed plugin already runs
Python on the device, so the trust boundary is install rather than this
route -- but a comment promising containment that is not there is worse
than no comment. This is the context for the py/reflective-xss alert on
this handler.

Also drops the now-unused os/os.path imports.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): inline url-input's scheme guard at the previewLink.href sink

CodeQL flagged this line as a new high-severity js/xss-through-dom alert
on this PR even though it is already covered by SCRIPTABLE_SCHEMES: the
guard reached the sink through safeHref -> isValidUrl, two function calls
away, which its DOM-based-XSS sanitizer recognition does not trace.

Behavior is unchanged -- same scheme check, same SCRIPTABLE_SCHEMES list,
same allowedProtocols gate -- just inlined directly above the
previewLink.href assignment it guards, so the barrier is visible in the
same scope as the sink.

Added a regression test that runs the shipped onInput handler (not just
the extracted helpers) against a mocked DOM, so a future change that
reintroduces an unguarded previewLink.href assignment fails here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): address CodeRabbit findings on the CodeQL triage PR

- src/wifi_manager.py: reject non-ASCII WPA-PSK passphrases before any
  credential-saving or connect flow runs. NetworkManager only accepts
  printable ASCII passphrases (or a 64-char hex key); a non-ASCII value
  was previously saved/attempted before nmcli itself rejected it.

- web_interface/blueprints/api_v3/config.py: fail closed when the
  plugin config schema path can't be resolved under the plugins
  directory (e.g. a symlinked plugin dir). Previously this fell
  through with secret_fields left empty, so submitted credentials for
  that plugin were saved as ordinary, unencrypted configuration.

- web_interface/static/v3/js/widgets/plugin-file-manager.js: stop
  splicing the JSON day/column key into an inline oninput="..." handler
  string. escHtml() escapes quotes for a normal HTML attribute, but the
  browser HTML-decodes the attribute before running it as script, which
  undoes that escaping and lets a crafted column name (e.g. from an
  uploaded JSON file) break out of the JS string and execute. Cell
  edits now travel through data-day/data-col attributes read by one
  delegated 'input' listener instead.

  While in this file: fixed 6 pre-existing missing-')' typos on
  multi-line safeSetHTML(...) calls (already flagged by Biome in this
  PR's own CodeRabbit run as syntax errors blocking its lint pass).
  These predate this PR (present on main too) but made the whole file
  fail to parse in any JS engine, which is a bigger problem than the
  XSS finding itself and directly touches the same lines.

Added/extended regression tests for each fix; full suites pass
(pytest: 4580 passed, 62 skipped; JS: 84 assertions).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 15:32:03 -04:00

524 lines
22 KiB
Python

"""Routes with no larger group of their own: errors, integrations,
cache, sync, skins, logs, health and hardware.
Routes decorate the shared `api_v3` Blueprint from ._common, so their
endpoint names are unchanged by living here.
"""
from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import (
_coerce_to_bool,
ErrorCode, Path, _JOURNALCTL, _MQTT_BRIDGE_CONFIG, _MQTT_BRIDGE_DEFAULTS,
_MQTT_BRIDGE_DIR, _SUDO, _coerce_mqtt_bridge_value,
_get_display_service_status, _mqtt_bridge_service_state,
_read_mqtt_bridge_config, api_v3, contextlib, describe_exception,
error_response, get_error_aggregator, json, jsonify, logger, os, request,
subprocess, success_response, tempfile,
)
from src.common.path_safety import safe_path_component
import web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 as _pkg
# Read through the module rather than bound by value: tests patch these
# as module attributes, and a value binding would not see the patch.
# Several are also called from helpers that live in __init__, so the
# package is the only patch point that covers every caller.
@api_v3.route('/health', methods=['GET'])
def get_health():
"""Get system health status"""
try:
health_status = {
'status': 'healthy',
'timestamp': _pkg.time.time(),
'services': {},
'checks': {}
}
# Check web interface service
# Stamp the start _pkg.time before measuring against it -- reading it with a
# fallback of _pkg.time.time() and only assigning afterwards made the very
# first call subtract two separate clock reads, reporting a small
# negative uptime.
if not hasattr(get_health, '_start_time'):
get_health._start_time = _pkg.time.time()
health_status['services']['web_interface'] = {
'status': 'running',
'uptime_seconds': _pkg.time.time() - get_health._start_time
}
# Check display service
display_service_status = _get_display_service_status()
health_status['services']['display_service'] = {
'status': 'active' if display_service_status.get('active') else 'inactive',
'details': display_service_status
}
# Check config file accessibility
try:
if api_v3.config_manager:
test_config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
health_status['checks']['config_file'] = {
'status': 'accessible',
'readable': True
}
else:
health_status['checks']['config_file'] = {
'status': 'unknown',
'readable': False
}
except Exception as e:
health_status['checks']['config_file'] = {
'status': 'error',
'readable': False,
'error': 'see logs for details'
}
# Check plugin system
try:
if api_v3.plugin_manager:
# Try to discover plugins (lightweight check)
plugin_count = len(api_v3.plugin_manager.get_available_plugins()) if hasattr(api_v3.plugin_manager, 'get_available_plugins') else 0
health_status['checks']['plugin_system'] = {
'status': 'operational',
'plugin_count': plugin_count
}
else:
health_status['checks']['plugin_system'] = {
'status': 'not_initialized'
}
except Exception as e:
health_status['checks']['plugin_system'] = {
'status': 'error',
'error': 'see logs for details'
}
# Check hardware connectivity (if display manager available)
try:
snapshot_path = "/tmp/led_matrix_preview.png"
if os.path.exists(snapshot_path):
# Check if snapshot is recent (updated in last 60 seconds)
mtime = os.path.getmtime(snapshot_path)
age_seconds = _pkg.time.time() - mtime
health_status['checks']['hardware'] = {
'status': 'connected' if age_seconds < 60 else 'stale',
'snapshot_age_seconds': round(age_seconds, 1)
}
else:
health_status['checks']['hardware'] = {
'status': 'no_snapshot',
'note': 'Display service may not be running'
}
except Exception as e:
health_status['checks']['hardware'] = {
'status': 'unknown',
'error': 'see logs for details'
}
# Determine overall health
all_healthy = all(
check.get('status') in ['accessible', 'operational', 'connected', 'running', 'active']
for check in health_status['checks'].values()
)
if not all_healthy:
health_status['status'] = 'degraded'
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': health_status})
except Exception as e:
logger.error("%s failed", request.path, exc_info=True)
return jsonify({
'status': 'error',
'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details',
'details': describe_exception(e),
'data': {'status': 'unhealthy'}
}), 500
@api_v3.route('/hardware/status', methods=['GET'])
def get_hardware_status():
"""Return LED matrix hardware initialization status written by display_manager at startup."""
status_path = "/tmp/led_matrix_hw_status.json" # nosec B108
try:
with open(status_path) as f:
hw_data = json.load(f)
return jsonify({"status": "success", "data": hw_data})
except FileNotFoundError:
return jsonify({"status": "success", "data": {"ok": None, "error": "Display service not yet started"}})
except PermissionError:
logger.warning("Permission denied reading hardware status file; display service may be running as a different user")
return jsonify({"status": "success", "data": {"ok": False, "error": "Hardware status temporarily unavailable"}})
except json.JSONDecodeError:
logger.error("Failed to parse hardware status file", exc_info=True)
return jsonify({"status": "success", "data": {"ok": False, "error": "Hardware status file corrupted"}})
except Exception:
logger.error("Unexpected error reading hardware status", exc_info=True)
return jsonify({"status": "error", "message": "Unable to read hardware status"}), 500
@api_v3.route('/skins', methods=['GET'])
def list_skins():
"""List installed visual skins (docs/SKIN_SYSTEM.md).
Optional ?plugin_id=... filters to skins matching that plugin.
"""
try:
from src.skin_system import skin_runtime
plugin_id = request.args.get('plugin_id')
if plugin_id:
skins = skin_runtime.skins_for_plugin(plugin_id)
else:
# The discovery cache self-invalidates on directory/manifest
# mtime changes, so no force_refresh — keeps Pi disk I/O down.
skins = skin_runtime.discover_skins()
payload = []
for skin_id, manifest in sorted(skins.items()):
skin_dir = Path(manifest['_skin_dir'])
preview = manifest.get('preview')
payload.append({
'id': skin_id,
'name': manifest.get('name', skin_id),
'version': manifest.get('version'),
'author': manifest.get('author'),
'description': manifest.get('description', ''),
'skin_api_version': manifest.get('skin_api_version'),
'targets': manifest.get('targets', {}),
'modes': manifest.get('modes', []),
'has_preview': bool(preview and (skin_dir / preview).is_file()),
})
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': {'skins': payload}})
except Exception as e:
logger.error('Error in list_skins', exc_info=True)
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@api_v3.route('/logs', methods=['GET'])
def get_logs():
"""Get system logs from journalctl"""
try:
if not _JOURNALCTL:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'journalctl not found on this system'}), 503
# Get recent logs from journalctl
_cmd = ([_SUDO, _JOURNALCTL] if _SUDO else [_JOURNALCTL]) + [
'-u', 'ledmatrix.service', '-u', 'ledmatrix-web.service',
'-n', '100', '--no-pager', '--output=short-iso']
result = subprocess.run(
_cmd,
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=5
)
if result.returncode == 0:
logs_text = result.stdout.strip()
return jsonify({
'status': 'success',
'data': {
'logs': logs_text if logs_text else 'No logs available from ledmatrix or ledmatrix-web service'
}
})
else:
return jsonify({
'status': 'error',
'message': f'Failed to get logs: {result.stderr}'
}), 500
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
return jsonify({
'status': 'error',
'message': 'Timeout while fetching logs'
}), 500
except Exception as e:
logger.error("%s failed", request.path, exc_info=True)
return jsonify({
'status': 'error',
'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details',
'details': describe_exception(e)
}), 500
# Multi-Display Sync Endpoints
@api_v3.route('/sync/status', methods=['GET'])
def get_sync_status():
"""Return live multi-display sync status written by the display process."""
import os as _os
status_file = "/tmp/led_matrix_sync_status.json"
# Also surface config so the UI can show the configured role even before
# the display process has written a status file.
cfg_role = "standalone"
cfg_port = 5765
if api_v3.config_manager:
try:
cfg = api_v3.config_manager.load_config().get("sync", {})
cfg_role = cfg.get("role", "standalone")
cfg_port = int(cfg.get("port", 5765))
except Exception:
pass
if _os.path.exists(status_file):
try:
with open(status_file) as f:
live = json.load(f)
return jsonify({"status": "success", "data": live})
except Exception:
pass
# Status file not yet written — return config-only placeholder
return jsonify({
"status": "success",
"data": {
"role": cfg_role,
"port": cfg_port,
"state": "starting",
}
})
@api_v3.route('/cache/list', methods=['GET'])
def list_cache_files():
"""List all cache files with metadata"""
try:
if not api_v3.cache_manager:
# Initialize cache manager if not already initialized
from src.cache_manager import CacheManager
api_v3.cache_manager = CacheManager()
cache_files = api_v3.cache_manager.list_cache_files()
cache_dir = api_v3.cache_manager.get_cache_dir()
return jsonify({
'status': 'success',
'data': {
'cache_files': cache_files,
'cache_dir': cache_dir,
'total_files': len(cache_files)
}
})
except Exception as e:
logger.error('Error in list_cache_files', exc_info=True)
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@api_v3.route('/cache/delete', methods=['POST'])
def delete_cache_file():
"""Delete a specific cache file by key"""
try:
if not api_v3.cache_manager:
# Initialize cache manager if not already initialized
from src.cache_manager import CacheManager
api_v3.cache_manager = CacheManager()
data = request.get_json(silent=True)
if not data or 'key' not in data:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'cache key is required'}), 400
cache_key = data['key']
# The key names the file about to be removed. DiskCache refuses an
# unusable key on its own, but silently: say so here instead of
# reporting a deletion that never happened.
if safe_path_component(cache_key) is None:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Invalid cache key'}), 400
# Delete the cache file
api_v3.cache_manager.clear_cache(cache_key)
return jsonify({
'status': 'success',
'message': f'Cache file for key "{cache_key}" deleted successfully'
})
except Exception as e:
logger.error('Error in delete_cache_file', exc_info=True)
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@api_v3.route('/errors/summary', methods=['GET'])
def get_error_summary():
"""
Get summary of all errors for monitoring and debugging.
Returns error counts, detected patterns, and recent errors.
"""
try:
aggregator = get_error_aggregator()
summary = aggregator.get_error_summary()
return success_response(data=summary, message="Error summary retrieved")
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error getting error summary: {e}", exc_info=True)
return error_response(
error_code=ErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
message="Failed to retrieve error summary",
status_code=500
)
@api_v3.route('/errors/plugin/<plugin_id>', methods=['GET'])
def get_plugin_errors(plugin_id):
"""
Get error health status for a specific plugin.
Args:
plugin_id: Plugin identifier
Returns health status and error statistics for the plugin.
"""
try:
aggregator = get_error_aggregator()
health = aggregator.get_plugin_health(plugin_id)
return success_response(data=health, message="Plugin health retrieved")
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error getting plugin health for {plugin_id}: {e}", exc_info=True)
return error_response(
error_code=ErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
message=f"Failed to retrieve health for plugin {plugin_id}",
status_code=500
)
@api_v3.route('/errors/clear', methods=['POST'])
def clear_old_errors():
"""
Clear error records older than specified age.
Request body (optional):
max_age_hours: Maximum age in hours (default: 24, max: 8760 = 1 year)
"""
try:
data = request.get_json(silent=True) or {}
raw_max_age = data.get('max_age_hours', 24)
# Validate and coerce max_age_hours
try:
max_age_hours = int(raw_max_age)
if max_age_hours < 1:
return error_response(
error_code=ErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT,
message="max_age_hours must be at least 1",
context={'provided_value': raw_max_age},
status_code=400
)
if max_age_hours > 8760: # 1 year max
return error_response(
error_code=ErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT,
message="max_age_hours cannot exceed 8760 (1 year)",
context={'provided_value': raw_max_age},
status_code=400
)
except (ValueError, TypeError, OverflowError):
return error_response(
error_code=ErrorCode.INVALID_INPUT,
message="max_age_hours must be a valid integer",
context={'provided_value': str(raw_max_age)},
status_code=400
)
aggregator = get_error_aggregator()
cleared_count = aggregator.clear_old_records(max_age_hours=max_age_hours)
return success_response(
data={'cleared_count': cleared_count},
message=f"Cleared {cleared_count} error records older than {max_age_hours} hours"
)
except Exception as e:
logger.error(f"Error clearing old errors: {e}", exc_info=True)
return error_response(
error_code=ErrorCode.SYSTEM_ERROR,
message="Failed to clear old errors",
status_code=500
)
@api_v3.route('/integrations/mqtt-bridge', methods=['GET'])
def get_mqtt_bridge():
"""Bridge service state and its settings, minus the password."""
try:
config = _read_mqtt_bridge_config()
password = config.get('mqtt_password')
safe = {key: config.get(key, default)
for key, default in _MQTT_BRIDGE_DEFAULTS.items()}
return jsonify({
'status': 'success',
'data': {
'service': _mqtt_bridge_service_state(),
'config_exists': _MQTT_BRIDGE_CONFIG.is_file(),
'config_path': str(_MQTT_BRIDGE_CONFIG),
'config': safe,
# Enough to render "a password is set" without disclosing it.
'password_set': bool(password),
'env_override_prefix': 'LEDMATRIX_MQTT_',
}
})
except Exception as e:
logger.exception('Error reading MQTT bridge settings')
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Could not read bridge settings',
'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@api_v3.route('/integrations/mqtt-bridge/config', methods=['PUT'])
def update_mqtt_bridge_config():
"""Write bridge_config.json.
The password is write-only: omit it to leave whatever is stored alone, send
a value to replace it, or send clear_password to remove it. It is never
returned by the GET above, so a form that round-tripped it would otherwise
have to blank it on every save.
"""
try:
# No `or {}` here: get_json(silent=True) returns None for a missing or
# unparseable body, and `None or {}` produced an empty dict that then
# satisfied the isinstance check below -- so malformed JSON, `null`,
# `[]` and `false` all reported success while applying nothing.
data = request.get_json(silent=True)
if not isinstance(data, dict):
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Body must be a JSON object'}), 400
config = _read_mqtt_bridge_config()
existing_password = config.get('mqtt_password')
updates = {}
for key in _MQTT_BRIDGE_DEFAULTS:
if key not in data:
continue
value, err = _coerce_mqtt_bridge_value(key, data[key])
if err:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': err}), 400
updates[key] = value
config.update(updates)
# Coerced, not merely truthy: the string "false" is truthy in Python,
# so a client echoing the field back as a string would have wiped a
# stored password it meant to keep.
if _coerce_to_bool(data.get('clear_password')):
config['mqtt_password'] = None
elif 'mqtt_password' in data and str(data['mqtt_password']) != '':
new_password = str(data['mqtt_password'])
if len(new_password) > 300:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Password is too long'}), 400
config['mqtt_password'] = new_password
else:
config['mqtt_password'] = existing_password
# CWE-319: a password with TLS off is sent in the clear. On a trusted
# LAN that is a normal, deliberate setup, so this is refused rather
# than forbidden -- allow_insecure_mqtt is the explicit acknowledgement.
insecure = bool(config.get('mqtt_password')) and not config.get('mqtt_tls')
if insecure and not config.get('allow_insecure_mqtt'):
return jsonify({
'status': 'error',
'message': 'MQTT credentials would cross the network in cleartext '
'with TLS disabled. Enable mqtt_tls, or set '
'allow_insecure_mqtt to accept that on a trusted network.'
}), 400
if insecure:
logger.warning('MQTT bridge: a password is set without TLS and '
'allow_insecure_mqtt is on; credentials will cross the '
'network in cleartext')
_MQTT_BRIDGE_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
# Write via a temp file in the same directory so a crash mid-write
# cannot leave a half-written config the bridge would refuse to load.
fd, tmp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=str(_MQTT_BRIDGE_DIR), prefix='.bridge_config.')
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as handle:
json.dump(config, handle, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
handle.write('\n')
os.chmod(tmp_path, 0o600)
os.replace(tmp_path, _MQTT_BRIDGE_CONFIG)
except Exception:
with contextlib.suppress(OSError):
os.unlink(tmp_path)
raise
service = _mqtt_bridge_service_state()
message = 'Bridge settings saved.'
if service['active']:
message += ' Restart the bridge for them to take effect.'
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'message': message,
'data': {'password_set': bool(config.get('mqtt_password')),
'restart_required': service['active']}})
except Exception as e:
logger.exception('Error saving MQTT bridge settings')
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Could not save bridge settings',
'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500