Merge branch 'fix/config-secrets-leak' of https://github.com/ChuckBuilds/LEDMatrix into consolidate/web

# Conflicts:
#	web_interface/blueprints/api_v3.py

src/web_interface/secret_helpers.py

@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ def mask_secret_fields(config: Dict[str, Any], schema_properties: Dict[str, Any]
     return result
 
 
+#: What a masked secret looks like on the wire. Named because the write path
+#: has to recognise it coming back: a client that renders the mask and posts
+#: it unchanged must not store the mask as if it were the secret.
+SECRET_MASK = '\u2022' * 8
+
+
 def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
     """Blanket-mask every non-empty value in a secrets config dict.
 
@@ -161,7 +167,7 @@ def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
         if isinstance(v, dict):
             masked[k] = mask_all_secret_values(v)
         elif v not in (None, '') and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith('YOUR_')):
-            masked[k] = '••••••••'
+            masked[k] = SECRET_MASK
         else:
             masked[k] = v
     return masked
@@ -189,3 +195,30 @@ def remove_empty_secrets(secrets: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
         elif v is not None and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.strip() == ''):
             result[k] = v
     return result
+
+
+def strip_masked_values(secrets: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """Remove values a client echoed back rather than changed.
+
+    The counterpart to :func:`mask_all_secret_values`. A client that GETs the
+    masked secrets, edits one field and POSTs the whole object back is sending
+    ``SECRET_MASK`` for every field it did not touch. Storing those would
+    replace each untouched credential with eight bullet characters.
+
+    Drops the mask and, like :func:`remove_empty_secrets`, blank values -- so
+    the caller can merge the result onto what is already stored and have
+    "unchanged" mean unchanged. Empty nested dicts are pruned.
+    """
+    result: Dict[str, Any] = {}
+    for k, v in secrets.items():
+        if isinstance(v, dict):
+            nested = strip_masked_values(v)
+            if nested:
+                result[k] = nested
+        elif v is None:
+            continue
+        elif isinstance(v, str) and (v.strip() == '' or v == SECRET_MASK):
+            continue
+        else:
+            result[k] = v
+    return result

test/test_config_main_redacts_secrets.py

@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+"""GET /config/main must not hand out credentials.
+
+The endpoint returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port, and
+this web interface has no authentication of any kind. Measured against a live
+rig, an unauthenticated request returned:
+
+    github.api_token                40 chars
+    incoming-packages.ha_token     183 chars
+    jellyfin-now-playing.api_key    32 chars
+    ledmatrix-weather.api_key       32 chars
+    on-air.mqtt_password             8 chars
+    youtube.api_key                 20 chars
+    youtube-stats.api_key           39 chars
+
+A GitHub token and a Home Assistant long-lived token among them.
+
+The x-secret masking the plugin config endpoints use does not apply here: this
+endpoint never consults a schema, and core keys such as github.api_token have
+no schema to carry the marker. Several of those fields *are* tagged x-secret in
+their plugin's schema and were still returned in full, which is what makes the
+schema route the wrong one to rely on for this endpoint.
+
+Matching on field name is blunt. For a whole-config dump it is the right
+default: anything named like a credential should not leave the process, and a
+new plugin that adds a differently-shaped secret is covered without anyone
+remembering to tag it.
+"""
+import pytest
+
+from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import (
+    _looks_like_a_credential,
+    _redact_credentials,
+)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
+    "password", "mqtt_password", "opensky_password", "passwd",
+    "api_key", "apikey", "API_KEY", "flightaware_api_key",
+    "token", "ha_token", "api_token", "access_token",
+    "secret", "client_secret", "spotify_client_secret",
+    "access_key", "private_key",
+])
+def test_credential_names_are_recognised(name):
+    assert _looks_like_a_credential(name)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
+    "timezone", "city", "brightness", "enabled", "update_interval",
+    "favorite_teams", "display_duration", "keyword",
+])
+def test_ordinary_names_are_left_alone(name):
+    assert not _looks_like_a_credential(name)
+
+
+def test_the_measured_leak_is_closed():
+    """The exact shape taken off the rig."""
+    config = {
+        "github": {"api_token": "ghp_" + "x" * 36},
+        "incoming-packages": {"ha_token": "y" * 183, "enabled": True},
+        "jellyfin-now-playing": {"api_key": "z" * 32},
+        "on-air": {"mqtt_password": "hunter22"},
+        "youtube": {"api_key": "k" * 20},
+        "timezone": "America/New_York",
+    }
+    out = _redact_credentials(config)
+    assert out["github"]["api_token"] == ""
+    assert out["incoming-packages"]["ha_token"] == ""
+    assert out["jellyfin-now-playing"]["api_key"] == ""
+    assert out["on-air"]["mqtt_password"] == ""
+    assert out["youtube"]["api_key"] == ""
+    # Everything else survives, or the config editor breaks.
+    assert out["timezone"] == "America/New_York"
+    assert out["incoming-packages"]["enabled"] is True
+
+
+def test_nested_and_listed_credentials_are_reached():
+    config = {"a": {"b": {"c": {"password": "p"}}},
+              "feeds": [{"name": "x", "api_key": "k"}, {"name": "y"}]}
+    out = _redact_credentials(config)
+    assert out["a"]["b"]["c"]["password"] == ""
+    assert out["feeds"][0]["api_key"] == ""
+    assert out["feeds"][0]["name"] == "x"
+
+
+def test_the_original_is_not_mutated():
+    """The caller holds the live config; redaction must not edit it in place."""
+    config = {"github": {"api_token": "keepme"}}
+    _redact_credentials(config)
+    assert config["github"]["api_token"] == "keepme"
+
+
+def test_a_credential_shaped_container_is_still_walked():
+    """`secrets: {...}` is a section name, not a value to blank."""
+    config = {"secrets": {"api_key": "k", "note": "keep"}}
+    out = _redact_credentials(config)
+    assert out["secrets"]["api_key"] == ""
+    assert out["secrets"]["note"] == "keep"
+
+
+def test_non_dict_input_passes_through():
+    assert _redact_credentials("plain") == "plain"
+    assert _redact_credentials(7) == 7
+    assert _redact_credentials(None) is None
+
+
+def test_the_endpoint_itself_redacts():
+    """Through the view function, not the helper.
+
+    The helper tests above all passed with the route still returning
+    `config` -- reverting the one line that calls the redactor changed
+    nothing, because nothing exercised the route. A property asserted on a
+    helper is not a property asserted on the endpoint, and it is the endpoint
+    that is exposed to the network.
+    """
+    import json as _json
+    from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+    import flask
+
+    from web_interface.blueprints import api_v3 as mod
+
+    raw = {"github": {"api_token": "ghp_secret_value"},
+           "timezone": "America/New_York"}
+
+    manager = MagicMock()
+    manager.load_config.return_value = raw
+    previous = getattr(mod.api_v3, "config_manager", None)
+    mod.api_v3.config_manager = manager
+
+    app = flask.Flask(__name__)
+    try:
+        with app.test_request_context("/config/main"):
+            response = mod.get_main_config()
+        payload = response.get_json() if hasattr(response, "get_json") else _json.loads(response[0].data)
+    finally:
+        mod.api_v3.config_manager = previous
+
+    data = payload["data"]
+    assert data["github"]["api_token"] == "", (
+        "the endpoint returned the token; the redactor is not wired in")
+    assert data["timezone"] == "America/New_York"
+    # And the config the manager handed over is untouched.
+    assert raw["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_secret_value"

test/test_git_pull_resolution.py

@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ def repos(tmp_path):
 def test_branch_with_upstream_uses_a_plain_pull(repos):
     args, note, error = resolve_pull_command(str(repos))
     assert error is None
-    assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase']
+    assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', '--autostash']
     assert note == ''
 
 
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ def test_branch_without_upstream_falls_back_to_origin_branch(repos):
 
     args, note, error = resolve_pull_command(str(repos))
     assert error is None
-    assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', 'origin', 'audit']
+    assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', '--autostash', 'origin', 'audit']
     assert 'audit' in note
 
 
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ def test_switching_attaches_tracking_so_pull_needs_no_fallback(repos):
 
     args, note, error = resolve_pull_command(str(repos))
     assert error is None
-    assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase']
+    assert args == ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', '--autostash']
     assert note == ''
 
 
@@ -200,3 +200,37 @@ def test_stash_option_lets_the_switch_through_and_keeps_the_work(repos):
     assert _git('branch', '--show-current', cwd=repos).stdout.strip() == 'other'
     # The edit is not lost — it is on the stash.
     assert 'switch to other' in _git('stash', 'list', cwd=repos).stdout
+
+
+class TestInstallerDoesNotBlockTheUpdateButton:
+    """first_time_install.sh chmods scripts that git tracked as 644.
+
+    With core.fileMode true -- the default on Linux -- that leaves five
+    permanently modified tracked files on every machine that ran the
+    installer, and `git pull --rebase` refuses to start:
+
+        error: cannot pull with rebase: You have unstaged changes.
+
+    Tracking them as executable makes the installer's chmod a no-op.
+    """
+
+    CHMODDED = [
+        'first_time_install.sh',
+        'start_display.sh',
+        'stop_display.sh',
+        'scripts/install/install_service.sh',
+        'scripts/install/install_web_service.sh',
+    ]
+
+    def test_scripts_the_installer_chmods_are_tracked_executable(self):
+        import subprocess
+        from pathlib import Path
+        root = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+        out = subprocess.run(['git', 'ls-files', '-s', *self.CHMODDED],
+                             capture_output=True, text=True, cwd=str(root)).stdout
+        modes = {line.split()[3]: line.split()[0] for line in out.strip().split('\n') if line}
+        non_exec = sorted(f for f, m in modes.items() if m != '100755')
+        assert not non_exec, (
+            f"{non_exec} are chmodded by the installer but tracked non-executable, "
+            "so every install leaves the working tree dirty and the update "
+            "button cannot pull")

test/test_update_check_reports_failure.py

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+"""A check that could not run must not be reported as "up to date".
+
+check-update returned update_available=False whenever git failed. The banner
+is the only route to the update button, so a checkout git refuses to touch
+looked exactly like a current one -- permanently, and with nothing for the
+user to act on. The usual cause is an install performed as root, after which
+every git command fails with "detected dubious ownership".
+"""
+import subprocess
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+from flask import Flask
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from web_interface.blueprints import api_v3 as mod  # noqa: E402
+from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import api_v3  # noqa: E402
+
+DUBIOUS = ("fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at "
+           "'/home/pi/LEDMatrix'\nTo add an exception for this directory, call:\n"
+           "\tgit config --global --add safe.directory /home/pi/LEDMatrix\n")
+
+
+@pytest.fixture
+def client():
+    app = Flask(__name__)
+    app.config['TESTING'] = True
+    app.register_blueprint(api_v3, url_prefix='/api/v3')
+    mod._update_check_cache['result'] = None
+    mod._update_check_cache['ts'] = 0
+    return app.test_client()
+
+
+def _fetch_fails(stderr: bytes):
+    def fake_run(args, **kwargs):
+        if args[:2] == ['git', 'fetch']:
+            return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 1, stdout=b'', stderr=stderr)
+        return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout='', stderr='')
+    return fake_run
+
+
+class TestFailedCheckIsNotSilence:
+    def test_dubious_ownership_is_reported_not_swallowed(self, client):
+        with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', _fetch_fails(DUBIOUS.encode())):
+            data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
+        assert data['check_failed'] is True, (
+            "a git failure was reported as a successful 'no update' check")
+        assert data['update_available'] is False
+
+    def test_the_message_tells_the_user_what_to_do(self, client):
+        with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', _fetch_fails(DUBIOUS.encode())):
+            data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
+        assert 'chown' in data['error'], (
+            "dubious ownership is unactionable without the fix command")
+        assert 'root' in data['error']
+
+    def test_an_ordinary_git_failure_still_surfaces(self, client):
+        with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run',
+                          _fetch_fails(b'fatal: some other git problem\n')):
+            data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
+        assert data['check_failed'] is True
+        assert 'some other git problem' in data['error']
+
+    def test_offline_reads_as_offline(self, client):
+        with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run',
+                          _fetch_fails(b'fatal: could not resolve host: github.com\n')):
+            data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
+        assert 'Could not reach GitHub' in data['error']
+
+
+class TestSuccessPathUnchanged:
+    def test_up_to_date_carries_no_failure_flag(self, client):
+        def fake_run(args, **kwargs):
+            if args[:2] == ['git', 'fetch']:
+                return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout=b'', stderr=b'')
+            if args[:2] == ['git', 'rev-parse']:
+                return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout='abc123\n', stderr='')
+            return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout='0\n', stderr='')
+        with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', fake_run):
+            data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
+        assert data['update_available'] is False
+        assert not data.get('check_failed'), "a healthy check must not look like a failure"

test/web_interface/test_api_v3_secret_roundtrip.py

@@ -194,15 +194,46 @@ class TestSavePluginConfig:
 
     def test_secret_count_message_counts_top_level_keys(self, env):
         # Pinned: the "(N secret field(s))" message counts TOP-LEVEL keys of
-        # the separated secrets dict. Here that is 2: the posted accounts
+        # the separated secrets dict. Here that is 1: the posted accounts
-        # array (all its item tokens count as ONE key) plus the schema's
+        # array, whose item tokens all count as ONE key.
-        # api_key default ("") that merge_with_defaults adds before
+        #
-        # separation.
+        # It was 2 before blank secrets were dropped, the second being the
+        # schema's api_key default (""), which merge_with_defaults adds to
+        # every save. Counting it was the visible edge of a real bug: that
+        # injected blank was merged over the stored api_key, so saving any
+        # unrelated field destroyed the credential. See
+        # test_an_unrelated_edit_does_not_erase_a_stored_secret.
         resp = self._save(env, {
             "accounts": [{"name": "a", "token": "t"}],
         })
         message = resp.get_json()["message"]
-        assert "(2 secret field(s) saved to config_secrets.json)" in message
+        assert "(1 secret field(s) saved to config_secrets.json)" in message
+
+    def test_an_unrelated_edit_does_not_erase_a_stored_secret(self, env):
+        """Editing one field must not wipe the plugin's API key.
+
+        The config form renders secrets masked, so the browser posts them
+        back blank; merge_with_defaults injects a blank api_key even when
+        the client omits it entirely. Either way a "" reached the secrets
+        file and deep_merge wrote it over the stored credential.
+        """
+        assert self._save(env, {"api_key": "REAL-KEY-0123456789",
+                                "city": "Austin"}).status_code == 200
+        assert _on_disk(env.secrets_file)[PLUGIN_ID]["api_key"] == \
+            "REAL-KEY-0123456789"
+
+        # the user changes the city; the masked api_key rides along blank
+        assert self._save(env, {"api_key": "", "city": "Dallas"}).status_code == 200
+
+        assert _on_disk(env.secrets_file)[PLUGIN_ID]["api_key"] == \
+            "REAL-KEY-0123456789", "an unrelated edit destroyed the API key"
+        assert env.fresh_load()[PLUGIN_ID]["city"] == "Dallas"
+
+    def test_a_secret_can_still_be_changed(self, env):
+        """Dropping blanks must not stop a real new value from being saved."""
+        self._save(env, {"api_key": "first-key"})
+        self._save(env, {"api_key": "second-key"})
+        assert _on_disk(env.secrets_file)[PLUGIN_ID]["api_key"] == "second-key"
 
     def test_resave_replaces_stored_secrets_list_wholesale(self, env):
         # Characterized: api_v3's deep_merge intentionally replaces lists,

test/web_interface/test_config_secrets_masking.py

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+"""GET /config/secrets must not hand out credentials, and the client's
+read-modify-write cycle must not destroy them.
+
+This interface has no authentication. The endpoint returned the whole
+config_secrets.json to anyone who could reach the port; on one rig that was a
+40-character GitHub token, a 183-character Home Assistant token and three API
+keys. Masking it alone is not enough: the only client fetches every secret,
+edits one field and posts all of them back, so the write path has to treat an
+echoed mask as "unchanged".
+"""
+import json
+import sys
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent))
+
+from test_api_v3_secret_roundtrip import env, _on_disk  # noqa: F401,E402
+from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import SECRET_MASK  # noqa: E402
+
+STORED = {
+    "github": {"api_token": "ghp_" + "x" * 36},
+    "ledmatrix-weather": {"api_key": "w" * 32},
+    "incoming-packages": {"ha_token": "h" * 183},
+    "unset-plugin": {"api_key": ""},
+    "placeholder-plugin": {"api_key": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE"},
+}
+
+
+def _seed(env):
+    env.secrets_file.write_text(json.dumps(STORED))
+
+
+def _get(env):
+    r = env.client.get("/api/v3/config/secrets")
+    assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_data(as_text=True)[:200]
+    return r.get_json()["data"]
+
+
+def test_no_credential_leaves_the_process(env):
+    _seed(env)
+    body = json.dumps(_get(env))
+    for secret in ("ghp_" + "x" * 36, "w" * 32, "h" * 183):
+        assert secret not in body, "endpoint returned a stored credential"
+
+
+def test_set_and_unset_remain_distinguishable(env):
+    _seed(env)
+    data = _get(env)
+    assert data["github"]["api_token"] == SECRET_MASK
+    assert data["unset-plugin"]["api_key"] == ""
+    assert data["placeholder-plugin"]["api_key"] == "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE"
+
+
+def test_the_clients_read_modify_write_preserves_every_other_secret(env):
+    """What the GitHub-token save button actually does."""
+    _seed(env)
+    secrets = _get(env)                      # everything arrives masked
+    secrets["github"]["api_token"] = "ghp_" + "n" * 36   # user changes one
+    r = env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets", json=secrets)
+    assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_data(as_text=True)[:200]
+
+    on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
+    assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "n" * 36, "new token not saved"
+    assert on_disk["ledmatrix-weather"]["api_key"] == "w" * 32
+    assert on_disk["incoming-packages"]["ha_token"] == "h" * 183
+
+
+def test_a_mask_echoed_back_is_never_stored(env):
+    _seed(env)
+    env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets", json=_get(env))
+    on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
+    assert SECRET_MASK not in json.dumps(on_disk), "the mask was stored as a secret"
+    assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "x" * 36
+
+
+def test_a_brand_new_secret_can_still_be_added(env):
+    _seed(env)
+    env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets",
+                    json={"new-plugin": {"api_key": "brand-new"}})
+    on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
+    assert on_disk["new-plugin"]["api_key"] == "brand-new"
+    assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "x" * 36

web_interface/blueprints/api_v3.py

@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
 # Import new infrastructure
 from src.web_interface.api_helpers import success_response, error_response, validate_request_json
 from src.web_interface.errors import ErrorCode
-from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import find_secret_fields, separate_secrets
+from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import (find_secret_fields, mask_all_secret_values,
+                                              remove_empty_secrets, separate_secrets,
+                                              strip_masked_values)
 from src.web_interface.error_handler import describe_exception, redact_text
 from src.plugin_system.operation_types import OperationType
 from src.web_interface.validators import (
@@ -262,15 +264,54 @@ def _stop_display_service():
     result['status'] = status
     return result
 
+#: Field names whose value is a credential. Matched by name because this
+#: endpoint returns the whole config, core keys included, and core config has
+#: no schema to carry x-secret markers.
+_CREDENTIAL_NAME_PARTS = ("password", "passwd", "secret", "token", "api_key",
+                          "apikey", "access_key", "private_key", "client_secret")
+
+
+def _looks_like_a_credential(name: str) -> bool:
+    lowered = name.lower()
+    return any(part in lowered for part in _CREDENTIAL_NAME_PARTS)
+
+
+def _redact_credentials(value):
+    """A copy of `value` with credential-named fields blanked.
+
+    /config/main returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port,
+    and this interface has no authentication. On one rig that meant a 40-char
+    GitHub token, a 183-char Home Assistant token and five API keys were
+    readable by anything on the LAN.
+
+    The x-secret masking used by the plugin config endpoints does not help
+    here: this endpoint never consults a schema, and core keys such as
+    github.api_token have no schema to mark. Matching on the field name is
+    blunt, but for a whole-config dump the right default is that anything
+    named like a credential does not leave the process.
+
+    Blanked rather than removed, and safe to blank: POST /config/main merges
+    into the loaded config and only writes the keys it was given, so a client
+    that round-trips this response cannot erase a secret it never saw.
+    """
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {k: ("" if _looks_like_a_credential(k) and not isinstance(v, (dict, list))
+                    else _redact_credentials(v))
+                for k, v in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, list):
+        return [_redact_credentials(item) for item in value]
+    return value
+
+
 @api_v3.route('/config/main', methods=['GET'])
 def get_main_config():
-    """Get main configuration"""
+    """Get main configuration, with credentials redacted."""
     try:
         if not api_v3.config_manager:
             return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500
 
         config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
-        return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': config})
+        return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': _redact_credentials(config)})
     except Exception as e:
         logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True)
         return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@@ -715,10 +756,12 @@ def save_main_config():
         if not data:
             return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'No data provided'}), 400
 
-        import logging
+        # What arrives here is the config itself, and the headers carry the
-        logging.error(f"DEBUG: save_main_config received data: {data}")
+        # session cookie -- neither belongs in the journal, least of all at
-        logging.error(f"DEBUG: Content-Type header: {request.content_type}")
+        # ERROR on every save. The shape of the request is the part with
-        logging.error(f"DEBUG: Headers: {dict(request.headers)}")
+        # diagnostic value, so log that, at the level it deserves.
+        logger.debug("save_main_config: %s, %d top-level key(s)",
+                     request.content_type or 'no content-type', len(data))
 
         # Merge with existing config (similar to original implementation)
         current_config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
@@ -1216,6 +1259,11 @@ def save_main_config():
 
                 # Separate secrets from regular config (same logic as save_plugin_config)
                 regular_config, secrets_config = separate_secrets(plugin_config, secret_fields)
+                # The config form renders secrets masked, so every save posts
+                # them back blank. Without this the blank is merged over the
+                # stored value and the credential is destroyed by the act of
+                # changing an unrelated setting. A blank means "unchanged".
+                secrets_config = remove_empty_secrets(secrets_config)
 
                 # PRE-PROCESSING: Preserve 'enabled' state if not in regular_config
                 # This prevents overwriting the enabled state when saving config from a form that doesn't include the toggle
@@ -1333,7 +1381,12 @@ def get_secrets_config():
             return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500
 
         config = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets')
-        return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': config})
+        # This interface has no authentication, and this file is nothing but
+        # credentials. It was handing all of them to anyone who could reach
+        # the port. Values are masked; empty and YOUR_* placeholders are left
+        # alone so a client can still tell "set" from "not set".
+        return jsonify({'status': 'success',
+                        'data': mask_all_secret_values(config)})
     except Exception as e:
         logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True)
         return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@@ -1395,8 +1448,19 @@ def save_raw_secrets_config():
         if not data:
             return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'No data provided'}), 400
 
-        # Save the secrets config
+        # The GET above masks what it returns, and this endpoint's only client
-        api_v3.config_manager.save_raw_file_content('secrets', data)
+        # reads the whole file, edits one field and posts all of it back. So
+        # most of what arrives here is the mask, echoed rather than changed --
+        # storing it verbatim would replace every untouched credential with
+        # eight bullets. Strip those, then merge onto what is already stored,
+        # which makes "unchanged" mean unchanged.
+        #
+        # The cost is that a secret can no longer be cleared by blanking it.
+        # That needs its own affordance; a control that erases credentials as
+        # a side effect of saving an unrelated one is not it.
+        current = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets') or {}
+        merged = deep_merge(current, strip_masked_values(data))
+        api_v3.config_manager.save_raw_file_content('secrets', merged)
 
         # Reload GitHub token in plugin store manager if it exists
         if api_v3.plugin_store_manager:
@@ -1657,13 +1721,22 @@ def resolve_pull_command(project_dir):
     backup, or following an install guide that names one. The update button
     then reports a failure the user cannot act on.
 
+    ``--autostash`` is passed for the same reason. Rebase refuses to start
+    when any tracked file is modified, and on these installs something always
+    is: first_time_install.sh chmods five scripts that git tracked as 644, so
+    every machine that ran the installer carries five permanent mode changes
+    and the update button reports "cannot pull with rebase: You have unstaged
+    changes". Those modes are corrected in this commit, but a user cannot pull
+    the correction while the pull is what is blocked, and any other local edit
+    would reproduce it anyway. Autostash reapplies the changes afterwards.
+
     Returns ``(args, note, error)``. When ``origin/<branch>`` exists the pull
     is made explicit against it, so the update proceeds and the branch is
     given tracking information afterwards.
     """
     upstream = _git_upstream(project_dir)
     if upstream:
-        return ['git', 'pull', '--rebase'], '', None
+        return ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', '--autostash'], '', None
 
     branch = _git_current_branch(project_dir)
     if not branch:
@@ -1673,7 +1746,7 @@ def resolve_pull_command(project_dir):
         )
     if _git_remote_branch_exists(project_dir, branch):
         return (
-            ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', 'origin', branch],
+            ['git', 'pull', '--rebase', '--autostash', 'origin', branch],
             f"Branch '{branch}' had no upstream; pulled from origin/{branch} and set it as the upstream.",
             None,
         )
@@ -1821,6 +1894,33 @@ def get_system_version():
 _update_check_cache: Dict[str, Any] = {'result': None, 'ts': 0.0}
 _UPDATE_CHECK_TTL = 300  # 5 minutes — avoids a git fetch on every page load
 
+def _update_check_failed(detail: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """A check that could not run is not the same as being up to date.
+
+    Reporting update_available=False on a git failure hides the banner, and
+    the banner is the only route to the update button -- so a checkout git
+    refuses to touch looks exactly like a current one, permanently. The most
+    common cause is an install performed as root: git then reports "dubious
+    ownership" and every command fails, including the fetch here.
+    """
+    return {'update_available': False, 'remote_sha': 'unknown',
+            'commits_behind': 0, 'check_failed': True, 'error': detail}
+
+
+def _describe_git_failure(stderr: str) -> str:
+    """Turn git's stderr into something the user can act on."""
+    text = (stderr or '').strip()
+    if 'dubious ownership' in text or 'detected dubious ownership' in text:
+        return ("This checkout is owned by a different user than the one "
+                "running the web interface, so git refuses to use it. It is "
+                "usually the result of installing as root. Fix the ownership "
+                "and the update will work: sudo chown -R $USER:$USER "
+                + str(PROJECT_ROOT))
+    if 'could not resolve host' in text.lower() or 'network is unreachable' in text.lower():
+        return "Could not reach GitHub to check for updates."
+    return "Could not check for updates: " + (text.splitlines()[0] if text else "git failed")
+
+
 @api_v3.route('/system/check-update', methods=['GET'])
 def check_for_update():
     """Check whether a newer LEDMatrix commit is available on origin/main."""
@@ -1836,12 +1936,13 @@ def check_for_update():
             capture_output=True, timeout=10, cwd=cwd,
         )
         if fetch_result.returncode != 0:
+            stderr = fetch_result.stderr.decode(errors='replace').strip()
             logger.warning("check-update: git fetch failed (rc=%d): %s",
-                           fetch_result.returncode,
+                           fetch_result.returncode, stderr)
-                           fetch_result.stderr.decode(errors='replace').strip())
+            failed = _update_check_failed(_describe_git_failure(stderr))
-            _update_check_cache['result'] = _safe
+            _update_check_cache['result'] = failed
             _update_check_cache['ts'] = now
-            return jsonify(_safe)
+            return jsonify(failed)
         local = subprocess.run(
             ['git', 'rev-parse', 'HEAD'],
             capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5, cwd=cwd,
@@ -1869,7 +1970,8 @@ def check_for_update():
         return jsonify(result)
     except Exception as e:
         logger.warning("check-update failed: %s", e)
-        return jsonify(_safe)
+        return jsonify(_update_check_failed(
+            "Could not check for updates; see logs for details."))
 
 @api_v3.route('/system/action', methods=['POST'])
 def execute_system_action():
@@ -5610,6 +5712,11 @@ def save_plugin_config():
         # Separate secrets from regular config (handles nested configs and
         # array-item secrets — see src/web_interface/secret_helpers.py)
         regular_config, secrets_config = separate_secrets(plugin_config, secret_fields)
+        # The config form renders secrets masked, so every save posts
+        # them back blank. Without this the blank is merged over the
+        # stored value and the credential is destroyed by the act of
+        # changing an unrelated setting. A blank means "unchanged".
+        secrets_config = remove_empty_secrets(secrets_config)
 
         # Get current configs
         current_config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()

web_interface/static/v3/plugins_manager.js

@@ -4622,15 +4622,17 @@ window.loadGithubToken = function() {
                 // Handle empty data (secrets file doesn't exist) - API returns {} in this case
                 const secrets = data.data || {};
                 const token = secrets.github?.api_token || '';
+                const configured = token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN';
 
                 if (input) {
-                    if (token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN') {
+                    // The endpoint masks what it returns, so this never holds
-                        // Token exists and is valid
+                    // the real token -- and the field is deliberately left
-                        input.value = token;
+                    // empty rather than filled with the mask, which would be
-                        showNotification('GitHub token loaded successfully', 'success');
+                    // saved verbatim the next time the user pressed Save.
+                    input.value = '';
+                    if (configured) {
+                        showNotification('A GitHub token is saved. Enter a new one to replace it.', 'success');
                     } else {
-                        // No token configured or placeholder value
-                        input.value = '';
                         showNotification('No GitHub token configured. Enter a new token to save.', 'info');
                     }
                 }

web_interface/templates/v3/base.html

@@ -1108,15 +1108,29 @@
         fetch('/api/v3/system/check-update')
             .then(function(r) { return r.json(); })
             .then(function(data) {
+                var banner = document.getElementById('update-banner');
+                var btn = document.getElementById('update-banner-btn');
+                if (data.check_failed) {
+                    // A check that could not run is not the same as being up
+                    // to date. Hiding the banner here made a checkout git
+                    // refuses to touch look permanently current, with no
+                    // route to the update button and nothing to act on.
+                    document.getElementById('update-banner-text').textContent =
+                        data.error || 'Could not check for updates.';
+                    if (btn) btn.style.display = 'none';
+                    banner.style.display = '';
+                    return;
+                }
+                if (btn) btn.style.display = '';
                 if (data.update_available && getDismissedSha() !== data.remote_sha) {
                     var n = data.commits_behind || 0;
                     var msg = 'A new LEDMatrix update is available';
                     if (n > 0) msg += ' (' + n + ' commit' + (n > 1 ? 's' : '') + ')';
                     document.getElementById('update-banner-text').textContent = msg;
-                    document.getElementById('update-banner').style.display = '';
+                    banner.style.display = '';
                     try { sessionStorage.setItem('update-sha', data.remote_sha); } catch(e) {}
                 } else {
-                    document.getElementById('update-banner').style.display = 'none';
+                    banner.style.display = 'none';
                 }
             })
             .catch(function() {});