Compare commits

..
Author SHA1 Message Date
ChuckandClaude Fable 5 ced173e95a test: sync mock cache manager signature with CacheManager.get
test_circuit_breaker has been failing on main: plugin_health passes
memory_ttl= to cache_manager.get(), and the conftest mock's signature
was never updated — the same component/double drift class as the
monitored_update bug (#392).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FqzC1nzTWL4kaqgMaQZFam
2026-07-12 10:31:52 -04:00
ChuckandClaude Fable 5 acfd704d13 fix(core): harden text-measurement caches; surface snapshot failures
Deep-dive findings, all three latent on every 24/7 install:

- font_manager.metrics_cache and display_manager._text_width_cache were
  unbounded dicts keyed by (text, id(font)). Two problems: keys embed
  the measured TEXT, so ever-changing strings (a clock, a live score, a
  ticker) grow them without limit; and id()-keying without holding a
  reference means a garbage-collected font's id can be recycled by a
  DIFFERENT font, silently returning wrong widths/metrics (classic
  plugins create fonts per render, so this is reachable). Both caches
  are now LRU-bounded (1024) and pin the font in the entry so its id
  stays valid. metrics_cache also keyed on the text itself instead of
  hash(text), removing a collision path.

- _write_snapshot_if_due logged failures at DEBUG — invisible at the
  default level. The snapshot's mtime is the web UI's display mirror
  AND its hardware-liveness proxy, so a quiet failure freezes the
  mirror and makes health checks lie (seen in the field: a stale
  root-owned /tmp file froze it for a day). Failures now WARN, rate-
  limited to once per 5 minutes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01FqzC1nzTWL4kaqgMaQZFam
2026-07-12 10:29:20 -04:00
05e7c43b27 fix(plugins): replace dependency marker files with a real satisfaction check (#390)
* fix(plugins): replace dependency marker files with a real satisfaction check

The .dependencies_installed hash-marker system only tracked "was this exact
requirements.txt hashed before" — not whether the packages it names are
actually present. That made it fragile (a wiped venv, a manually removed
package, or a lost/corrupted marker forces a needless full pip reinstall or,
worse, a false skip) and produced dead weight for the ~10 plugins whose
requirements.txt is comment-only (they still paid a pip subprocess on first
boot before a marker existed).

Replace it with requirements_are_satisfied() in plugin_loader.py, which
checks each real requirement line against importlib.metadata directly, so
install_dependencies() only shells out to pip when something is actually
missing or version-mismatched. Drops the marker file entirely: removed all
marker read/write sites in plugin_loader.py and store_manager.py, the
now-pointless marker-cleanup step in the git-update path, the unused legacy
marker implementation in plugin_manager.py, and the already-stale
clear_dependency_markers.sh script.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KEZK1P1Q1fu5pcuVrkrCFZ

* fix(security): close path-injection gap in dependency-satisfaction checks

CodeQL flagged 2 new high-severity "uncontrolled data used in path
expression" alerts at the open() calls inside this PR's new
requirements_has_real_deps()/requirements_are_satisfied() -- both are
reachable from paths that were never run through the basename+trusted-base
sanitiser this codebase already uses elsewhere:

- PluginLoader.install_dependencies() only applied that sanitiser when its
  optional plugins_dir argument was actually passed; the "no plugins_dir"
  branch trusted plugin_dir_real directly. Made plugins_dir required (not
  Optional) so that branch can't exist, and added an explicit guard in
  load_plugin() so install_deps=True without a plugins_dir fails loudly
  instead of silently. Production's only real caller (PluginManager) always
  passes plugins_dir already; the harness/dev-server/render-plugin callers
  all use install_deps=False and are unaffected.

- StoreManager._install_dependencies() never sanitised plugin_path at all,
  and its call sites ultimately derive that path from a plugin's own
  manifest.json "id" field (install_plugin_from_url) -- a malicious plugin
  could otherwise point requirements_file outside plugins_dir. Applied the
  same os.path.basename()-based containment pattern PluginLoader already
  uses (and that CodeQL recognises as a real sanitiser).

Added test_install_dependencies_requires_plugins_dir and
test_install_dependencies_rejects_path_outside_plugins_dir to lock in the
actual security property, not just quiet the scanner. Verified: all 20
tests in test_plugin_loader.py pass, plus the PR's existing test plan
(test_plugin_system.py, test_store_manager_caches.py: 53 passed) and the
full CI plugin-safety suite (test_harness.py, test_visual_rendering.py,
test_plugin_matrix.py: 52 passed, 2 pre-existing skips) all still pass.

* fix(security): replace basename-only sanitiser with a trusted-enumeration check

The previous commit's os.path.basename() + os.path.join() pattern (which a
pre-existing code comment claimed CodeQL recognises as a sanitiser) did not
actually clear the alert -- the next CodeQL run still flagged the same 2
sink lines, plus a new one at the os.path.join() call itself. Taking a
substring of tainted data apparently isn't treated as a barrier by this
query, whatever the comment assumed.

Replaced it with find_trusted_subdir(): enumerate the trusted plugins_dir
via os.scandir() and only use a name that scandir itself produced, matched
by equality against the caller's requested name. The path is then built
from that enumerated entry, not from the caller's string -- a value
sourced from iterating a trusted, non-tainted directory carries no taint
regardless of what it happens to equal, which is a stronger and more
conventional allowlist-style barrier than string-stripping. Applied
identically in both PluginLoader.install_dependencies() and
StoreManager._install_dependencies(), sharing one implementation.

Re-verified: all 65 tests across test_plugin_loader.py (20, including the
2 new security regression tests), test_store_manager_caches.py (35),
test_plugin_system.py (10) pass, plus the full CI plugin-safety suite
(test_harness.py/test_visual_rendering.py/test_plugin_matrix.py: 52
passed, 2 pre-existing skips).

* fix(security): redact URL credentials from pip subprocess output before logging

CodeQL flagged 3 clear-text-logging-of-secrets alerts in
install_requirements_file() (src/common/permission_utils.py:353,360,371).
Pre-existing on main, unrelated to this PR's own diff, but now visible
since the path-injection alerts that previously took priority in the
annotation list are fixed.

The underlying risk is real: pip can echo a private index URL's embedded
basic-auth credentials (from a requirements.txt --index-url line or
PIP_INDEX_URL) back verbatim in its own stderr/stdout on failure, and this
function both logs that output directly and returns it to callers --
store_manager.py's _install_dependencies() logs result.stderr from this
same function too.

Added _redact_url_credentials(), applied immediately after each of the two
subprocess.run() calls (mutating result.stderr/stdout in place) rather
than patching each log call site individually. This closes the leak at
the source: every downstream use -- the three flagged log lines, the
"note" string embedded in the returned stdout, and store_manager.py's own
logging of the returned result -- gets the redacted text for free.

Verified the fixed-phrase "denied" check (`"a password is required" in
result.stderr`) is unaffected, since URL syntax and those phrases don't
overlap -- covered explicitly by
test_does_not_touch_denied_check_phrases. Added
test/test_permission_utils.py (6 tests) covering the redaction helper
directly and both subprocess.run() call sites (the sudo-wrapper branch,
which this repo's scripts/fix_perms/safe_pip_install.sh makes live, and
the no-wrapper fallback branch). All pass.

* fix(security): stop interpolating req_file/pip-output into log calls

The previous commit's redaction (mutating result.stderr/stdout right after
each subprocess.run()) didn't clear CodeQL's clear-text-logging alerts --
same lesson as the path-injection fix earlier in this PR: a static
analyzer can't tell "this value was already sanitised two lines up" from
"this is still the raw tainted value" just by looking at a single log
call in isolation, so it conservatively keeps flagging it regardless of
what the redaction function actually does.

Removed all dynamic interpolation (req_file, result.stderr) from the 3
flagged logger.warning() calls entirely, replacing them with fixed
messages plus (for the one that had it) result.returncode, which is a
plain int with no possible taint. The full redacted detail is still
available where it actually matters -- in the returned
CompletedProcess.stderr/stdout and the "note" text -- just not duplicated
into a log line a scanner has to reason about in isolation.

Re-verified: all 6 test_permission_utils.py tests still pass (they assert
on the returned result, not log call arguments), plus the full
test_plugin_loader.py/test_store_manager_caches.py/test_plugin_system.py
suite (71 passed, 1 pre-existing deselect, 4 subtests).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-11 08:55:50 -04:00
ChuckandGitHub 2ffc57cf40 fix(plugin-harness): add no-op process_deferred_updates to test double (#391)
The safety harness's VisualTestDisplayManager (base of
BoundsCheckingDisplayManager) doesn't implement process_deferred_updates(),
which 5 first-party ledmatrix-plugins call unconditionally between
set_scrolling_state() and their scroll-position update: news, odds-ticker,
ledmatrix-leaderboard, stock-news, and ledmatrix-stocks. Any of them fails
the harness with AttributeError the moment it's touched (surfaced when
ledmatrix-plugins#177 had to add a local hasattr guard in ledmatrix-stocks
just to pass CI). Add the method as a no-op, mirroring the existing
"no-op for testing" pattern already used for set_scrolling_state, so these
plugins render under the harness without every touching PR needing its own
guard.
2026-07-11 08:55:03 -04:00
ChuckandGitHub aab0e9ade0 fix(plugin-manager): fix TypeError breaking every plugin's scheduled update (#392)
run_scheduled_updates()'s resource-monitor branch wrapped the update call
in a closure stored as a *class* attribute on a dynamically-built type
(type('obj', (object,), {'update': monitored_update})()). The descriptor
protocol turns a function found via class-attribute lookup into a bound
method on instance access, silently prepending the synthetic instance as
an implicit first argument -- but monitored_update() takes none, so every
call raised "monitored_update() takes 0 positional arguments but 1 was
given", was caught by run_scheduled_updates' try/except, and recorded as
an update failure.

self.resource_monitor is None by default and was dormant until PR #388
("activate dormant plugin health/metrics subsystem") wired it up in both
display_controller.py and web_interface/app.py -- meaning this bug went
live in every real deployment as of that merge (2026-07-09) despite the
buggy line itself dating back to 2025-12-27. In practice this means no
plugin's update() has succeeded since upgrading past #388: circuit
breakers cycle through half-open -> immediate failure -> reopened every
health-check interval forever, and all plugin data (scores, odds, prices,
etc.) goes stale from whatever was last fetched before the upgrade.
Confirmed live on a running instance: odds-ticker (and stock-news,
ledmatrix-stocks, baseball-scoreboard, ledmatrix-leaderboard, of-the-day)
failing this exact way every 5-minute circuit-breaker retry.

Fixed by using types.SimpleNamespace(update=monitored_update) instead of
a dynamic class: SimpleNamespace stores attributes on the instance
itself, so attribute lookup returns the plain function unchanged --
never routed through the class-attribute descriptor protocol that
injects an implicit self.

Added test_run_scheduled_updates_calls_update_with_resource_monitor to
test/test_plugin_system.py using a real PluginResourceMonitor (not a
mock of it), so the test exercises the actual descriptor-binding
behavior that caused this. Verified the test fails with the exact
reported error against the pre-fix code and passes against the fix.
2026-07-11 08:54:30 -04:00
12 changed files with 381 additions and 63 deletions
+43 -8
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ files that need to be accessible by both root service and web user.
import os
import logging
import re
import shutil as _shutil
import subprocess
import sys
@@ -16,6 +17,25 @@ from typing import Optional
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Matches the credentials portion of a "scheme://user:pass@host" URL, so pip's
# own error output can be logged/displayed without echoing back a private
# index URL's embedded basic-auth secret verbatim (e.g. from a
# requirements.txt --index-url line or the PIP_INDEX_URL env var).
_URL_CREDENTIALS_RE = re.compile(r'://[^/\s@:]+:[^/\s@]+@')
def _redact_url_credentials(text: Optional[str]) -> str:
"""Replace embedded user:pass@ URL credentials in text with a placeholder.
Safe to call on any subprocess output destined for logs: it only ever
shortens/replaces the credential substring, never changes the presence
or absence of the specific fixed phrases callers check for
(e.g. "a password is required"), so it can't affect control flow.
"""
if not text:
return text or ""
return _URL_CREDENTIALS_RE.sub('://***:***@', text)
# System directories that should never have their permissions modified
# These directories have special system-level permissions that must be preserved
PROTECTED_SYSTEM_DIRECTORIES = { # nosec B108 - these are checked to PREVENT permission changes, not to use as temp paths
@@ -338,6 +358,13 @@ def install_requirements_file(req_file: Path, timeout: int = 300) -> subprocess.
["sudo", "-n", bash_path, str(wrapper), str(req_file)],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, cwd=str(project_root)
)
# Redact immediately: pip can echo a private index URL's embedded
# basic-auth credentials back in its own error/progress output
# (e.g. from a requirements.txt --index-url line). Doesn't affect
# the fixed-phrase "denied" check below -- those phrases never
# overlap with URL syntax.
result.stderr = _redact_url_credentials(result.stderr)
result.stdout = _redact_url_credentials(result.stdout)
if result.returncode == 0:
return result
# Distinguish "sudo rejected this exact command line" (worth
@@ -348,16 +375,24 @@ def install_requirements_file(req_file: Path, timeout: int = 300) -> subprocess.
for phrase in ("a password is required", "is not allowed to run", "no tty present")
)
if not denied:
# Deliberately don't interpolate req_file or the pip output here:
# this log line is scanner-visible, and a static analyzer can't
# tell "already redacted above" from "still raw" just by looking
# at this call in isolation. The full (redacted) text is still
# available to callers via the returned CompletedProcess.
logger.warning(
"Root pip install failed (rc=%s) for %s: %s",
result.returncode, req_file, result.stderr.strip()[:500],
"Root pip install failed (rc=%s); see the returned "
"CompletedProcess.stderr for details.",
result.returncode,
)
return result
# Same reasoning as above: no req_file / pip-output interpolation in
# this log line, only in the returned note/CompletedProcess.
logger.warning(
"Root pip install wrapper denied via sudo for %s; falling back to "
"user-level install: %s",
req_file, result.stderr.strip()[:500] if result else "no bash candidates found",
"Root pip install wrapper denied via sudo for all candidates; "
"falling back to user-level install. See the returned "
"CompletedProcess.stderr for details."
)
note = (
f"[Root install unavailable ({(result.stderr.strip() if result else 'sudo denied') or 'sudo denied'}); "
@@ -367,8 +402,7 @@ def install_requirements_file(req_file: Path, timeout: int = 300) -> subprocess.
)
else:
logger.warning(
"safe_pip_install.sh not found; falling back to user-level install for %s",
req_file,
"safe_pip_install.sh not found; falling back to user-level install."
)
note = (
"[safe_pip_install.sh not found; installed for the current process's "
@@ -386,6 +420,7 @@ def install_requirements_file(req_file: Path, timeout: int = 300) -> subprocess.
[sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--break-system-packages", "--ignore-installed", "-r", str(req_file)],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, cwd=str(project_root)
)
result.stdout = note + (result.stdout or "")
result.stderr = _redact_url_credentials(result.stderr)
result.stdout = note + _redact_url_credentials(result.stdout)
return result
+35 -8
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ else:
from contextlib import contextmanager
from PIL import Image, ImageDraw, ImageFont
import time
from typing import Dict, Any, List, Optional
from collections import OrderedDict
from typing import Dict, Any, List, Optional, Tuple
import logging
import math
import freetype
@@ -180,14 +181,25 @@ class DisplayManager:
# the logical image is blitted to the matrix unchanged.
self._double_sided = None # dict {copies, axis, logical_width, logical_height} or None
self._physical_image = None # full-chain buffer reused each frame when tiling
# Text-width measurement cache: (text, id(font)) -> pixel_width
# Text-width measurement cache: (text, id(font)) -> (width, font_ref)
# Avoids re-measuring the same string+font on every display() call.
# LRU-bounded: keys embed the TEXT, so changing strings (a clock, a
# live score) would otherwise grow it forever on a 24/7 service.
# Entries hold a strong reference to the font so its id() can't be
# recycled by a different font object — an id-keyed cache without
# the reference can return the WRONG width after garbage collection.
# Cleared on _load_fonts() so stale entries don't survive a font reload.
self._text_width_cache: Dict[tuple, int] = {}
self._text_width_cache: "OrderedDict[tuple, Tuple[int, Any]]" = OrderedDict()
self._TEXT_WIDTH_CACHE_MAX = 1024
# Snapshot settings for web preview integration (service writes, web reads)
self._snapshot_path = "/tmp/led_matrix_preview.png" # nosec B108 - fixed path intentional; web UI reads same path
self._snapshot_min_interval_sec = 0.2 # max ~5 fps
self._last_snapshot_ts = 0.0
# Snapshot failures are logged as warnings, rate-limited so a
# persistent failure (e.g. an unwritable file) can't spam the log —
# but is never silent: the snapshot's mtime doubles as the web UI's
# hardware-liveness signal, so a quiet failure makes health checks lie.
self._snapshot_fail_log_ts = 0.0
# Scrolling state tracking for graceful updates
self._scrolling_state = {
@@ -699,12 +711,15 @@ class DisplayManager:
Results are cached by (text, font identity) so plugins that measure
the same string every frame (e.g. to centre a score) pay only one
measurement per unique (text, font) pair.
measurement per unique (text, font) pair. The entry keeps the font
alive so its id() can't be recycled, and the cache is LRU-bounded so
ever-changing text (clocks, tickers) can't grow it without limit.
"""
cache_key = (text, id(font))
cached = self._text_width_cache.get(cache_key)
if cached is not None:
return cached
self._text_width_cache.move_to_end(cache_key)
return cached[0]
try:
if isinstance(font, freetype.Face):
@@ -719,7 +734,9 @@ class DisplayManager:
logger.error("Error getting text width: %s", e)
return 0
self._text_width_cache[cache_key] = width
self._text_width_cache[cache_key] = (width, font)
while len(self._text_width_cache) > self._TEXT_WIDTH_CACHE_MAX:
self._text_width_cache.popitem(last=False)
return width
def get_font_height(self, font):
@@ -1164,5 +1181,15 @@ class DisplayManager:
pass
self._last_snapshot_ts = now
except Exception as e:
# Snapshot failures should never break display; log at debug to avoid noise
logger.debug(f"Snapshot write skipped: {e}")
# Snapshot failures must never break display — but they must not
# be silent either: the snapshot's mtime is the web UI's display
# mirror AND its hardware-liveness proxy, so a quietly failing
# write freezes the mirror and makes health checks lie (seen in
# the field: a stale root-owned /tmp file froze it for a day).
# Warn at most once per 5 minutes to avoid log spam.
if (now - self._snapshot_fail_log_ts) > 300:
self._snapshot_fail_log_ts = now
logger.warning("Snapshot write failing (web preview/health "
"mirror is stale): %s", e)
else:
logger.debug(f"Snapshot write skipped: {e}")
+18 -5
View File
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ import urllib.request
import zipfile
import tempfile
import time
from collections import OrderedDict
from pathlib import Path
from PIL import ImageFont
from typing import Dict, Tuple, Optional, Union, Any, List
@@ -58,7 +59,13 @@ class FontManager:
# Font discovery and catalog
self.font_catalog: Dict[str, str] = {} # family_name -> file_path
self.font_cache: Dict[str, Union[ImageFont.FreeTypeFont, freetype.Face]] = {} # (family, size) -> font
self.metrics_cache: Dict[str, Tuple[int, int, int]] = {} # (text, font_id) -> (width, height, baseline)
# (text, id(font)) -> ((width, height, baseline), font_ref).
# LRU-bounded — keys embed the measured TEXT, so changing strings
# (clocks, live scores) would otherwise grow it forever. Entries
# keep the font alive so its id() can't be recycled by a different
# font object (which would silently return wrong metrics).
self.metrics_cache: "OrderedDict[Any, Tuple[Tuple[int, int, int], Any]]" = OrderedDict()
self._METRICS_CACHE_MAX = 1024
# Plugin font management
self.plugin_fonts: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {} # plugin_id -> font_manifest
@@ -507,10 +514,14 @@ class FontManager:
Returns:
Tuple of (width, height, baseline_offset)
"""
cache_key = f"{hash(text)}_{id(font)}"
# Key on the text itself (hash(text) could collide) + font identity;
# the entry below keeps the font referenced so the id stays valid.
cache_key = (text, id(font))
if cache_key in self.metrics_cache:
return self.metrics_cache[cache_key]
cached = self.metrics_cache.get(cache_key)
if cached is not None:
self.metrics_cache.move_to_end(cache_key)
return cached[0]
try:
if isinstance(font, freetype.Face):
@@ -547,7 +558,9 @@ class FontManager:
baseline = 10
result = (width, height, baseline)
self.metrics_cache[cache_key] = result
self.metrics_cache[cache_key] = (result, font)
while len(self.metrics_cache) > self._METRICS_CACHE_MAX:
self.metrics_cache.popitem(last=False)
return result
def get_font_height(self, font: Union[ImageFont.FreeTypeFont, freetype.Face]) -> int:
+54 -27
View File
@@ -93,6 +93,27 @@ def requirements_are_satisfied(requirements_file: str) -> bool:
return True
def find_trusted_subdir(trusted_dir: str, name: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return `name` if it names an actual subdirectory of trusted_dir, else None.
Used as a containment check for a directory name derived from untrusted
input (a manifest-declared plugin id, an externally-supplied plugin
path): the returned value always comes from enumerating trusted_dir
itself via os.scandir(), so a caller that builds a path by joining
trusted_dir with this return value is joining against a name the
filesystem produced under a trusted root -- not the caller's original
string, which could otherwise smuggle a traversal sequence through.
"""
try:
with os.scandir(trusted_dir) as entries:
for entry in entries:
if entry.name == name and entry.is_dir():
return entry.name
except OSError:
pass
return None
class PluginLoader:
"""Handles plugin module loading and class instantiation."""
@@ -200,14 +221,14 @@ class PluginLoader:
except (json.JSONDecodeError, Exception) as e:
self.logger.debug("Skipping %s due to manifest error: %s", item.name, e)
continue
return None
def install_dependencies(
self,
plugin_dir: Path,
plugin_id: str,
plugins_dir: Optional[Path] = None,
plugins_dir: Path,
timeout: int = 300
) -> bool:
"""
@@ -216,7 +237,12 @@ class PluginLoader:
Args:
plugin_dir: Plugin directory path
plugin_id: Plugin identifier
plugins_dir: Trusted base plugins directory for path containment check
plugins_dir: Trusted base plugins directory for path containment check.
Required (not optional) so every caller reconstructs the plugin
path through the sanitiser below rather than trusting plugin_dir
directly -- CodeQL's path-injection query (and a malicious
manifest/plugin_id in practice) can't tell a legitimate
plugin_dir from one crafted to traverse outside plugins_dir.
timeout: Installation timeout in seconds
Returns:
@@ -228,31 +254,24 @@ class PluginLoader:
# Resolve to a canonical absolute path (normalises .. and symlinks)
plugin_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(plugin_dir))
plugins_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(plugins_dir))
requested_name = os.path.basename(plugin_dir_real)
if plugins_dir is not None:
# Reconstruct the plugin path from a trusted base + a sanitised
# directory name. os.path.basename() is CodeQL's recognised
# py/path-injection sanitiser: it strips all directory components
# so the result cannot contain traversal sequences. Joining it
# with the resolved, trusted plugins_dir produces a path that
# CodeQL considers untainted.
plugins_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(plugins_dir))
safe_dir_name = os.path.basename(plugin_dir_real)
if not safe_dir_name:
self.logger.error("Could not determine plugin directory name for %s", plugin_id)
return False
safe_plugin_dir = os.path.join(plugins_dir_real, safe_dir_name)
if not os.path.isdir(safe_plugin_dir):
self.logger.error(
"Plugin directory for %s not found inside plugins dir", plugin_id
)
return False
else:
safe_plugin_dir = plugin_dir_real
if not os.path.isdir(safe_plugin_dir):
self.logger.error("Plugin directory does not exist: %s", plugin_dir)
return False
# Match the requested directory against an entry actually enumerated
# from the trusted plugins_dir, and build the path from that entry --
# not from requested_name. A name that came out of os.scandir() on a
# trusted root carries no taint regardless of what the caller asked
# for, so this is a real containment guarantee (an allowlist check
# against a trusted source), not a string-sanitisation of untrusted
# input that a static analyzer has to trust blindly.
matched_name = find_trusted_subdir(plugins_dir_real, requested_name)
if matched_name is None:
self.logger.error(
"Plugin directory for %s not found inside plugins dir", plugin_id
)
return False
safe_plugin_dir = os.path.join(plugins_dir_real, matched_name)
requirements_file = os.path.join(safe_plugin_dir, "requirements.txt")
if not os.path.isfile(requirements_file):
@@ -698,6 +717,14 @@ class PluginLoader:
"""
# Install dependencies if needed
if install_deps:
if plugins_dir is None:
raise PluginError(
f"plugins_dir is required to install dependencies for plugin {plugin_id} "
"(needed for path containment; pass install_deps=False if the caller "
"doesn't have a trusted plugins directory to supply)",
plugin_id=plugin_id,
context={'plugin_dir': str(plugin_dir)},
)
if not self.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, plugin_id, plugins_dir=plugins_dir):
raise PluginError(
f"Dependency installation failed for plugin {plugin_id} in {plugin_dir}",
+12 -1
View File
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import json
import sys
import time
import threading
import types
from pathlib import Path
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Any
import logging
@@ -743,8 +744,18 @@ class PluginManager:
# If resource monitor exists, wrap the call
def monitored_update():
self.resource_monitor.monitor_call(plugin_id, plugin_instance.update)
# SimpleNamespace stores `update` as an *instance*
# attribute, so attribute lookup returns the plain
# function object as-is. A dynamically-built class
# (`type(..., {'update': monitored_update})`) instead
# stores it as a *class* attribute, which the
# descriptor protocol turns into a bound method on
# access -- silently prepending the instance as an
# implicit first argument to a function that takes
# none, raising "monitored_update() takes 0
# positional arguments but 1 was given" on every call.
success = self.plugin_executor.execute_update(
type('obj', (object,), {'update': monitored_update})(),
types.SimpleNamespace(update=monitored_update),
plugin_id
)
else:
+25 -5
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ import logging
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from src.common.permission_utils import sudo_remove_directory, install_requirements_file
from src.plugin_system.plugin_loader import requirements_has_real_deps, requirements_are_satisfied
from src.plugin_system.plugin_loader import (
requirements_has_real_deps, requirements_are_satisfied, find_trusted_subdir
)
try:
from jsonschema import Draft7Validator, ValidationError
@@ -1900,15 +1902,33 @@ class PluginStoreManager:
def _install_dependencies(self, plugin_path: Path) -> bool:
"""
Install Python dependencies from requirements.txt.
Args:
plugin_path: Path to plugin directory
Returns:
True if successful or no requirements file
"""
requirements_file = plugin_path / "requirements.txt"
# Reconstruct the plugin path from the trusted self.plugins_dir base +
# an entry actually enumerated from it, rather than trusting
# plugin_path directly -- callers ultimately derive it from a
# plugin-supplied manifest "id" field (see install_plugin_from_url),
# so without this a malicious manifest could point requirements_file
# outside plugins_dir. find_trusted_subdir()'s return value always
# comes from os.scandir() on the trusted root, so building the path
# from it (not from the caller's string) is a real containment
# guarantee, matching the pattern in PluginLoader.install_dependencies().
plugin_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(plugin_path))
plugins_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(self.plugins_dir))
requested_name = os.path.basename(plugin_dir_real)
matched_name = find_trusted_subdir(plugins_dir_real, requested_name)
if matched_name is None:
self.logger.error("Plugin directory not found inside plugins dir for dependency install")
return False
safe_plugin_path = Path(os.path.join(plugins_dir_real, matched_name))
requirements_file = safe_plugin_path / "requirements.txt"
if not requirements_file.exists():
self.logger.debug(f"No requirements.txt found in {plugin_path.name}")
return True
@@ -454,6 +454,18 @@ class VisualTestDisplayManager:
"""Check if display is currently scrolling."""
return self._scrolling_state['is_scrolling']
def process_deferred_updates(self):
"""Process any deferred updates (no-op for testing).
Several ticker-style plugins (news, odds-ticker, leaderboard,
stock-news, stocks) call this unconditionally between
set_scrolling_state() and their scroll-position update, mirroring the
real display_manager's deferred-update queue. This double has no such
queue, so there is nothing to process the no-op just lets those
plugins render under the harness instead of raising AttributeError.
"""
pass
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
# Utility methods
# ------------------------------------------------------------------
+5 -1
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,11 @@ def mock_cache_manager():
mock._memory_cache_timestamps = {}
mock.cache_dir = "/tmp/test_cache"
def mock_get(key: str, max_age: int = 300) -> Optional[Dict]:
def mock_get(key: str, max_age: Optional[int] = 300,
memory_ttl: Optional[int] = None) -> Optional[Dict]:
# Signature mirrors CacheManager.get — keep in sync or callers
# passing keyword args (health tracker, resource monitor) break
# only in tests, hiding real-API compatibility.
return mock._memory_cache.get(key)
def mock_set(key: str, data: Dict, ttl: Optional[int] = None) -> None:
+10
View File
@@ -172,6 +172,16 @@ class TestVisualDisplayManager:
vdm.set_scrolling_state(False)
assert vdm.is_currently_scrolling() is False
def test_process_deferred_updates_is_noop(self):
# Ticker-style plugins (news, odds-ticker, leaderboard, stock-news,
# stocks) call this unconditionally alongside set_scrolling_state();
# it must exist and be harmless so those plugins render under the
# harness instead of raising AttributeError.
vdm = VisualTestDisplayManager(width=128, height=32)
vdm.set_scrolling_state(True)
vdm.process_deferred_updates() # should not raise
assert vdm.is_currently_scrolling() is True
def test_format_date_with_ordinal(self):
from datetime import datetime
vdm = VisualTestDisplayManager(width=128, height=32)
+83
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
"""
Tests for src.common.permission_utils's URL-credential redaction.
Covers the fix for a CodeQL clear-text-logging-of-secrets alert:
install_requirements_file() must never let a private index URL's embedded
user:pass@ credentials reach logs or its returned CompletedProcess, since
pip can echo that URL back verbatim in its own stderr/stdout on failure.
"""
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from src.common.permission_utils import _redact_url_credentials, install_requirements_file
class TestRedactUrlCredentials:
def test_redacts_embedded_basic_auth(self):
text = "Could not fetch URL https://alice:s3cr3t@pypi.example.com/simple/: 403"
redacted = _redact_url_credentials(text)
assert "s3cr3t" not in redacted
assert "alice" not in redacted
assert "https://***:***@pypi.example.com/simple/" in redacted
def test_leaves_credential_free_text_unchanged(self):
text = "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement foo==1.0"
assert _redact_url_credentials(text) == text
def test_handles_none_and_empty(self):
assert _redact_url_credentials(None) == ""
assert _redact_url_credentials("") == ""
def test_does_not_touch_denied_check_phrases(self):
"""The fixed phrases install_requirements_file greps for must survive
redaction untouched -- they don't overlap with URL syntax, but this
pins that assumption so a regex change can't silently break it."""
text = "sudo: a password is required"
assert _redact_url_credentials(text) == text
class TestInstallRequirementsFileRedaction:
@patch('src.common.permission_utils.subprocess.run')
def test_wrapper_path_redacts_stderr_and_stdout(self, mock_run, tmp_path):
"""safe_pip_install.sh exists in this repo, so install_requirements_file
takes the sudo-wrapper branch; a failing result must come back
with any embedded index-URL credentials already redacted."""
req_file = tmp_path / "requirements.txt"
req_file.write_text("requests\n")
mock_run.return_value = MagicMock(
returncode=1,
stdout="Looking in indexes: https://bob:hunter2@pypi.internal/simple\n",
stderr="ERROR https://bob:hunter2@pypi.internal/simple/foo: 401",
)
result = install_requirements_file(req_file, timeout=5)
assert "hunter2" not in result.stdout
assert "hunter2" not in result.stderr
assert "https://***:***@pypi.internal" in result.stdout
assert "https://***:***@pypi.internal" in result.stderr
@patch('src.common.permission_utils.subprocess.run')
@patch('src.common.permission_utils.Path.exists', return_value=False)
def test_no_wrapper_fallback_path_redacts_stderr_and_stdout(self, mock_exists, mock_run, tmp_path):
"""No safe_pip_install.sh wrapper -> falls straight to the
sys.executable pip fallback (the second subprocess.run call site);
its result must come back redacted too, independent of the wrapper
branch's own redaction above."""
req_file = tmp_path / "requirements.txt"
req_file.write_text("requests\n")
mock_run.return_value = MagicMock(
returncode=1,
stdout="Looking in indexes: https://carol:swordfish@pypi.internal/simple\n",
stderr="ERROR https://carol:swordfish@pypi.internal/simple/foo: 401",
)
result = install_requirements_file(req_file, timeout=5)
assert "swordfish" not in result.stdout
assert "swordfish" not in result.stderr
assert "https://***:***@pypi.internal" in result.stdout
assert "https://***:***@pypi.internal" in result.stderr
+34 -7
View File
@@ -193,7 +193,7 @@ class TestPluginLoader:
mock_subprocess.return_value = MagicMock(returncode=0)
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin")
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin", plugins_dir=tmp_plugins_dir)
assert result is True
mock_subprocess.assert_called_once()
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ class TestPluginLoader:
plugin_dir = tmp_plugins_dir / "test_plugin"
plugin_dir.mkdir()
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin")
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin", plugins_dir=tmp_plugins_dir)
assert result is True
mock_subprocess.assert_not_called()
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ class TestPluginLoader:
mock_subprocess.return_value = MagicMock(returncode=1)
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin")
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin", plugins_dir=tmp_plugins_dir)
assert result is False
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ class TestPluginLoader:
retry_attempt = MagicMock(returncode=0, stderr="")
mock_subprocess.side_effect = [first_attempt, retry_attempt]
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin")
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin", plugins_dir=tmp_plugins_dir)
assert result is True
assert mock_subprocess.call_count == 2
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ class TestPluginLoader:
retry_attempt = MagicMock(returncode=1, stderr="some other pip error")
mock_subprocess.side_effect = [first_attempt, retry_attempt]
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin")
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin", plugins_dir=tmp_plugins_dir)
assert result is True
assert mock_subprocess.call_count == 2
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ class TestPluginLoader:
subprocess.TimeoutExpired(cmd="pip", timeout=300),
]
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin")
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin", plugins_dir=tmp_plugins_dir)
assert result is True
assert mock_subprocess.call_count == 2
@@ -311,7 +311,34 @@ class TestPluginLoader:
requirements_file = plugin_dir / "requirements.txt"
requirements_file.write_text("pytest>=1.0\n")
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin")
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin", plugins_dir=tmp_plugins_dir)
assert result is True
mock_subprocess.assert_not_called()
def test_install_dependencies_requires_plugins_dir(self, plugin_loader, tmp_plugins_dir):
"""plugins_dir is a required argument, not an optional trust-me flag --
calling without it must fail loudly (TypeError) rather than silently
falling back to trusting plugin_dir unchecked."""
plugin_dir = tmp_plugins_dir / "test_plugin"
plugin_dir.mkdir()
with pytest.raises(TypeError):
plugin_loader.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, "test_plugin")
@patch('subprocess.run')
def test_install_dependencies_rejects_path_outside_plugins_dir(
self, mock_subprocess, plugin_loader, tmp_path, tmp_plugins_dir
):
"""A plugin_dir that doesn't actually live inside plugins_dir (e.g. a
manifest-derived id crafted to traverse elsewhere) must be rejected
rather than read from -- this is the path-injection containment
check CodeQL flagged as missing."""
outside_dir = tmp_path / "outside"
outside_dir.mkdir()
(outside_dir / "requirements.txt").write_text("requests>=2.0\n")
result = plugin_loader.install_dependencies(outside_dir, "evil_plugin", plugins_dir=tmp_plugins_dir)
assert result is False
mock_subprocess.assert_not_called()
+50 -1
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from pathlib import Path
from src.plugin_system.plugin_manager import PluginManager
from src.plugin_system.plugin_state import PluginState
from src.plugin_system.resource_monitor import PluginResourceMonitor
class TestPluginManager:
"""Test PluginManager functionality."""
@@ -74,10 +75,58 @@ class TestPluginManager:
# No manifest in pm.plugin_manifests
result = pm.load_plugin("non_existent_plugin")
assert result is False
assert pm.state_manager.get_state("non_existent_plugin") == PluginState.ERROR
def test_run_scheduled_updates_calls_update_with_resource_monitor(
self, mock_config_manager, mock_display_manager, mock_cache_manager
):
"""Regression test: run_scheduled_updates() must actually call a
plugin's update() when self.resource_monitor is set (as it is in
every real deployment -- display_controller.py and web_interface/
app.py both assign a real PluginResourceMonitor after construction).
Previously, the resource_monitor branch wrapped the call in a
function stored as a *class* attribute on a dynamically-built type
(`type('obj', (object,), {'update': monitored_update})()`), which
the descriptor protocol turns into a bound method on access --
silently passing the synthetic instance as an implicit first
argument to monitored_update(), which takes none. Every plugin's
scheduled update failed with "monitored_update() takes 0 positional
arguments but 1 was given" and was silently swallowed into a
circuit-breaker retry loop that never succeeded, so plugin data
(scores, odds, etc.) never refreshed.
"""
with patch('src.plugin_system.plugin_manager.ensure_directory_permissions'):
pm = PluginManager(
plugins_dir="plugins",
config_manager=mock_config_manager,
display_manager=mock_display_manager,
cache_manager=mock_cache_manager
)
plugin_instance = MagicMock()
plugin_instance.enabled = True
plugin_instance.update = MagicMock()
pm.plugins["test_plugin"] = plugin_instance
pm.plugin_manifests["test_plugin"] = {"update_interval": 10}
pm.state_manager.set_state("test_plugin", PluginState.ENABLED)
# Plain MagicMock, not the mock_cache_manager fixture: this test
# is about run_scheduled_updates() actually invoking update()
# through the resource-monitor wrapper, not about
# PluginResourceMonitor's own cache-backed metrics persistence
# (which calls cache_manager.get(..., memory_ttl=...) --
# a kwarg the fixture's mock_get() doesn't accept).
pm.resource_monitor = PluginResourceMonitor(MagicMock())
pm.run_scheduled_updates(current_time=time.time())
plugin_instance.update.assert_called_once()
assert "test_plugin" in pm.plugin_last_update
assert pm.state_manager.get_state("test_plugin") == PluginState.ENABLED
class TestPluginLoader:
"""Test PluginLoader functionality."""