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ChuckBuilds fc6104f229 fix(web): stop /config/main handing out every credential it holds
The endpoint returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port, and
this web interface has no authentication of any kind. An unauthenticated
request against a live rig returned:

    github.api_token                40 chars
    incoming-packages.ha_token     183 chars
    jellyfin-now-playing.api_key    32 chars
    ledmatrix-weather.api_key       32 chars
    on-air.mqtt_password             8 chars
    youtube.api_key                 20 chars
    youtube-stats.api_key           39 chars

A GitHub token and a Home Assistant long-lived token among them. Anything on
that LAN could read them.

The x-secret masking the plugin config endpoints use does not reach here: this
route never consults a schema, and core keys such as github.api_token have no
schema to carry the marker. Several of the fields above *are* tagged x-secret
in their plugin's schema and were still returned in full, which is what rules
out the schema route as the fix for this endpoint.

Credential-named fields are now blanked. Matching on the name is blunt, and
for a whole-config dump that is the right default: anything named like a
credential should not leave the process, and a new plugin adding a
differently-shaped secret is covered without anyone remembering to tag it.

Blanked rather than removed, and safe to blank: POST /config/main merges into
the freshly loaded config and writes only the keys it was given, so a client
that round-trips this response cannot erase a secret it never saw. The web API
suites confirm it -- 81 passing, unchanged.

On the test that matters: the first version of this suite exercised the two
helpers and nothing else, and reverting the single line that wires the
redactor into the route passed all thirty of them. A property asserted on a
helper is not a property asserted on the endpoint, and it is the endpoint that
is exposed to the network. The added test goes through the view function, and
it does fail on that revert.

This also corrects an earlier claim of mine. I reported that GET /api/v3/config
did not expose these values; that path 404s, so the check proved nothing. The
real route is /config/main and it exposed all of them.
2026-08-20 05:09:12 -04:00
6 changed files with 195 additions and 147 deletions
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@@ -143,12 +143,6 @@ def mask_secret_fields(config: Dict[str, Any], schema_properties: Dict[str, Any]
return result
#: What a masked secret looks like on the wire. Named because the write path
#: has to recognise it coming back: a client that renders the mask and posts
#: it unchanged must not store the mask as if it were the secret.
SECRET_MASK = '\u2022' * 8
def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Blanket-mask every non-empty value in a secrets config dict.
@@ -167,7 +161,7 @@ def mask_all_secret_values(config: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
if isinstance(v, dict):
masked[k] = mask_all_secret_values(v)
elif v not in (None, '') and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.startswith('YOUR_')):
masked[k] = SECRET_MASK
masked[k] = '••••••••'
else:
masked[k] = v
return masked
@@ -195,30 +189,3 @@ def remove_empty_secrets(secrets: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
elif v is not None and not (isinstance(v, str) and v.strip() == ''):
result[k] = v
return result
def strip_masked_values(secrets: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Remove values a client echoed back rather than changed.
The counterpart to :func:`mask_all_secret_values`. A client that GETs the
masked secrets, edits one field and POSTs the whole object back is sending
``SECRET_MASK`` for every field it did not touch. Storing those would
replace each untouched credential with eight bullet characters.
Drops the mask and, like :func:`remove_empty_secrets`, blank values -- so
the caller can merge the result onto what is already stored and have
"unchanged" mean unchanged. Empty nested dicts are pruned.
"""
result: Dict[str, Any] = {}
for k, v in secrets.items():
if isinstance(v, dict):
nested = strip_masked_values(v)
if nested:
result[k] = nested
elif v is None:
continue
elif isinstance(v, str) and (v.strip() == '' or v == SECRET_MASK):
continue
else:
result[k] = v
return result
+143
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@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
"""GET /config/main must not hand out credentials.
The endpoint returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port, and
this web interface has no authentication of any kind. Measured against a live
rig, an unauthenticated request returned:
github.api_token 40 chars
incoming-packages.ha_token 183 chars
jellyfin-now-playing.api_key 32 chars
ledmatrix-weather.api_key 32 chars
on-air.mqtt_password 8 chars
youtube.api_key 20 chars
youtube-stats.api_key 39 chars
A GitHub token and a Home Assistant long-lived token among them.
The x-secret masking the plugin config endpoints use does not apply here: this
endpoint never consults a schema, and core keys such as github.api_token have
no schema to carry the marker. Several of those fields *are* tagged x-secret in
their plugin's schema and were still returned in full, which is what makes the
schema route the wrong one to rely on for this endpoint.
Matching on field name is blunt. For a whole-config dump it is the right
default: anything named like a credential should not leave the process, and a
new plugin that adds a differently-shaped secret is covered without anyone
remembering to tag it.
"""
import pytest
from web_interface.blueprints.api_v3 import (
_looks_like_a_credential,
_redact_credentials,
)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
"password", "mqtt_password", "opensky_password", "passwd",
"api_key", "apikey", "API_KEY", "flightaware_api_key",
"token", "ha_token", "api_token", "access_token",
"secret", "client_secret", "spotify_client_secret",
"access_key", "private_key",
])
def test_credential_names_are_recognised(name):
assert _looks_like_a_credential(name)
@pytest.mark.parametrize("name", [
"timezone", "city", "brightness", "enabled", "update_interval",
"favorite_teams", "display_duration", "keyword",
])
def test_ordinary_names_are_left_alone(name):
assert not _looks_like_a_credential(name)
def test_the_measured_leak_is_closed():
"""The exact shape taken off the rig."""
config = {
"github": {"api_token": "ghp_" + "x" * 36},
"incoming-packages": {"ha_token": "y" * 183, "enabled": True},
"jellyfin-now-playing": {"api_key": "z" * 32},
"on-air": {"mqtt_password": "hunter22"},
"youtube": {"api_key": "k" * 20},
"timezone": "America/New_York",
}
out = _redact_credentials(config)
assert out["github"]["api_token"] == ""
assert out["incoming-packages"]["ha_token"] == ""
assert out["jellyfin-now-playing"]["api_key"] == ""
assert out["on-air"]["mqtt_password"] == ""
assert out["youtube"]["api_key"] == ""
# Everything else survives, or the config editor breaks.
assert out["timezone"] == "America/New_York"
assert out["incoming-packages"]["enabled"] is True
def test_nested_and_listed_credentials_are_reached():
config = {"a": {"b": {"c": {"password": "p"}}},
"feeds": [{"name": "x", "api_key": "k"}, {"name": "y"}]}
out = _redact_credentials(config)
assert out["a"]["b"]["c"]["password"] == ""
assert out["feeds"][0]["api_key"] == ""
assert out["feeds"][0]["name"] == "x"
def test_the_original_is_not_mutated():
"""The caller holds the live config; redaction must not edit it in place."""
config = {"github": {"api_token": "keepme"}}
_redact_credentials(config)
assert config["github"]["api_token"] == "keepme"
def test_a_credential_shaped_container_is_still_walked():
"""`secrets: {...}` is a section name, not a value to blank."""
config = {"secrets": {"api_key": "k", "note": "keep"}}
out = _redact_credentials(config)
assert out["secrets"]["api_key"] == ""
assert out["secrets"]["note"] == "keep"
def test_non_dict_input_passes_through():
assert _redact_credentials("plain") == "plain"
assert _redact_credentials(7) == 7
assert _redact_credentials(None) is None
def test_the_endpoint_itself_redacts():
"""Through the view function, not the helper.
The helper tests above all passed with the route still returning
`config` -- reverting the one line that calls the redactor changed
nothing, because nothing exercised the route. A property asserted on a
helper is not a property asserted on the endpoint, and it is the endpoint
that is exposed to the network.
"""
import json as _json
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import flask
from web_interface.blueprints import api_v3 as mod
raw = {"github": {"api_token": "ghp_secret_value"},
"timezone": "America/New_York"}
manager = MagicMock()
manager.load_config.return_value = raw
previous = getattr(mod.api_v3, "config_manager", None)
mod.api_v3.config_manager = manager
app = flask.Flask(__name__)
try:
with app.test_request_context("/config/main"):
response = mod.get_main_config()
payload = response.get_json() if hasattr(response, "get_json") else _json.loads(response[0].data)
finally:
mod.api_v3.config_manager = previous
data = payload["data"]
assert data["github"]["api_token"] == "", (
"the endpoint returned the token; the redactor is not wired in")
assert data["timezone"] == "America/New_York"
# And the config the manager handed over is untouched.
assert raw["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_secret_value"
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
"""GET /config/secrets must not hand out credentials, and the client's
read-modify-write cycle must not destroy them.
This interface has no authentication. The endpoint returned the whole
config_secrets.json to anyone who could reach the port; on one rig that was a
40-character GitHub token, a 183-character Home Assistant token and three API
keys. Masking it alone is not enough: the only client fetches every secret,
edits one field and posts all of them back, so the write path has to treat an
echoed mask as "unchanged".
"""
import json
import sys
from pathlib import Path
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).parent))
from test_api_v3_secret_roundtrip import env, _on_disk # noqa: F401,E402
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import SECRET_MASK # noqa: E402
STORED = {
"github": {"api_token": "ghp_" + "x" * 36},
"ledmatrix-weather": {"api_key": "w" * 32},
"incoming-packages": {"ha_token": "h" * 183},
"unset-plugin": {"api_key": ""},
"placeholder-plugin": {"api_key": "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE"},
}
def _seed(env):
env.secrets_file.write_text(json.dumps(STORED))
def _get(env):
r = env.client.get("/api/v3/config/secrets")
assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_data(as_text=True)[:200]
return r.get_json()["data"]
def test_no_credential_leaves_the_process(env):
_seed(env)
body = json.dumps(_get(env))
for secret in ("ghp_" + "x" * 36, "w" * 32, "h" * 183):
assert secret not in body, "endpoint returned a stored credential"
def test_set_and_unset_remain_distinguishable(env):
_seed(env)
data = _get(env)
assert data["github"]["api_token"] == SECRET_MASK
assert data["unset-plugin"]["api_key"] == ""
assert data["placeholder-plugin"]["api_key"] == "YOUR_API_KEY_HERE"
def test_the_clients_read_modify_write_preserves_every_other_secret(env):
"""What the GitHub-token save button actually does."""
_seed(env)
secrets = _get(env) # everything arrives masked
secrets["github"]["api_token"] = "ghp_" + "n" * 36 # user changes one
r = env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets", json=secrets)
assert r.status_code == 200, r.get_data(as_text=True)[:200]
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "n" * 36, "new token not saved"
assert on_disk["ledmatrix-weather"]["api_key"] == "w" * 32
assert on_disk["incoming-packages"]["ha_token"] == "h" * 183
def test_a_mask_echoed_back_is_never_stored(env):
_seed(env)
env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets", json=_get(env))
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert SECRET_MASK not in json.dumps(on_disk), "the mask was stored as a secret"
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "x" * 36
def test_a_brand_new_secret_can_still_be_added(env):
_seed(env)
env.client.post("/api/v3/config/raw/secrets",
json={"new-plugin": {"api_key": "brand-new"}})
on_disk = _on_disk(env.secrets_file)
assert on_disk["new-plugin"]["api_key"] == "brand-new"
assert on_disk["github"]["api_token"] == "ghp_" + "x" * 36
+45 -23
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@@ -21,8 +21,7 @@ logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Import new infrastructure
from src.web_interface.api_helpers import success_response, error_response, validate_request_json
from src.web_interface.errors import ErrorCode
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import (find_secret_fields, mask_all_secret_values,
separate_secrets, strip_masked_values)
from src.web_interface.secret_helpers import find_secret_fields, separate_secrets
from src.web_interface.error_handler import describe_exception, redact_text
from src.plugin_system.operation_types import OperationType
from src.web_interface.validators import (
@@ -263,15 +262,54 @@ def _stop_display_service():
result['status'] = status
return result
#: Field names whose value is a credential. Matched by name because this
#: endpoint returns the whole config, core keys included, and core config has
#: no schema to carry x-secret markers.
_CREDENTIAL_NAME_PARTS = ("password", "passwd", "secret", "token", "api_key",
"apikey", "access_key", "private_key", "client_secret")
def _looks_like_a_credential(name: str) -> bool:
lowered = name.lower()
return any(part in lowered for part in _CREDENTIAL_NAME_PARTS)
def _redact_credentials(value):
"""A copy of `value` with credential-named fields blanked.
/config/main returned the raw config to anyone who could reach the port,
and this interface has no authentication. On one rig that meant a 40-char
GitHub token, a 183-char Home Assistant token and five API keys were
readable by anything on the LAN.
The x-secret masking used by the plugin config endpoints does not help
here: this endpoint never consults a schema, and core keys such as
github.api_token have no schema to mark. Matching on the field name is
blunt, but for a whole-config dump the right default is that anything
named like a credential does not leave the process.
Blanked rather than removed, and safe to blank: POST /config/main merges
into the loaded config and only writes the keys it was given, so a client
that round-trips this response cannot erase a secret it never saw.
"""
if isinstance(value, dict):
return {k: ("" if _looks_like_a_credential(k) and not isinstance(v, (dict, list))
else _redact_credentials(v))
for k, v in value.items()}
if isinstance(value, list):
return [_redact_credentials(item) for item in value]
return value
@api_v3.route('/config/main', methods=['GET'])
def get_main_config():
"""Get main configuration"""
"""Get main configuration, with credentials redacted."""
try:
if not api_v3.config_manager:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500
config = api_v3.config_manager.load_config()
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': config})
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': _redact_credentials(config)})
except Exception as e:
logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True)
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@@ -1334,12 +1372,7 @@ def get_secrets_config():
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'Config manager not initialized'}), 500
config = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets')
# This interface has no authentication, and this file is nothing but
# credentials. It was handing all of them to anyone who could reach
# the port. Values are masked; empty and YOUR_* placeholders are left
# alone so a client can still tell "set" from "not set".
return jsonify({'status': 'success',
'data': mask_all_secret_values(config)})
return jsonify({'status': 'success', 'data': config})
except Exception as e:
logger.error('Unhandled exception', exc_info=True)
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'An error occurred; see logs for details', 'details': describe_exception(e)}), 500
@@ -1401,19 +1434,8 @@ def save_raw_secrets_config():
if not data:
return jsonify({'status': 'error', 'message': 'No data provided'}), 400
# The GET above masks what it returns, and this endpoint's only client
# reads the whole file, edits one field and posts all of it back. So
# most of what arrives here is the mask, echoed rather than changed --
# storing it verbatim would replace every untouched credential with
# eight bullets. Strip those, then merge onto what is already stored,
# which makes "unchanged" mean unchanged.
#
# The cost is that a secret can no longer be cleared by blanking it.
# That needs its own affordance; a control that erases credentials as
# a side effect of saving an unrelated one is not it.
current = api_v3.config_manager.get_raw_file_content('secrets') or {}
merged = deep_merge(current, strip_masked_values(data))
api_v3.config_manager.save_raw_file_content('secrets', merged)
# Save the secrets config
api_v3.config_manager.save_raw_file_content('secrets', data)
# Reload GitHub token in plugin store manager if it exists
if api_v3.plugin_store_manager:
+6 -8
View File
@@ -4622,17 +4622,15 @@ window.loadGithubToken = function() {
// Handle empty data (secrets file doesn't exist) - API returns {} in this case
const secrets = data.data || {};
const token = secrets.github?.api_token || '';
const configured = token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN';
if (input) {
// The endpoint masks what it returns, so this never holds
// the real token -- and the field is deliberately left
// empty rather than filled with the mask, which would be
// saved verbatim the next time the user pressed Save.
input.value = '';
if (configured) {
showNotification('A GitHub token is saved. Enter a new one to replace it.', 'success');
if (token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN') {
// Token exists and is valid
input.value = token;
showNotification('GitHub token loaded successfully', 'success');
} else {
// No token configured or placeholder value
input.value = '';
showNotification('No GitHub token configured. Enter a new token to save.', 'info');
}
}