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ChuckandClaude Opus 5.5
e3c85cece6
Optional web login, off by default: a device that sets no password behaves exactly as before. Set under General > Security; then every page and API route needs a session login or an API token (Authorization: Bearer). Loopback, the Wi-Fi setup flow in AP mode, static files, captive-portal probes and a reduced /api/v3/health stay open. Secrets live in the web_auth section of config_secrets.json and no API returns them. scripts/reset_web_password.py turns login off. Stacked on #674. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
110 lines
4.7 KiB
Markdown
110 lines
4.7 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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If you've found a security issue in LEDMatrix, **please don't open a
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public GitHub issue**. Disclose it privately so we can fix it before it's
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exploited.
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### How to report
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Use one of these channels, in order of preference:
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1. **GitHub Security Advisories** (preferred). On the LEDMatrix repo,
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go to **Security → Advisories → Report a vulnerability**. This
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creates a private discussion thread visible only to you and the
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maintainer.
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- Direct link: <https://github.com/ChuckBuilds/LEDMatrix/security/advisories/new>
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2. **Discord DM**. Send a direct message to a moderator on the
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[LEDMatrix Discord](https://discord.gg/RdrC37rEag). Don't post in
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public channels.
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Please include:
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- A description of the issue
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- The version / commit hash you're testing against
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- Steps to reproduce, ideally a minimal proof of concept
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- The impact you can demonstrate
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- Any suggested mitigation
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### What to expect
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- An acknowledgement within a few days (this is a hobby project, not
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a 24/7 ops team).
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- A discussion of the issue's severity and a plan for the fix.
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- Credit in the release notes when the fix ships, unless you'd
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prefer to remain anonymous.
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- For high-severity issues affecting active deployments, we'll
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coordinate disclosure timing with you.
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## Scope
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In scope for this policy:
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- The LEDMatrix display controller, web interface, and plugin loader
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in this repository
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- The official plugins in
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[`ledmatrix-plugins`](https://github.com/ChuckBuilds/ledmatrix-plugins)
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- Installation scripts and systemd unit files
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Out of scope (please report upstream):
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- Vulnerabilities in `rpi-rgb-led-matrix` itself —
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report to <https://github.com/hzeller/rpi-rgb-led-matrix>
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- Vulnerabilities in Python packages we depend on — report to the
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upstream package maintainer
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- Issues in third-party plugins not in `ledmatrix-plugins` — report
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to that plugin's repository
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## Known security model
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LEDMatrix is designed for trusted local networks. Several limitations
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are intentional rather than vulnerabilities:
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- **Web UI authentication is optional and off by default.** Out of the
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box the web interface assumes the network it's running on is trusted.
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Setting a password under **General > Security** makes every page and
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API route require a login or an API token (`Authorization: Bearer`),
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with wrong passwords rate-limited per address
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(`web_interface/auth.py`). Deliberately left open even then: requests
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from the Pi itself (loopback without proxy headers; a reverse proxy on
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the Pi must add `X-Forwarded-For`, or every request it relays counts as
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local), the Wi-Fi setup flow while the Pi is in access-point mode,
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static files, and a status-only `/api/v3/health`. The password is a
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werkzeug hash and tokens are stored as SHA-256, in
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`config/config_secrets.json`, which no API returns. There is no TLS:
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over plain HTTP the password and tokens cross the LAN in the clear, so
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still don't expose port 5000 to the internet; put a TLS reverse proxy
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or a VPN in front for remote access. Anyone with shell access to the Pi
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can turn login off (`scripts/reset_web_password.py`), which is the
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documented recovery path.
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"Trusted network" does not mean "trusted websites", though: any page
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a LAN user opens could make their browser POST to the Pi. So the
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interface refuses a `POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE` whose `Origin` (or
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`Referer`) header names another site (`web_interface/origin_guard.py`),
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and `/api/v3/system/action` only accepts JSON or HTMX requests. Tools
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that send neither header (curl, Home Assistant, the MQTT bridge) are
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unaffected. Not covered: DNS rebinding, and anyone who can reach the
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port directly.
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- **Plugins run unsandboxed.** Installed plugins execute in the same
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Python process as the display loop with full file-system and
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network access. Review plugin code (especially third-party plugins
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from arbitrary GitHub URLs) before installing. The Plugin Store
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marks community plugins as **Custom** to highlight this.
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- **The display service runs as root** for hardware GPIO access. This
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is required by `rpi-rgb-led-matrix`.
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- **`config_secrets.json` is plaintext.** API keys and tokens are
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stored unencrypted on the Pi. Lock down filesystem permissions on
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the config directory if this matters for your deployment.
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These are documented as known limitations rather than bugs. If you
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have ideas for improving them while keeping the project usable on a
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Pi, open a discussion — we're interested.
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## Supported versions
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LEDMatrix is rolling-release on `main`. Security fixes land on `main`
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and become available the next time users run **Update Code** from the
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web UI's Overview tab (which does a `git pull`). There are no LTS
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branches.
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