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Author SHA1 Message Date
ChuckBuilds 7d8d3a544e Merge branch 'fix/config-secrets-leak' of https://github.com/ChuckBuilds/LEDMatrix into consolidate/web
# Conflicts:
#	web_interface/blueprints/api_v3.py
2026-08-20 17:43:51 -04:00
ChuckBuilds f4db8dcae9 Merge branch 'fix/update-prompts-restart' of https://github.com/ChuckBuilds/LEDMatrix into consolidate/web 2026-08-20 17:43:00 -04:00
ChuckBuilds 1cb01c1e5d Merge branch 'fix/update-check-reports-failure' of https://github.com/ChuckBuilds/LEDMatrix into consolidate/web 2026-08-20 17:42:59 -04:00
ChuckBuilds b8ef65856c Merge branch 'fix/update-blocked-by-installer-chmod' of https://github.com/ChuckBuilds/LEDMatrix into consolidate/web 2026-08-20 17:42:57 -04:00
ChuckBuilds c7401e17e0 Merge branch 'fix/debug-dump-of-config-and-headers' of https://github.com/ChuckBuilds/LEDMatrix into consolidate/web 2026-08-20 17:42:55 -04:00
ChuckBuilds e085379dad Merge branch 'fix/blank-secrets-erase-stored-credentials' of https://github.com/ChuckBuilds/LEDMatrix into consolidate/web 2026-08-20 17:42:54 -04:00
ChuckBuildsandClaude Opus 5 6642a78d0e fix(web): ask for the restart that makes an update take effect
The update button pulls new code and restarts nothing. There is no systemctl,
restart, reload or reboot anywhere in the 172-line git_pull handler -- it
stashes, pulls, installs changed requirements, re-removes plugins the user had
uninstalled, and returns "Code updated successfully."

Meanwhile both services go on running the code they loaded at boot. So the
display keeps rendering the old build, the web interface keeps serving the old
build, and the user is told the update worked. Nothing on screen suggests
otherwise, and the next reboot is what actually applies it -- whenever that is.

The affordance for this already exists: the restart-pending banner, raised
after main-config saves, with a Restart Now button wired to the display
service. A code update is a stronger reason to show it than a config save is.

The response now reports restart_required, and applyUpdate raises the banner
with wording for a code update rather than a config save. The banner's message
became a parameter and is persisted next to the flag, since it outlives the
page that raised it.

restart_required is only true when the pull actually moved HEAD. "Already up
to date" is a success too, and prompting after a no-op would train users to
dismiss the prompt unread.

This covers the display service, which is what the Restart Now button drives
and what users notice. The web interface still picks up its own new code on
its next restart; restarting it from inside a request it is serving is a
larger change than this one.

Reverting the flag fails the test that a pull which moved HEAD asks for a
restart. 290 tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01STMbQE4YctTacQXfbYqKuW
2026-08-20 14:29:39 -04:00
ChuckBuildsandClaude Opus 5 ec8591e4ac fix(web): stop reporting "no update" when the update check could not run
check-update returned update_available=False whenever git failed. The banner
is the only route to the update button, so a checkout git refuses to touch
looked exactly like a current one -- permanently, with nothing on screen to
act on and only a log line recording why.

The common cause is an install performed as root. scripts/install/one-shot-install.sh
clones into ${HOME}/LEDMatrix, never consults SUDO_USER, and contains no chown
at all, while its own error text suggests running the whole thing under sudo.
The result is a root-owned checkout, and on a rig this is what every git
command in it does:

    fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at '...'

including the fetch this endpoint runs. Verified on real hardware rather than
assumed.

A failed check now reports check_failed with a message the user can act on --
for dubious ownership, the chown that fixes it. The banner shows that message
instead of hiding itself, with the update button suppressed since updating
cannot work until the cause is fixed. The success path is untouched.

This does not fix the installer, which is the real cause; it stops the symptom
being invisible. The installer needs SUDO_USER handling and a chown, and its
suggestion to run as root should go.

Reverting the endpoint change fails four of the five new tests; the fifth
guards the success path and correctly does not move.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01STMbQE4YctTacQXfbYqKuW
2026-08-20 13:04:16 -04:00
ChuckBuildsandClaude Opus 5 d2379a1eb6 fix(web): stop /config/secrets handing out every credential it holds
GET /api/v3/config/secrets returned config_secrets.json in full to anyone who
could reach the port, and this interface has no authentication. Probed against
a real rig it produced six populated credential fields: a 40-character GitHub
token, a 183-character Home Assistant token, and Jellyfin and weather API keys.
This is the second door onto the same credentials; #477 closes the first.

Masking the response alone would have been worse than the leak. The only
client fetches every secret, edits one field and posts all of them back, and
save_raw_file_content replaces the file wholesale -- so a masked GET followed
by the client's own save would write the mask over every credential the user
had not touched. That is why this was left open when the leak was found; it
needs both halves.

Read side: mask_all_secret_values(), which already existed for exactly this
endpoint -- its docstring names it -- and had never been wired to a call site.
It leaves empty values and YOUR_* placeholders alone, so a client can still
tell "set" from "not set" without being told the secret.

Write side: strip the echoed mask and blanks from the submission, then merge
onto what is stored, so "unchanged" means unchanged. The cost is that a secret
can no longer be cleared by blanking it; that wants its own affordance, since
a control that erases credentials as a side effect of saving an unrelated one
is not one.

Browser side: the token field is now left empty rather than filled from the
response. Filling it with the mask would have stored eight bullet characters
as the token the next time the user pressed Save, and filling it with the real
value is the thing being fixed. It reports whether a token is saved instead.

Verified end to end through the Flask endpoints, not the helpers. Reverting
the masking fails the leak tests; reverting the merge fails the preservation
tests; both halves are independently guarded. 278 web tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01STMbQE4YctTacQXfbYqKuW
2026-08-20 12:13:12 -04:00
ChuckBuildsandClaude Opus 5 f0efdafbdb fix(web): stop dumping the config and request headers to the journal
save_main_config logged its entire POST body and the full request headers at
ERROR on every save. The body is the configuration itself, and the headers
carry the session cookie, so a routine settings change wrote both to the
journal -- at a level that guarantees they survive any sane log filter.

The lines are leftover debug output: they say "DEBUG:" in the message while
calling logging.error, and they went through the root logger rather than the
module logger, bypassing the level configured for this blueprint.

Replaced with a debug-level line recording the shape of the request, which is
the part with diagnostic value. The local `import logging` went with them; it
shadowed a module-level import that was already there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01STMbQE4YctTacQXfbYqKuW
2026-08-20 05:55:45 -04:00
ChuckBuildsandClaude Opus 5 95bd8a1a67 fix(web): stop an unrelated config edit from erasing a plugin's secret
Saving any field on a plugin's config form destroyed that plugin's stored
credential. On a rig with a weather API key, changing the city silently
emptied the key, and the plugin stopped working at the next fetch with no
indication why.

The path had no guard at any step. The config partial masks secrets before
rendering (pages_v3.py:740), so the browser posts them back blank; _parse_value
deliberately preserves "" for optional string fields; separate_secrets routes
that "" into secrets_config, which is a truthy dict; deep_merge writes it over
the stored value; save_raw_file_content persists it.

The blank does not even need the round-trip. merge_with_defaults injects the
schema's api_key default ("") into every save, so a client that never sends
the field at all still erases it. test_secret_count_message_counts_top_level_keys
was counting exactly that injected blank as a saved secret field -- the visible
edge of the bug, pinned as expected behaviour.

remove_empty_secrets() already existed for this, with seven unit tests and a
docstring describing this precise scenario ("clients will send those empty
strings back ... so that existing stored secrets are not overwritten with
blanks"). It was never wired into a call site. This wires it into both save
paths that merge into the secrets file.

A blank now means "unchanged" rather than "delete", which is the same contract
the helper's tests already describe. The cost is that a secret can no longer be
cleared by emptying the field; clearing needs its own affordance, since a
control that erases credentials as a side effect of ordinary edits is not one.

Verified by reverting the guard: the new round-trip test then fails with the
stored key read back as ''. 262 web tests pass with it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01STMbQE4YctTacQXfbYqKuW
2026-08-20 05:53:51 -04:00
ChuckBuilds fc6104f229 fix(web): stop /config/main handing out every credential it holds
The endpoint returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port, and
this web interface has no authentication of any kind. An unauthenticated
request against a live rig returned:

    github.api_token                40 chars
    incoming-packages.ha_token     183 chars
    jellyfin-now-playing.api_key    32 chars
    ledmatrix-weather.api_key       32 chars
    on-air.mqtt_password             8 chars
    youtube.api_key                 20 chars
    youtube-stats.api_key           39 chars

A GitHub token and a Home Assistant long-lived token among them. Anything on
that LAN could read them.

The x-secret masking the plugin config endpoints use does not reach here: this
route never consults a schema, and core keys such as github.api_token have no
schema to carry the marker. Several of the fields above *are* tagged x-secret
in their plugin's schema and were still returned in full, which is what rules
out the schema route as the fix for this endpoint.

Credential-named fields are now blanked. Matching on the name is blunt, and
for a whole-config dump that is the right default: anything named like a
credential should not leave the process, and a new plugin adding a
differently-shaped secret is covered without anyone remembering to tag it.

Blanked rather than removed, and safe to blank: POST /config/main merges into
the freshly loaded config and writes only the keys it was given, so a client
that round-trips this response cannot erase a secret it never saw. The web API
suites confirm it -- 81 passing, unchanged.

On the test that matters: the first version of this suite exercised the two
helpers and nothing else, and reverting the single line that wires the
redactor into the route passed all thirty of them. A property asserted on a
helper is not a property asserted on the endpoint, and it is the endpoint that
is exposed to the network. The added test goes through the view function, and
it does fail on that revert.

This also corrects an earlier claim of mine. I reported that GET /api/v3/config
did not expose these values; that path 404s, so the check proved nothing. The
real route is /config/main and it exposed all of them.
2026-08-20 05:09:12 -04:00
11 changed files with 638 additions and 33 deletions
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@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ def mask_secret_fields(config: Dict[str, Any], schema_properties: Dict[str, Any]
return result
#: What a masked secret looks like on the wire. Named because the write path
#: has to recognise it coming back: a client that renders the mask and posts
#: it unchanged must not store the mask as if it were the secret.
SECRET_MASK = '\u2022' * 8
def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Blanket-mask every non-empty value in a secrets config dict.
@@ -161,7 +167,7 @@ def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if isinstance(v, dict):
masked[k] = mask_all_secret_values(v)
elif v not in (None, '') and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith('YOUR_')):
masked[k] = '••••••••'
masked[k] = SECRET_MASK
else:
masked[k] = v
return masked
@@ -189,3 +195,30 @@ def remove_empty_secrets(secrets: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
elif v is not None and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.strip() == ''):
result[k] = v
return result
def strip_masked_values(secrets: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Remove values a client echoed back rather than changed.
The counterpart to :func:`mask_all_secret_values`. A client that GETs the
masked secrets, edits one field and POSTs the whole object back is sending
``SECRET_MASK`` for every field it did not touch. Storing those would
replace each untouched credential with eight bullet characters.
Drops the mask and, like :func:`remove_empty_secrets`, blank values -- so
the caller can merge the result onto what is already stored and have
"unchanged" mean unchanged. Empty nested dicts are pruned.
"""
result: Dict[str, Any] = {}
for k, v in secrets.items():
if isinstance(v, dict):
nested = strip_masked_values(v)
if nested:
result[k] = nested
elif v is None:
continue
elif isinstance(v, str) and (v.strip() == '' or v == SECRET_MASK):
continue
else:
result[k] = v
return result
+143
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@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
"""GET /config/main must not hand out credentials.
The endpoint returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port, and
this web interface has no authentication of any kind. Measured against a live
rig, an unauthenticated request returned:
github.api_token 40 chars
incoming-packages.ha_token 183 chars
jellyfin-now-playing.api_key 32 chars
ledmatrix-weather.api_key 32 chars
on-air.mqtt_password 8 chars
youtube.api_key 20 chars
youtube-stats.api_key 39 chars
A GitHub token and a Home Assistant long-lived token among them.
The x-secret masking the plugin config endpoints use does not apply here: this
endpoint never consults a schema, and core keys such as github.api_token have
no schema to carry the marker. Several of those fields *are* tagged x-secret in
their plugin's schema and were still returned in full, which is what makes the
schema route the wrong one to rely on for this endpoint.
Matching on field name is blunt. For a whole-config dump it is the right
default: anything named like a credential should not leave the process, and a
new plugin that adds a differently-shaped secret is covered without anyone
remembering to tag it.
"""
import pytest
from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import (
_looks_like_a_credential,
_redact_credentials,
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
"password", "mqtt_password", "opensky_password", "passwd",
"api_key", "apikey", "API_KEY", "flightaware_api_key",
"token", "ha_token", "api_token", "access_token",
"secret", "client_secret", "spotify_client_secret",
"access_key", "private_key",
])
def test_credential_names_are_recognised(name):
assert _looks_like_a_credential(name)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
"timezone", "city", "brightness", "enabled", "update_interval",
"favorite_teams", "display_duration", "keyword",
])
def test_ordinary_names_are_left_alone(name):
assert not _looks_like_a_credential(name)
def test_the_measured_leak_is_closed():
"""The exact shape taken off the rig."""
config = {
"github": {"api_token": "ghp_" + "x" * 36},
"incoming-packages": {"ha_token": "y" * 183, "enabled": True},
"jellyfin-now-playing": {"api_key": "z" * 32},
"on-air": {"mqtt_password": "hunter22"},
"youtube": {"api_key": "k" * 20},
"timezone": "America/New_York",
}
out = _redact_credentials(config)
assert out["github"]["api_token"] == ""
assert out["incoming-packages"]["ha_token"] == ""
assert out["jellyfin-now-playing"]["api_key"] == ""
assert out["on-air"]["mqtt_password"] == ""
assert out["youtube"]["api_key"] == ""
# Everything else survives, or the config editor breaks.
assert out["timezone"] == "America/New_York"
assert out["incoming-packages"]["enabled"] is True
def test_nested_and_listed_credentials_are_reached():
config = {"a": {"b": {"c": {"password": "p"}}},
"feeds": [{"name": "x", "api_key": "k"}, {"name": "y"}]}
out = _redact_credentials(config)
assert out["a"]["b"]["c"]["password"] == ""
assert out["feeds"][0]["api_key"] == ""
assert out["feeds"][0]["name"] == "x"
def test_the_original_is_not_mutated():
"""The caller holds the live config; redaction must not edit it in place."""
config = {"github": {"api_token": "keepme"}}
_redact_credentials(config)
assert config["github"]["api_token"] == "keepme"
def test_a_credential_shaped_container_is_still_walked():
"""`secrets: {...}` is a section name, not a value to blank."""
config = {"secrets": {"api_key": "k", "note": "keep"}}
out = _redact_credentials(config)
assert out["secrets"]["api_key"] == ""
assert out["secrets"]["note"] == "keep"
def test_non_dict_input_passes_through():
assert _redact_credentials("plain") == "plain"
assert _redact_credentials(7) == 7
assert _redact_credentials(None) is None
def test_the_endpoint_itself_redacts():
"""Through the view function, not the helper.
The helper tests above all passed with the route still returning
`config` -- reverting the one line that calls the redactor changed
nothing, because nothing exercised the route. A property asserted on a
helper is not a property asserted on the endpoint, and it is the endpoint
that is exposed to the network.
"""
import json as _json
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import flask
from web_interface.blueprints import api_v3 as mod
raw = {"github": {"api_token": "ghp_secret_value"},
"timezone": "America/New_York"}
manager = MagicMock()
manager.load_config.return_value = raw
previous = getattr(mod.api_v3, "config_manager", None)
mod.api_v3.config_manager = manager
app = flask.Flask(__name__)
try:
with app.test_request_context("/config/main"):
response = mod.get_main_config()
payload = response.get_json() if hasattr(response, "get_json") else _json.loads(response[0].data)
finally:
mod.api_v3.config_manager = previous
data = payload["data"]
assert data["github"]["api_token"] == "", (
"the endpoint returned the token; the redactor is not wired in")
assert data["timezone"] == "America/New_York"
# And the config the manager handed over is untouched.
assert raw["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_secret_value"
+85
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@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
"""A check that could not run must not be reported as "up to date".
check-update returned update_available=False whenever git failed. The banner
is the only route to the update button, so a checkout git refuses to touch
looked exactly like a current one -- permanently, and with nothing for the
user to act on. The usual cause is an install performed as root, after which
every git command fails with "detected dubious ownership".
"""
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
import pytest
from flask import Flask
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from web_interface.blueprints import api_v3 as mod # noqa: E402
from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import api_v3 # noqa: E402
DUBIOUS = ("fatal: detected dubious ownership in repository at "
"'/home/pi/LEDMatrix'\nTo add an exception for this directory, call:\n"
"\tgit config --global --add safe.directory /home/pi/LEDMatrix\n")
@pytest.fixture
def client():
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config['TESTING'] = True
app.register_blueprint(api_v3, url_prefix='/api/v3')
mod._update_check_cache['result'] = None
mod._update_check_cache['ts'] = 0
return app.test_client()
def _fetch_fails(stderr: bytes):
def fake_run(args, **kwargs):
if args[:2] == ['git', 'fetch']:
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 1, stdout=b'', stderr=stderr)
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout='', stderr='')
return fake_run
class TestFailedCheckIsNotSilence:
def test_dubious_ownership_is_reported_not_swallowed(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', _fetch_fails(DUBIOUS.encode())):
data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
assert data['check_failed'] is True, (
"a git failure was reported as a successful 'no update' check")
assert data['update_available'] is False
def test_the_message_tells_the_user_what_to_do(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', _fetch_fails(DUBIOUS.encode())):
data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
assert 'chown' in data['error'], (
"dubious ownership is unactionable without the fix command")
assert 'root' in data['error']
def test_an_ordinary_git_failure_still_surfaces(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run',
_fetch_fails(b'fatal: some other git problem\n')):
data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
assert data['check_failed'] is True
assert 'some other git problem' in data['error']
def test_offline_reads_as_offline(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run',
_fetch_fails(b'fatal: could not resolve host: github.com\n')):
data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
assert 'Could not reach GitHub' in data['error']
class TestSuccessPathUnchanged:
def test_up_to_date_carries_no_failure_flag(self, client):
def fake_run(args, **kwargs):
if args[:2] == ['git', 'fetch']:
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout=b'', stderr=b'')
if args[:2] == ['git', 'rev-parse']:
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout='abc123\n', stderr='')
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(args, 0, stdout='0\n', stderr='')
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', fake_run):
data = client.get('/api/v3/system/check-update').get_json()
assert data['update_available'] is False
assert not data.get('check_failed'), "a healthy check must not look like a failure"
+84
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@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
"""A pull that changed nothing on the running system is not an applied update.
git_pull replaces files on disk and restarts nothing -- there is no systemctl
call anywhere in the handler. The display and web services keep running the
code they loaded at boot, so the user is told "Code updated successfully" and
sees no change until they happen to reboot. The response now says whether a
restart is owed, and the UI raises the existing restart-pending banner.
"""
import subprocess
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
import pytest
from flask import Flask
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from web_interface.blueprints import api_v3 as mod # noqa: E402
from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import api_v3 # noqa: E402
@pytest.fixture
def client():
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config['TESTING'] = True
app.register_blueprint(api_v3, url_prefix='/api/v3')
# The handler consults these after a successful pull; None is the
# "not wired up" case it already guards for.
api_v3.plugin_store_manager = None
api_v3.config_manager = None
return app.test_client()
def _git(heads, pull_rc=0, pull_out='Updating a1b2c3..d4e5f6\n'):
"""Fake git. `heads` are the successive answers to rev-parse HEAD."""
seq = list(heads)
def run(args, **kwargs):
def ok(stdout='', rc=0, b=False):
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(
args, rc, stdout=(stdout.encode() if b else stdout),
stderr=(b'' if b else ''))
if args[:2] == ['git', 'rev-parse'] and args[-1] == 'HEAD':
return ok(seq.pop(0) + '\n' if seq else 'deadbeef\n')
if 'symbolic-full-name' in args or '@{u}' in args:
return ok('origin/main\n')
if args[:2] == ['git', 'status']:
return ok('')
if args[:2] == ['git', 'diff']:
return ok('')
if args[:2] == ['git', 'pull']:
return ok(pull_out, pull_rc)
return ok('')
return run
def _pull(client):
return client.post('/api/v3/system/action',
json={'action': 'git_pull'}).get_json()
class TestRestartIsRequestedWhenCodeChanged:
def test_a_pull_that_moved_head_asks_for_a_restart(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', _git(['aaa111', 'bbb222'])):
data = _pull(client)
assert data['status'] == 'success'
assert data['restart_required'] is True, (
"new code on disk, services still running the old code, and "
"nothing told the user to restart")
def test_already_up_to_date_does_not(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run',
_git(['aaa111', 'aaa111'], pull_out='Already up to date.\n')):
data = _pull(client)
assert data['status'] == 'success'
assert data['restart_required'] is False, (
"prompting after a no-op update trains users to ignore the prompt")
def test_a_failed_pull_does_not(self, client):
with patch.object(mod.subprocess, 'run', _git(['aaa111'], pull_rc=1)):
data = _pull(client)
assert data['status'] == 'error'
assert data['restart_required'] is False
@@ -194,15 +194,46 @@ class TestSavePluginConfig:
def test_secret_count_message_counts_top_level_keys(self, env):
# Pinned: the "(N secret field(s))" message counts TOP-LEVEL keys of
# the separated secrets dict. Here that is 2: the posted accounts
# array (all its item tokens count as ONE key) plus the schema's
# api_key default ("") that merge_with_defaults adds before
# separation.
# the separated secrets dict. Here that is 1: the posted accounts
# array, whose item tokens all count as ONE key.
#
# It was 2 before blank secrets were dropped, the second being the
# schema's api_key default (""), which merge_with_defaults adds to
# every save. Counting it was the visible edge of a real bug: that
# injected blank was merged over the stored api_key, so saving any
# unrelated field destroyed the credential. See
# test_an_unrelated_edit_does_not_erase_a_stored_secret.
resp = self._save(env, {
"accounts": [{"name": "a", "token": "t"}],
})
message = resp.get_json()["message"]
assert "(2 secret field(s) saved to config_secrets.json)" in message
assert "(1 secret field(s) saved to config_secrets.json)" in message
def test_an_unrelated_edit_does_not_erase_a_stored_secret(self, env):
"""Editing one field must not wipe the plugin's API key.
The config form renders secrets masked, so the browser posts them
back blank; merge_with_defaults injects a blank api_key even when
the client omits it entirely. Either way a "" reached the secrets
file and deep_merge wrote it over the stored credential.
"""
assert self._save(env, {"api_key": "REAL-KEY-0123456789",
"city": "Austin"}).status_code == 200
assert _on_disk(env.secrets_file)[PLUGIN_ID]["api_key"] == \
"REAL-KEY-0123456789"
# the user changes the city; the masked api_key rides along blank
assert self._save(env, {"api_key": "", "city": "Dallas"}).status_code == 200
assert _on_disk(env.secrets_file)[PLUGIN_ID]["api_key"] == \
"REAL-KEY-0123456789", "an unrelated edit destroyed the API key"
assert env.fresh_load()[PLUGIN_ID]["city"] == "Dallas"
def test_a_secret_can_still_be_changed(self, env):
"""Dropping blanks must not stop a real new value from being saved."""
self._save(env, {"api_key": "first-key"})
self._save(env, {"api_key": "second-key"})
assert _on_disk(env.secrets_file)[PLUGIN_ID]["api_key"] == "second-key"
def test_resave_replaces_stored_secrets_list_wholesale(self, env):
# Characterized: api_v3's deep_merge intentionally replaces lists,
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
"""GET /config/secrets must not hand out credentials, and the client's
read-modify-write cycle must not destroy them.
This interface has no authentication. The endpoint returned the whole
config_secrets.json to anyone who could reach the port; on one rig that was a
40-character GitHub token, a 183-character Home Assistant token and three API
keys. Masking it alone is not enough: the only client fetches every secret,
edits one field and posts all of them back, so the write path has to treat an
echoed mask as "unchanged".
"""
import json
import sys
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent))
from test_api_v3_secret_roundtrip import env, _on_disk # noqa: F401,E402
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import SECRET_MASK # noqa: E402
STORED = {
"github": {"api_token": "ghp_" + "x" * 36},
"ledmatrix-weather": {"api_key": "w" * 32},
"incoming-packages": {"ha_token": "h" * 183},
"unset-plugin": {"api_key": ""},
"placeholder-plugin": {"api_key": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE"},
}
def _seed(env):
env.secrets_file.write_text(json.dumps(STORED))
def _get(env):
r = env.client.get("/api/v3/config/secrets")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_data(as_text=True)[:200]
return r.get_json()["data"]
def test_no_credential_leaves_the_process(env):
_seed(env)
body = json.dumps(_get(env))
for secret in ("ghp_" + "x" * 36, "w" * 32, "h" * 183):
assert secret not in body, "endpoint returned a stored credential"
def test_set_and_unset_remain_distinguishable(env):
_seed(env)
data = _get(env)
assert data["github"]["api_token"] == SECRET_MASK
assert data["unset-plugin"]["api_key"] == ""
assert data["placeholder-plugin"]["api_key"] == "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE"
def test_the_clients_read_modify_write_preserves_every_other_secret(env):
"""What the GitHub-token save button actually does."""
_seed(env)
secrets = _get(env) # everything arrives masked
secrets["github"]["api_token"] = "ghp_" + "n" * 36 # user changes one
r = env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets", json=secrets)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_data(as_text=True)[:200]
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "n" * 36, "new token not saved"
assert on_disk["ledmatrix-weather"]["api_key"] == "w" * 32
assert on_disk["incoming-packages"]["ha_token"] == "h" * 183
def test_a_mask_echoed_back_is_never_stored(env):
_seed(env)
env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets", json=_get(env))
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert SECRET_MASK not in json.dumps(on_disk), "the mask was stored as a secret"
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "x" * 36
def test_a_brand_new_secret_can_still_be_added(env):
_seed(env)
env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets",
json={"new-plugin": {"api_key": "brand-new"}})
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert on_disk["new-plugin"]["api_key"] == "brand-new"
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "x" * 36
+124 -15
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,9 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Import new infrastructure
from src.web_interface.api_helpers import success_response, error_response, validate_request_json
from src.web_interface.errors import ErrorCode
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import find_secret_fields, separate_secrets
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import (find_secret_fields, mask_all_secret_values,
remove_empty_secrets, separate_secrets,
strip_masked_values)
from src.web_interface.error_handler import describe_exception, redact_text
from src.plugin_system.operation_types import OperationType
from src.web_interface.validators import (
@@ -262,15 +264,54 @@ def _stop_display_service():
result['status'] = status
return result
#: Field names whose value is a credential. Matched by name because this
#: endpoint returns the whole config, core keys included, and core config has
#: no schema to carry x-secret markers.
_CREDENTIAL_NAME_PARTS = ("password", "passwd", "secret", "token", "api_key",
"apikey", "access_key", "private_key", "client_secret")
def _looks_like_a_credential(name: str) -> bool:
lowered = name.lower()
return any(part in lowered for part in _CREDENTIAL_NAME_PARTS)
def _redact_credentials(value):
"""A copy of `value` with credential-named fields blanked.
/config/main returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port,
and this interface has no authentication. On one rig that meant a 40-char
GitHub token, a 183-char Home Assistant token and five API keys were
readable by anything on the LAN.
The x-secret masking used by the plugin config endpoints does not help
here: this endpoint never consults a schema, and core keys such as
github.api_token have no schema to mark. Matching on the field name is
blunt, but for a whole-config dump the right default is that anything
named like a credential does not leave the process.
Blanked rather than removed, and safe to blank: POST /config/main merges
into the loaded config and only writes the keys it was given, so a client
that round-trips this response cannot erase a secret it never saw.
"""
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {k: ("" if _looks_like_a_credential(k) and not isinstance(v, (dict, list))
else _redact_credentials(v))
for k, v in value.items()}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [_redact_credentials(item) for item in value]
return value
@api_v3.route('/config/main', methods=['GET'])
def get_main_config():
"""Get main configuration"""
"""Get main configuration, with credentials redacted."""
try:
if not api_v3.config_manager:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500
config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': config})
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': _redact_credentials(config)})
except Exception as e:
logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True)
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@@ -715,10 +756,12 @@ def save_main_config():
if not data:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'No data provided'}), 400
import logging
logging.error(f"DEBUG: save_main_config received data: {data}")
logging.error(f"DEBUG: Content-Type header: {request.content_type}")
logging.error(f"DEBUG: Headers: {dict(request.headers)}")
# What arrives here is the config itself, and the headers carry the
# session cookie -- neither belongs in the journal, least of all at
# ERROR on every save. The shape of the request is the part with
# diagnostic value, so log that, at the level it deserves.
logger.debug("save_main_config: %s, %d top-level key(s)",
request.content_type or 'no content-type', len(data))
# Merge with existing config (similar to original implementation)
current_config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
@@ -1216,6 +1259,11 @@ def save_main_config():
# Separate secrets from regular config (same logic as save_plugin_config)
regular_config, secrets_config = separate_secrets(plugin_config, secret_fields)
# The config form renders secrets masked, so every save posts
# them back blank. Without this the blank is merged over the
# stored value and the credential is destroyed by the act of
# changing an unrelated setting. A blank means "unchanged".
secrets_config = remove_empty_secrets(secrets_config)
# PRE-PROCESSING: Preserve 'enabled' state if not in regular_config
# This prevents overwriting the enabled state when saving config from a form that doesn't include the toggle
@@ -1333,7 +1381,12 @@ def get_secrets_config():
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500
config = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets')
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': config})
# This interface has no authentication, and this file is nothing but
# credentials. It was handing all of them to anyone who could reach
# the port. Values are masked; empty and YOUR_* placeholders are left
# alone so a client can still tell "set" from "not set".
return jsonify({'status': 'success',
'data': mask_all_secret_values(config)})
except Exception as e:
logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True)
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@@ -1395,8 +1448,19 @@ def save_raw_secrets_config():
if not data:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'No data provided'}), 400
# Save the secrets config
api_v3.config_manager.save_raw_file_content('secrets', data)
# The GET above masks what it returns, and this endpoint's only client
# reads the whole file, edits one field and posts all of it back. So
# most of what arrives here is the mask, echoed rather than changed --
# storing it verbatim would replace every untouched credential with
# eight bullets. Strip those, then merge onto what is already stored,
# which makes "unchanged" mean unchanged.
#
# The cost is that a secret can no longer be cleared by blanking it.
# That needs its own affordance; a control that erases credentials as
# a side effect of saving an unrelated one is not it.
current = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets') or {}
merged = deep_merge(current, strip_masked_values(data))
api_v3.config_manager.save_raw_file_content('secrets', merged)
# Reload GitHub token in plugin store manager if it exists
if api_v3.plugin_store_manager:
@@ -1830,6 +1894,33 @@ def get_system_version():
_update_check_cache: Dict[str, Any] = {'result': None, 'ts': 0.0}
_UPDATE_CHECK_TTL = 300 # 5 minutes — avoids a git fetch on every page load
def _update_check_failed(detail: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""A check that could not run is not the same as being up to date.
Reporting update_available=False on a git failure hides the banner, and
the banner is the only route to the update button -- so a checkout git
refuses to touch looks exactly like a current one, permanently. The most
common cause is an install performed as root: git then reports "dubious
ownership" and every command fails, including the fetch here.
"""
return {'update_available': False, 'remote_sha': 'unknown',
'commits_behind': 0, 'check_failed': True, 'error': detail}
def _describe_git_failure(stderr: str) -> str:
"""Turn git's stderr into something the user can act on."""
text = (stderr or '').strip()
if 'dubious ownership' in text or 'detected dubious ownership' in text:
return ("This checkout is owned by a different user than the one "
"running the web interface, so git refuses to use it. It is "
"usually the result of installing as root. Fix the ownership "
"and the update will work: sudo chown -R $USER:$USER "
+ str(PROJECT_ROOT))
if 'could not resolve host' in text.lower() or 'network is unreachable' in text.lower():
return "Could not reach GitHub to check for updates."
return "Could not check for updates: " + (text.splitlines()[0] if text else "git failed")
@api_v3.route('/system/check-update', methods=['GET'])
def check_for_update():
"""Check whether a newer LEDMatrix commit is available on origin/main."""
@@ -1845,12 +1936,13 @@ def check_for_update():
capture_output=True, timeout=10, cwd=cwd,
)
if fetch_result.returncode != 0:
stderr = fetch_result.stderr.decode(errors='replace').strip()
logger.warning("check-update: git fetch failed (rc=%d): %s",
fetch_result.returncode,
fetch_result.stderr.decode(errors='replace').strip())
_update_check_cache['result'] = _safe
fetch_result.returncode, stderr)
failed = _update_check_failed(_describe_git_failure(stderr))
_update_check_cache['result'] = failed
_update_check_cache['ts'] = now
return jsonify(_safe)
return jsonify(failed)
local = subprocess.run(
['git', 'rev-parse', 'HEAD'],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5, cwd=cwd,
@@ -1878,7 +1970,8 @@ def check_for_update():
return jsonify(result)
except Exception as e:
logger.warning("check-update failed: %s", e)
return jsonify(_safe)
return jsonify(_update_check_failed(
"Could not check for updates; see logs for details."))
@api_v3.route('/system/action', methods=['POST'])
def execute_system_action():
@@ -2005,6 +2098,11 @@ def execute_system_action():
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
logger.warning("git rev-parse timed out before pull")
# Whether the pull actually brought new code in. "Already up to
# date" is a success too, and prompting for a restart then would
# train users to ignore the prompt.
code_changed = False
# Perform the git pull. Branches without an upstream were given
# an explicit "origin <branch>" above so the update still works.
result = subprocess.run(
@@ -2048,6 +2146,7 @@ def execute_system_action():
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10, cwd=project_dir)
new_head = _post.stdout.strip() if _post.returncode == 0 else None
if old_head and new_head and old_head != new_head:
code_changed = True
diff = subprocess.run(
['git', 'diff', '--name-only', f'{old_head}..{new_head}'],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=15, cwd=project_dir)
@@ -2107,9 +2206,14 @@ def execute_system_action():
if ln.strip()), '')
pull_message = f"Update failed: {detail}" if detail else "Update failed; check logs for details"
# Nothing here restarts anything: the pull replaces files on
# disk while the display and web services keep running the code
# they loaded at boot. Without this the user is told the update
# succeeded and sees no change until they happen to reboot.
return jsonify({
'status': 'success' if result.returncode == 0 else 'error',
'message': pull_message,
'restart_required': bool(result.returncode == 0 and code_changed),
})
elif action == 'checkout_branch':
# Switch branches from the Tools tab. Needed because a checkout
@@ -5608,6 +5712,11 @@ def save_plugin_config():
# Separate secrets from regular config (handles nested configs and
# array-item secrets — see src/web_interface/secret_helpers.py)
regular_config, secrets_config = separate_secrets(plugin_config, secret_fields)
# The config form renders secrets masked, so every save posts
# them back blank. Without this the blank is merged over the
# stored value and the credential is destroyed by the act of
# changing an unrelated setting. A blank means "unchanged".
secrets_config = remove_empty_secrets(secrets_config)
# Get current configs
current_config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
+17 -3
View File
@@ -116,14 +116,25 @@ document.body.addEventListener('htmx:afterRequest', function(event) {
// ===== Restart-pending banner =====
// Shown after restart-requiring saves; persists across tab switches (and
// reloads, via sessionStorage) until the display restarts or it's dismissed.
window.showRestartPending = function() {
try { sessionStorage.setItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending', '1'); } catch { /* private browsing */ }
window.showRestartPending = function(message) {
try {
sessionStorage.setItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending', '1');
// Persisted alongside the flag: a code update and a config save want
// different wording, and the banner outlives the page that raised it.
if (message) sessionStorage.setItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending-text', message);
else sessionStorage.removeItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending-text');
} catch { /* private browsing */ }
const banner = document.getElementById('restart-pending-banner');
const text = document.getElementById('restart-pending-text');
if (text && message) text.textContent = message;
if (banner) banner.style.display = 'block';
};
window.dismissRestartPending = function() {
try { sessionStorage.removeItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending'); } catch { /* no-op */ }
try {
sessionStorage.removeItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending');
sessionStorage.removeItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending-text');
} catch { /* no-op */ }
const banner = document.getElementById('restart-pending-banner');
if (banner) banner.style.display = 'none';
};
@@ -151,6 +162,9 @@ document.addEventListener('DOMContentLoaded', function() {
try {
if (sessionStorage.getItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending') === '1') {
const banner = document.getElementById('restart-pending-banner');
const saved = sessionStorage.getItem('ledmatrix-restart-pending-text');
const text = document.getElementById('restart-pending-text');
if (text && saved) text.textContent = saved;
if (banner) banner.style.display = 'block';
}
} catch { /* no-op */ }
+8 -6
View File
@@ -4622,15 +4622,17 @@ window.loadGithubToken = function() {
// Handle empty data (secrets file doesn't exist) - API returns {} in this case
const secrets = data.data || {};
const token = secrets.github?.api_token || '';
const configured = token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN';
if (input) {
if (token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN') {
// Token exists and is valid
input.value = token;
showNotification('GitHub token loaded successfully', 'success');
// The endpoint masks what it returns, so this never holds
// the real token -- and the field is deliberately left
// empty rather than filled with the mask, which would be
// saved verbatim the next time the user pressed Save.
input.value = '';
if (configured) {
showNotification('A GitHub token is saved. Enter a new one to replace it.', 'success');
} else {
// No token configured or placeholder value
input.value = '';
showNotification('No GitHub token configured. Enter a new token to save.', 'info');
}
}
+25 -3
View File
@@ -413,7 +413,8 @@
<div class="flex items-center justify-between">
<div class="flex items-center space-x-3">
<i class="fas fa-rotate text-lg"></i>
<span class="text-sm font-medium" aria-live="polite">
<span class="text-sm font-medium" aria-live="polite"
id="restart-pending-text">
Configuration saved &mdash; restart the display to apply the changes
</span>
</div>
@@ -1107,15 +1108,29 @@
fetch('/api/v3/system/check-update')
.then(function(r) { return r.json(); })
.then(function(data) {
var banner = document.getElementById('update-banner');
var btn = document.getElementById('update-banner-btn');
if (data.check_failed) {
// A check that could not run is not the same as being up
// to date. Hiding the banner here made a checkout git
// refuses to touch look permanently current, with no
// route to the update button and nothing to act on.
document.getElementById('update-banner-text').textContent =
data.error || 'Could not check for updates.';
if (btn) btn.style.display = 'none';
banner.style.display = '';
return;
}
if (btn) btn.style.display = '';
if (data.update_available && getDismissedSha() !== data.remote_sha) {
var n = data.commits_behind || 0;
var msg = 'A new LEDMatrix update is available';
if (n > 0) msg += ' (' + n + ' commit' + (n > 1 ? 's' : '') + ')';
document.getElementById('update-banner-text').textContent = msg;
document.getElementById('update-banner').style.display = '';
banner.style.display = '';
try { sessionStorage.setItem('update-sha', data.remote_sha); } catch(e) {}
} else {
document.getElementById('update-banner').style.display = 'none';
banner.style.display = 'none';
}
})
.catch(function() {});
@@ -1146,6 +1161,13 @@
if (data.status === 'success') {
document.getElementById('update-banner').style.display = 'none';
try { sessionStorage.removeItem('update-sha-dismissed'); } catch(e) {}
// The pull replaced files on disk; the running services still
// hold the code they loaded at boot. Ask for the restart that
// makes the update actually take effect.
if (data.restart_required && typeof window.showRestartPending === 'function') {
window.showRestartPending(
'Update installed \u2014 restart the display to run the new code');
}
}
if (typeof showNotification === 'function') {
showNotification(data.message || 'Update complete', data.status || 'success');