fix(install): drop the iptables wildcard, and pin each grant properly

Review follow-up. Two findings, both right, and the first is a hole I opened
myself.

`NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name.
`iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so a wildcard
grant on iptables escalates rather than restricts. I added that rule while
fixing a permissions gap, which is a worse outcome than the gap. It is gone,
and a test now fails on any trailing-wildcard grant to a tool that can execute
another program -- iptables, nft, tcpdump, find, awk, sed, perl, python, env.

The other finding: checking only the binary made the coverage test far weaker
than it looked. With `sysctl` present anywhere in the allow-list, deleting the
`net.ipv4.ip_forward=0` grant still passed -- and the portal would then be
unable to restore forwarding on teardown. Each required command is now matched
in full, and each is mutation-checked individually, including that exact
single-line case.

Scope pulled in deliberately. The first version of this test tried to assert
that *every* sudo call in the codebase is granted. Run honestly, it showed the
portal also runs iptables, nft, `ip addr`, `ip link` and `cp` with arguments
built at runtime -- an interface name, a port. Those cannot be granted safely
in a sudoers file: the rule needs a trailing wildcard, and that is the
escalation above. Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the
rules itself and takes only an interface and a port, granted the way
safe_plugin_rm.sh already is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant,
so the test now pins the four commands this change actually grants and the
docstring says plainly what it does not cover.

Better a narrow test that is true than a broad one that is not.

scripts/install/configure_wifi_permissions.sh

@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ echo "  systemctl: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH"
 echo ""
 echo "Step 1: Configuring sudo permissions for nmcli..."
 SUDOERS_FILE="/etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_wifi"
+SYSCTL_PATH=$(command -v sysctl || echo /usr/sbin/sysctl)
+NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft || echo /usr/sbin/nft)
+RFKILL_PATH=$(command -v rfkill || echo /usr/sbin/rfkill)
+MKDIR_PATH=$(command -v mkdir || echo /usr/bin/mkdir)
 
 # Create a temporary sudoers file using mktemp (handles permissions better)
 TEMP_SUDOERS=$(mktemp) || {
@@ -62,6 +66,36 @@ $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH start dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH stop dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH restart dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH restart NetworkManager
+# The captive portal turns IP forwarding on while the access point is up and
+# restores the previous value when it comes down (wifi_manager._setup_iptables_
+# redirect / _teardown_iptables_redirect). Without this rule that sudo call
+# needs a password, so forwarding stays off and clients associate to the AP but
+# cannot route. It goes unnoticed on a stock Raspberry Pi image, where
+# /etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd grants the default user blanket NOPASSWD and
+# masks every gap in this file -- it only bites once that blanket rule is
+# removed.
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSCTL_PATH -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSCTL_PATH -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
+# The portal's redirect lives in its own nftables table, created when the AP
+# comes up and deleted when it goes down, and the radio has to be unblocked
+# before the AP can start at all. Same story as the sysctl rules above: called
+# with sudo, never granted here, and invisible on a stock Pi image.
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $NFT_PATH add table ip ledmatrix
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $NFT_PATH delete table ip ledmatrix
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $RFKILL_PATH unblock wifi
+# NetworkManager's dnsmasq drop-in directory, exact path.
+$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $MKDIR_PATH -p /etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d
+#
+# iptables is deliberately NOT granted here. Its rules are built from the live
+# interface name and port, so a rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard --
+# and `iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
+# `NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name. That
+# is a worse outcome than the gap it would close, which today is masked anyway
+# by the blanket NOPASSWD rule on stock Pi images.
+#
+# Closing it safely means a wrapper script that builds the rules itself and
+# takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
+# is. That belongs in its own change rather than being smuggled into this one.
 
 # Allow copying hostapd and dnsmasq config files into place
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cp /tmp/hostapd.conf /etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf

src/plugin_system/plugin_health.py

@@ -178,20 +178,10 @@ class PluginHealthTracker:
             )
         return self._health_state[plugin_id]
     
-    # Fields the circuit breaker is rebuilt from after a restart. Everything
-    # else in a health record is reporting, read only for display.
-    _DURABLE_FIELDS = ('consecutive_failures', 'circuit_state',
-                       'circuit_opened_time', 'half_open_start_time')
-
-    def _durable(self, state: Dict[str, Any]) -> tuple:
-        """The part of a health record whose loss would change behaviour."""
-        return tuple(state.get(field) for field in self._DURABLE_FIELDS)
-
     def record_success(self, plugin_id: str) -> None:
         """Record a successful plugin execution."""
         state = self.get_health_state(plugin_id)
         current_time = time.time()
-        durable_before = self._durable(state)
         
         # Reset consecutive failures
         state['consecutive_failures'] = 0
@@ -209,17 +199,6 @@ class PluginHealthTracker:
             state['circuit_state'] = CircuitState.CLOSED.value
             state['circuit_opened_time'] = None
         
-        # A healthy plugin reports success every cycle, and in that steady state
-        # the only fields changed above are a counter and a timestamp that
-        # nothing reads back after a restart. Persisting them anyway rewrites a
-        # small file per plugin per cycle: on a rig running 24 plugins, a
-        # five-minute sample measured 22 rewrites, about 4.4 a minute or 6,300 a
-        # day. Those land on an SD card, where the cost is an erase-block cycle
-        # rather than the 400 bytes involved, and where wear is what eventually
-        # kills the card.
-        # In-memory state is still updated every time, so the health API and web
-        # UI show exactly what they did before; only the write is skipped.
-        if self._durable(state) != durable_before:
         self._save_health_state(plugin_id, state)
     
     def record_failure(self, plugin_id: str, error: Optional[Exception] = None) -> None:

test/test_health_write_churn.py

@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-"""A healthy plugin must not rewrite its health record every cycle.
-
-Every successful plugin update called record_success(), which persisted the
-record unconditionally. In steady state the only fields that had changed were
-total_successes and last_success_time -- a counter and a timestamp that
-health_monitor reads for display and that nothing reads back after a restart.
-
-Measured on a rig running 24 plugins: about 17 health-file rewrites a minute,
-roughly 25,000 a day. Each is ~400 bytes, but they land on an SD card where
-the unit of cost is an erase-block cycle, not the byte count, and where wear is
-what eventually kills the card.
-
-The circuit breaker still needs its own state to survive a restart, so the
-write is kept for exactly the fields it is rebuilt from -- and a failure, a
-circuit opening, or a recovery must still be written the moment it happens.
-"""
-import time
-
-import pytest
-
-from src.plugin_system.plugin_health import PluginHealthTracker, CircuitState
-
-
-class _Cache:
-    """Counts writes; serves back whatever was last written."""
-
-    def __init__(self):
-        self.store = {}
-        self.writes = 0
-
-    def set(self, key, data, ttl=None, **kwargs):
-        self.writes += 1
-        self.store[key] = data
-
-    def get(self, key, max_age=None, memory_ttl=None, **kwargs):
-        return self.store.get(key)
-
-
-@pytest.fixture
-def tracker():
-    cache = _Cache()
-    t = PluginHealthTracker(cache_manager=cache)
-    return t, cache
-
-
-def test_steady_state_success_stops_writing(tracker):
-    """The regression: 100 healthy cycles used to be 100 SD writes."""
-    t, cache = tracker
-    t.record_success("weather")
-    first = cache.writes
-    for _ in range(100):
-        t.record_success("weather")
-    assert cache.writes == first, (
-        f"{cache.writes - first} redundant writes across 100 healthy cycles"
-    )
-
-
-def test_the_counters_are_still_accurate_in_memory(tracker):
-    """Skipping the write must not skip the bookkeeping."""
-    t, _ = tracker
-    for _ in range(10):
-        t.record_success("weather")
-    state = t.get_health_state("weather")
-    assert state["total_successes"] == 10
-    assert state["last_success_time"] is not None
-    assert state["last_success_time"] <= time.time()
-
-
-def test_a_failure_is_written_immediately(tracker):
-    t, cache = tracker
-    t.record_success("weather")
-    before = cache.writes
-    t.record_failure("weather", RuntimeError("boom"))
-    assert cache.writes > before, "a failure must reach disk"
-
-
-def test_recovery_after_failure_is_written(tracker):
-    """consecutive_failures returning to 0 is durable state changing."""
-    t, cache = tracker
-    t.record_failure("weather", RuntimeError("boom"))
-    before = cache.writes
-    t.record_success("weather")
-    assert cache.writes > before, "recovery must reach disk"
-    assert t.get_health_state("weather")["consecutive_failures"] == 0
-
-
-def test_a_closing_circuit_is_written(tracker):
-    """Success in half-open closes the circuit -- that must survive a restart."""
-    t, cache = tracker
-    state = t.get_health_state("weather")
-    state["circuit_state"] = CircuitState.HALF_OPEN.value
-    state["half_open_start_time"] = time.time()
-    before = cache.writes
-    t.record_success("weather")
-    assert cache.writes > before, "a circuit transition must reach disk"
-    assert t.get_health_state("weather")["circuit_state"] == CircuitState.CLOSED.value
-
-
-def test_durable_state_survives_a_restart(tracker):
-    """What is skipped must genuinely not matter to the breaker."""
-    t, cache = tracker
-    for _ in range(3):
-        t.record_failure("weather", RuntimeError("boom"))
-    for _ in range(50):
-        t.record_success("weather")
-
-    revived = PluginHealthTracker(cache_manager=cache)
-    state = revived.get_health_state("weather")
-    assert state["consecutive_failures"] == 0
-    assert state["circuit_state"] == CircuitState.CLOSED.value

test/test_sudo_allowlist_covers_calls.py

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+"""The captive portal's fixed-argument sudo calls must be granted.
+
+The installers write two allow-lists, /etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_web and
+ledmatrix_wifi. A sudo call absent from both needs a password, which a service
+cannot supply, so it fails.
+
+Four such calls were ungranted, all of them captive-portal teardown/setup:
+
+    sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0|1     wifi_manager.py:788, 883
+    nft add|delete table ip ledmatrix     wifi_manager.py:835, 895
+    rfkill unblock wifi                   wifi_manager.py:1811
+    mkdir -p .../dnsmasq-shared.d         wifi_manager.py:922
+
+It goes unnoticed because a stock Raspberry Pi image ships
+/etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd granting the default user
+`ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL`, which satisfies every gap in both files. It only
+bites once that blanket rule is removed or the service runs as another user.
+
+Scope, deliberately narrow: this pins the four commands above, each of which
+can be written out literally. The portal makes further sudo calls whose
+arguments are built at runtime -- iptables and nft rules carrying an interface
+name and a port, `ip addr`, `ip link` -- and those cannot be granted safely
+here. A rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard, and
+`iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
+`NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name.
+Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the rules itself and
+takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
+is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant, and belongs in its own
+change.
+"""
+import re
+from pathlib import Path
+
+import pytest
+
+ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
+INSTALLERS = (
+    ROOT / "first_time_install.sh",
+    ROOT / "scripts" / "install" / "configure_wifi_permissions.sh",
+)
+
+#: Commands this change grants, each fully literal in the source.
+REQUIRED = (
+    ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=0"),
+    ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=1"),
+    ("nft", "add", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
+    ("nft", "delete", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
+    ("rfkill", "unblock", "wifi"),
+    ("mkdir", "-p", "/etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d"),
+)
+
+#: Tools with an option that executes a program of the caller's choosing.
+#: A trailing wildcard on any of these is a privilege escalation.
+EXEC_CAPABLE = ("iptables", "ip6tables", "nft", "tcpdump", "find", "awk",
+                "sed", "perl", "python", "python3", "env")
+
+
+def _grant_lines():
+    lines = []
+    for installer in INSTALLERS:
+        if not installer.is_file():
+            continue
+        for line in installer.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines():
+            if "NOPASSWD:" in line:
+                lines.append(line.split("NOPASSWD:", 1)[1])
+    return lines
+
+
+def _normalised_grants():
+    """Grants with binary-path variables reduced to tool names.
+
+    Rules are written as `$SYSCTL_PATH -w ...`, so matching the literal
+    "sysctl" finds nothing and every rule looks absent -- which is exactly how
+    an earlier version of this test reported six gaps that did not exist.
+    Only NOPASSWD lines are considered, because taking the whole script let a
+    variable definition such as NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft) satisfy the check on
+    its own while the grant itself had been deleted.
+    """
+    text = "\n".join(_grant_lines())
+    text = re.sub(r"\$\{?([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)_PATH\}?", lambda m: m.group(1).lower(), text)
+    return re.sub(r"/usr/(?:s?bin)/", "", text)
+
+
+def test_the_installers_are_present():
+    missing = [str(p.relative_to(ROOT)) for p in INSTALLERS if not p.is_file()]
+    assert not missing, f"installer(s) missing: {missing}"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", REQUIRED, ids=lambda c: " ".join(c))
+def test_the_command_is_granted(command):
+    """Whole command, not just the binary.
+
+    Checking only the binary made this far weaker than it looked: with
+    `sysctl` present anywhere, deleting the ip_forward=0 grant still passed,
+    and the portal would then be unable to restore forwarding on teardown.
+    """
+    pattern = r"\s+".join(re.escape(word) for word in command)
+    assert re.search(pattern, _normalised_grants()), (
+        f"no installer grants `{' '.join(command)}`")
+
+
+def test_no_wildcard_on_a_tool_that_can_exec():
+    """`NOPASSWD: iptables *` hands the web user root.
+
+    iptables --modprobe=/path runs that path as root. This caught a grant added
+    in this very change, which is why it is here.
+    """
+    offenders = []
+    for rule in _grant_lines():
+        rule = rule.strip()
+        if not rule.endswith("*"):
+            continue
+        haystack = rule.replace("_PATH", "").lower()
+        for tool in EXEC_CAPABLE:
+            if re.search(rf"(^|/|\s|\$){tool}(\s|$)", haystack):
+                offenders.append(rule)
+                break
+    assert not offenders, (
+        "wildcard grant on a tool that can execute another program:\n  "
+        + "\n  ".join(offenders))