Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
ChuckBuildsandClaude Opus 5 f7492e573a fix(plugins): warn once per directory, not once per scan
Self-review catch. Discovery runs on every web UI page load and every config
reconcile, so warning unconditionally about an unloadable directory would put
a line in the journal each time someone opened a page -- the same log-volume
problem this change exists to help diagnose.

The skip is now reported once per directory per process. The diagnostic value
is unchanged: the reason a plugin is missing still appears in the journal,
once, where before it appeared nowhere.

Test added covering five consecutive scans producing one warning.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01STMbQE4YctTacQXfbYqKuW
2026-08-21 10:30:56 -04:00
ChuckBuildsandClaude Opus 5 0a7d14d75e fix(plugins): say when discovery skips a directory
A plugin can be enabled in config, enabled in plugin state, present on disk
with a valid manifest and an importable entry point -- and simply absent from
the running process, with nothing anywhere to say why.

That is not hypothetical. hockey-scoreboard on a live rig is enabled in both
places, imports cleanly when loaded by hand, and is listed in the Vegas plugin
order, but is not among the 22 plugins the process actually holds. Establishing
even that much meant comparing cache-file mtimes to find it had last run three
days earlier. The journal had nothing, because discovery does not report what
it declines to load.

Two paths were silent. A directory with no manifest.json was skipped without
comment, which is defensible until it is the thing you are trying to explain.
Quieter still, a manifest that parsed but carried no "id" was read
successfully and then dropped on the floor -- no warning, no trace, and the
plugin simply does not exist as far as the rest of the system is concerned.

Both now log a warning naming the directory and the reason.

This does not explain the rig above; its manifest has an id. It makes the next
occurrence diagnosable from the journal instead of from file timestamps.

Reverting the change fails both tests. 65 plugin-system tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01STMbQE4YctTacQXfbYqKuW
2026-08-20 23:47:40 -04:00
7 changed files with 134 additions and 157 deletions
Binary file not shown.

Before

Width:  |  Height:  |  Size: 467 B

+36 -6
View File
@@ -76,6 +76,9 @@ class PluginManager:
# Lock protecting plugin_manifests and plugin_directories from # Lock protecting plugin_manifests and plugin_directories from
# concurrent mutation (background reconciliation) and reads (requests). # concurrent mutation (background reconciliation) and reads (requests).
self._discovery_lock = threading.RLock() self._discovery_lock = threading.RLock()
#: Directories already reported as unloadable, so the warning is
#: emitted once rather than on every discovery scan.
self._skip_reported: set = set()
# Lock protecting plugin_last_update from concurrent mutation/iteration. # Lock protecting plugin_last_update from concurrent mutation/iteration.
# It's written from run_scheduled_updates()/update_all_plugins() (main # It's written from run_scheduled_updates()/update_all_plugins() (main
@@ -195,18 +198,45 @@ class PluginManager:
continue continue
manifest_path = item / "manifest.json" manifest_path = item / "manifest.json"
if manifest_path.exists(): if not manifest_path.exists():
# Once per directory per process. Discovery runs on every
# web UI page load and every config reconcile, so warning
# unconditionally would put a line in the journal each
# time someone opened a page -- the same log-volume
# problem this is meant to help diagnose.
# A directory here that carries no manifest is not a
# plugin. Said once, because the alternative is a plugin
# that is enabled in config, enabled in plugin state,
# present on disk, and simply absent from the running
# process with nothing anywhere to say why. Working that
# out afterwards means reading cache-file mtimes.
if item.name not in self._skip_reported:
self._skip_reported.add(item.name)
self.logger.warning(
"Skipping %s: no manifest.json, so it cannot be "
"loaded as a plugin", item.name)
continue
try: try:
with open(manifest_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f: with open(manifest_path, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as f:
manifest = json.load(f) manifest = json.load(f)
plugin_id = manifest.get('id')
if plugin_id:
plugin_ids.append(plugin_id)
new_manifests[plugin_id] = manifest
new_directories[plugin_id] = item
except (json.JSONDecodeError, PermissionError, OSError) as e: except (json.JSONDecodeError, PermissionError, OSError) as e:
self.logger.warning("Error reading manifest from %s: %s", manifest_path, e, exc_info=True) self.logger.warning("Error reading manifest from %s: %s", manifest_path, e, exc_info=True)
continue continue
plugin_id = manifest.get('id')
if not plugin_id:
# Parsed but unusable. This was the quietest path of all:
# the manifest is read successfully and then dropped.
if item.name not in self._skip_reported:
self._skip_reported.add(item.name)
self.logger.warning(
"Skipping %s: its manifest.json has no \"id\", so "
"there is nothing to register it under", item.name)
continue
plugin_ids.append(plugin_id)
new_manifests[plugin_id] = manifest
new_directories[plugin_id] = item
except (OSError, PermissionError) as e: except (OSError, PermissionError) as e:
self.logger.error("Error scanning directory %s: %s", directory, e, exc_info=True) self.logger.error("Error scanning directory %s: %s", directory, e, exc_info=True)
+1 -34
View File
@@ -143,12 +143,6 @@ def mask_secret_fields(config: Dict[str, Any], schema_properties: Dict[str, Any]
return result return result
#: What a masked secret looks like on the wire. Named because the write path
#: has to recognise it coming back: a client that renders the mask and posts
#: it unchanged must not store the mask as if it were the secret.
SECRET_MASK = '\u2022' * 8
def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]: def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Blanket-mask every non-empty value in a secrets config dict. """Blanket-mask every non-empty value in a secrets config dict.
@@ -167,7 +161,7 @@ def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if isinstance(v, dict): if isinstance(v, dict):
masked[k] = mask_all_secret_values(v) masked[k] = mask_all_secret_values(v)
elif v not in (None, '') and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith('YOUR_')): elif v not in (None, '') and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith('YOUR_')):
masked[k] = SECRET_MASK masked[k] = '••••••••'
else: else:
masked[k] = v masked[k] = v
return masked return masked
@@ -195,30 +189,3 @@ def remove_empty_secrets(secrets: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
elif v is not None and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.strip() == ''): elif v is not None and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.strip() == ''):
result[k] = v result[k] = v
return result return result
def strip_masked_values(secrets: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Remove values a client echoed back rather than changed.
The counterpart to :func:`mask_all_secret_values`. A client that GETs the
masked secrets, edits one field and POSTs the whole object back is sending
``SECRET_MASK`` for every field it did not touch. Storing those would
replace each untouched credential with eight bullet characters.
Drops the mask and, like :func:`remove_empty_secrets`, blank values -- so
the caller can merge the result onto what is already stored and have
"unchanged" mean unchanged. Empty nested dicts are pruned.
"""
result: Dict[str, Any] = {}
for k, v in secrets.items():
if isinstance(v, dict):
nested = strip_masked_values(v)
if nested:
result[k] = nested
elif v is None:
continue
elif isinstance(v, str) and (v.strip() == '' or v == SECRET_MASK):
continue
else:
result[k] = v
return result
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Discovery must say when it skips a directory.
A plugin can be enabled in config, enabled in plugin state, present on disk
with a valid entry point -- and simply absent from the running process, with
nothing in the journal to say why. Working that out afterwards meant comparing
cache-file mtimes to find when it had last run.
Two paths were silent. A directory with no manifest.json was ignored, and --
quieter still -- a manifest that parsed but carried no "id" was read
successfully and then dropped on the floor.
"""
import json
import logging
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from src.plugin_system.plugin_manager import PluginManager # noqa: E402
def _manager(tmp_path):
pm = PluginManager.__new__(PluginManager)
pm.plugins_dir = tmp_path
pm.logger = logging.getLogger("test.discovery")
pm.plugin_manifests = {}
pm.plugin_directories = {}
pm._discovery_lock = __import__("threading").RLock()
pm._skip_reported = set()
pm.schema_manager = MagicMock()
return pm
def test_a_directory_without_a_manifest_is_reported(tmp_path, caplog):
(tmp_path / "not-a-plugin").mkdir()
pm = _manager(tmp_path)
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="test.discovery"):
pm._scan_directory_for_plugins(tmp_path)
joined = " ".join(r.message for r in caplog.records)
assert "not-a-plugin" in joined and "manifest" in joined, (
f"skip was silent; log said: {joined!r}")
def test_a_manifest_without_an_id_is_reported(tmp_path, caplog):
d = tmp_path / "idless"
d.mkdir()
(d / "manifest.json").write_text(json.dumps({"name": "No Id", "version": "1.0.0"}))
pm = _manager(tmp_path)
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="test.discovery"):
pm._scan_directory_for_plugins(tmp_path)
joined = " ".join(r.message for r in caplog.records)
assert "idless" in joined and "id" in joined, (
f"a parsed-but-unusable manifest vanished silently; log said: {joined!r}")
def test_a_good_plugin_still_registers(tmp_path, caplog):
d = tmp_path / "real-plugin"
d.mkdir()
(d / "manifest.json").write_text(json.dumps(
{"id": "real-plugin", "name": "Real", "version": "1.0.0"}))
pm = _manager(tmp_path)
pm._scan_directory_for_plugins(tmp_path)
assert "real-plugin" in pm.plugin_manifests, "a valid plugin was not registered"
def test_the_warning_does_not_repeat_on_every_scan(tmp_path, caplog):
"""Discovery runs on every web UI page load and every config reconcile.
Warning unconditionally would put a line in the journal each time someone
opened a page -- the same log-volume problem this is meant to help
diagnose.
"""
(tmp_path / "not-a-plugin").mkdir()
pm = _manager(tmp_path)
with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="test.discovery"):
for _ in range(5):
pm._scan_directory_for_plugins(tmp_path)
hits = [r for r in caplog.records if "not-a-plugin" in r.message]
assert len(hits) == 1, f"warned {len(hits)} times across 5 scans"
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
"""GET /config/secrets must not hand out credentials, and the client's
read-modify-write cycle must not destroy them.
This interface has no authentication. The endpoint returned the whole
config_secrets.json to anyone who could reach the port; on one rig that was a
40-character GitHub token, a 183-character Home Assistant token and three API
keys. Masking it alone is not enough: the only client fetches every secret,
edits one field and posts all of them back, so the write path has to treat an
echoed mask as "unchanged".
"""
import json
import sys
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent))
from test_api_v3_secret_roundtrip import env, _on_disk # noqa: F401,E402
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import SECRET_MASK # noqa: E402
STORED = {
"github": {"api_token": "ghp_" + "x" * 36},
"ledmatrix-weather": {"api_key": "w" * 32},
"incoming-packages": {"ha_token": "h" * 183},
"unset-plugin": {"api_key": ""},
"placeholder-plugin": {"api_key": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE"},
}
def _seed(env):
env.secrets_file.write_text(json.dumps(STORED))
def _get(env):
r = env.client.get("/api/v3/config/secrets")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_data(as_text=True)[:200]
return r.get_json()["data"]
def test_no_credential_leaves_the_process(env):
_seed(env)
body = json.dumps(_get(env))
for secret in ("ghp_" + "x" * 36, "w" * 32, "h" * 183):
assert secret not in body, "endpoint returned a stored credential"
def test_set_and_unset_remain_distinguishable(env):
_seed(env)
data = _get(env)
assert data["github"]["api_token"] == SECRET_MASK
assert data["unset-plugin"]["api_key"] == ""
assert data["placeholder-plugin"]["api_key"] == "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE"
def test_the_clients_read_modify_write_preserves_every_other_secret(env):
"""What the GitHub-token save button actually does."""
_seed(env)
secrets = _get(env) # everything arrives masked
secrets["github"]["api_token"] = "ghp_" + "n" * 36 # user changes one
r = env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets", json=secrets)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_data(as_text=True)[:200]
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "n" * 36, "new token not saved"
assert on_disk["ledmatrix-weather"]["api_key"] == "w" * 32
assert on_disk["incoming-packages"]["ha_token"] == "h" * 183
def test_a_mask_echoed_back_is_never_stored(env):
_seed(env)
env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets", json=_get(env))
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert SECRET_MASK not in json.dumps(on_disk), "the mask was stored as a secret"
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "x" * 36
def test_a_brand_new_secret_can_still_be_added(env):
_seed(env)
env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets",
json={"new-plugin": {"api_key": "brand-new"}})
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert on_disk["new-plugin"]["api_key"] == "brand-new"
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "x" * 36
+4 -21
View File
@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Import new infrastructure # Import new infrastructure
from src.web_interface.api_helpers import success_response, error_response, validate_request_json from src.web_interface.api_helpers import success_response, error_response, validate_request_json
from src.web_interface.errors import ErrorCode from src.web_interface.errors import ErrorCode
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import (find_secret_fields, mask_all_secret_values, from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import find_secret_fields, separate_secrets
separate_secrets, strip_masked_values)
from src.web_interface.error_handler import describe_exception, redact_text from src.web_interface.error_handler import describe_exception, redact_text
from src.plugin_system.operation_types import OperationType from src.plugin_system.operation_types import OperationType
from src.web_interface.validators import ( from src.web_interface.validators import (
@@ -1334,12 +1333,7 @@ def get_secrets_config():
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500 return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500
config = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets') config = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets')
# This interface has no authentication, and this file is nothing but return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': config})
# credentials. It was handing all of them to anyone who could reach
# the port. Values are masked; empty and YOUR_* placeholders are left
# alone so a client can still tell "set" from "not set".
return jsonify({'status': 'success',
'data': mask_all_secret_values(config)})
except Exception as e: except Exception as e:
logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True) logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True)
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500 return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@@ -1401,19 +1395,8 @@ def save_raw_secrets_config():
if not data: if not data:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'No data provided'}), 400 return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'No data provided'}), 400
# The GET above masks what it returns, and this endpoint's only client # Save the secrets config
# reads the whole file, edits one field and posts all of it back. So api_v3.config_manager.save_raw_file_content('secrets', data)
# most of what arrives here is the mask, echoed rather than changed --
# storing it verbatim would replace every untouched credential with
# eight bullets. Strip those, then merge onto what is already stored,
# which makes "unchanged" mean unchanged.
#
# The cost is that a secret can no longer be cleared by blanking it.
# That needs its own affordance; a control that erases credentials as
# a side effect of saving an unrelated one is not it.
current = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets') or {}
merged = deep_merge(current, strip_masked_values(data))
api_v3.config_manager.save_raw_file_content('secrets', merged)
# Reload GitHub token in plugin store manager if it exists # Reload GitHub token in plugin store manager if it exists
if api_v3.plugin_store_manager: if api_v3.plugin_store_manager:
+6 -8
View File
@@ -4622,17 +4622,15 @@ window.loadGithubToken = function() {
// Handle empty data (secrets file doesn't exist) - API returns {} in this case // Handle empty data (secrets file doesn't exist) - API returns {} in this case
const secrets = data.data || {}; const secrets = data.data || {};
const token = secrets.github?.api_token || ''; const token = secrets.github?.api_token || '';
const configured = token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN';
if (input) { if (input) {
// The endpoint masks what it returns, so this never holds if (token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN') {
// the real token -- and the field is deliberately left // Token exists and is valid
// empty rather than filled with the mask, which would be input.value = token;
// saved verbatim the next time the user pressed Save. showNotification('GitHub token loaded successfully', 'success');
input.value = '';
if (configured) {
showNotification('A GitHub token is saved. Enter a new one to replace it.', 'success');
} else { } else {
// No token configured or placeholder value
input.value = '';
showNotification('No GitHub token configured. Enter a new token to save.', 'info'); showNotification('No GitHub token configured. Enter a new token to save.', 'info');
} }
} }