Files
LEDMatrix/src/cache/disk_cache.py
T
ChuckandClaude Opus 5 f6367d63ae security: triage the CodeQL backlog — 129 alerts, three of them live (#561)
* fix(web): escape quotes in every HTML escaper, not just & < >

The escapers are all `div.textContent = x; return div.innerHTML`. That
round-trip escapes &, < and > -- the only characters the HTML serializer
must escape in a text node -- and leaves quotes alone. Every widget then
interpolates the result into a quoted attribute value:

    value="${escapeHtml(v)}"   title="${escapeHtml(v)}"

so a value of `x" onmouseover="alert(1)` closes the attribute and adds an
event handler of its own. CodeQL reported this 83 times
(js/incomplete-html-attribute-sanitization) across the widget files.

It is one bug, not 83: the widgets each carry a standalone fallback that
did escape quotes, but they all prefer BaseWidget.escapeHtml when
window.BaseWidget exists -- which it always does in the shipped page -- so
the correct fallbacks were dead code and the incomplete shared one ran.
Fixed at each source instead of at the call sites.

app-shell.js already documented this exact gap in a comment and worked
around it by building DOM nodes by hand; that workaround stays (setting a
property cannot be got wrong), the comment is now accurate.

cache.html's delete button interpolated the cache key into
`onclick="deleteCacheFile('...')"`. Escaping cannot help there -- the
browser HTML-decodes the attribute before parsing it as JS, so `&#39;`
becomes a real `'` again -- so the key moves to a data-cache-key
attribute that the handler reads back.

url-input.js additionally wrote a value straight into an <a href> after
validating it against a schema-supplied protocol list, and that list
accepted any RFC 3986 scheme -- "javascript" included. Scriptable schemes
(javascript, data, vbscript, blob, filesystem) are now refused both when
the list is normalised and when a URL is checked against it, and the
render path routes its href through the same check instead of emitting
whatever was stored (js/xss-through-dom).

test/js/unit/test_html_escaping.js reads each escaper out of the shipped
file and runs it, so losing the quote handling again fails a test rather
than a scan.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): stop request-supplied names from reaching paths outside their base

Three of the py/path-injection alerts were live, not lint:

* GET /api/v3/plugins/<plugin_id>/static/<path:file_path> read any file
  whose resolved path *string-prefixed* the plugin directory. Flask's
  default converter forbids a slash but not dots, and
  get_plugin_directory('..') returned the parent of the plugins directory
  because it exists -- so every file under the project root then prefixed
  that directory, config/config_secrets.json included. The prefix check
  was also wrong on its own terms: with plugin dir "plugin-repos/foo",
  "../foo-evil/x" resolves to "plugin-repos/foo-evil/x", whose string does
  start with "plugin-repos/foo".

* POST /api/v3/plugins/of-the-day/json/delete interpolated the request
  body's file_id into f"{file_id}.json" and unlinked it, unvalidated. A
  file_id of "../../../../etc/something" deleted that file. This is the
  one finding in the batch that destroyed data rather than exposing it.

* POST /api/v3/cache/delete passed the body's key through
  CacheManager.clear_cache to DiskCache, which joined it as a filename and
  called os.remove. Same shape, same result. The guard goes in
  DiskCache.get_cache_path, the single choke point get/set/clear share, so
  every caller is covered rather than just this route. Real keys are the
  stems of files already flat in the cache directory -- that is how
  list_cache_files derives them -- so nothing legitimate is turned away.

The rest of the cluster (web_interface/app.py's asset route, the plugin
update handler, _get_plugin_version, the plugin-schema read in config.py)
was guarded in ways that held, but each had grown its own version of the
check. They now go through one helper, src/common/path_safety.py, which
returns the *sanitised value* rather than a verdict -- so a caller cannot
validate one string and open another, which is how the two real bugs
above were shaped.

Also: WiFiManager.connect_to_network took the SSID and password straight
from POST /api/v3/wifi/connect into nmcli's argv. There is no shell there,
so CodeQL's py/command-line-injection alert overstates the risk -- but
nmcli reads a leading "-" as an option, so an SSID of "--ask" asks nmcli
to run differently rather than to join a network. Both values are now
checked for shape (802.11's 32-octet SSID limit, WPA's 8-63 char
passphrase or 64-char hex key, no control characters, no leading dash)
before any subprocess runs.

test/test_path_traversal_guards.py asserts on the filesystem, not just
the status code: a handler that returns 403 and deletes the file anyway
would pass the weaker check. Twelve of its cases fail against the
unpatched code.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): refuse a plugin id that is not a plain name, don't truncate it

pages_v3 and scripts/dev_server.py ran request ids through
os.path.basename and carried on with what came out, so "../weather"
rendered the config form for "weather". Nothing escaped the plugins
directory -- the relative_to guards held -- but the handler answered a
request nobody made, and validating one string while the filesystem sees
another is the shape both live traversals earlier in this branch had.

Same treatment as the rest: safe_path_component rejects rather than
truncates, resolve_under returns the path it checked, and the call sites
use what those return. The three handlers that had hand-rolled
resolve-and-relative_to blocks lose about twenty lines to the shared one.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(web): say what the plugin web_ui iframe actually is

The docstring claimed the fragment runs "in a sandboxed iframe". The
iframe in plugin_config.html carries no sandbox attribute, so the
fragment runs with the interface's own origin. That is fine -- the file
belongs to an installed plugin, and an installed plugin already runs
Python on the device, so the trust boundary is install rather than this
route -- but a comment promising containment that is not there is worse
than no comment. This is the context for the py/reflective-xss alert on
this handler.

Also drops the now-unused os/os.path imports.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): inline url-input's scheme guard at the previewLink.href sink

CodeQL flagged this line as a new high-severity js/xss-through-dom alert
on this PR even though it is already covered by SCRIPTABLE_SCHEMES: the
guard reached the sink through safeHref -> isValidUrl, two function calls
away, which its DOM-based-XSS sanitizer recognition does not trace.

Behavior is unchanged -- same scheme check, same SCRIPTABLE_SCHEMES list,
same allowedProtocols gate -- just inlined directly above the
previewLink.href assignment it guards, so the barrier is visible in the
same scope as the sink.

Added a regression test that runs the shipped onInput handler (not just
the extracted helpers) against a mocked DOM, so a future change that
reintroduces an unguarded previewLink.href assignment fails here.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(security): address CodeRabbit findings on the CodeQL triage PR

- src/wifi_manager.py: reject non-ASCII WPA-PSK passphrases before any
  credential-saving or connect flow runs. NetworkManager only accepts
  printable ASCII passphrases (or a 64-char hex key); a non-ASCII value
  was previously saved/attempted before nmcli itself rejected it.

- web_interface/blueprints/api_v3/config.py: fail closed when the
  plugin config schema path can't be resolved under the plugins
  directory (e.g. a symlinked plugin dir). Previously this fell
  through with secret_fields left empty, so submitted credentials for
  that plugin were saved as ordinary, unencrypted configuration.

- web_interface/static/v3/js/widgets/plugin-file-manager.js: stop
  splicing the JSON day/column key into an inline oninput="..." handler
  string. escHtml() escapes quotes for a normal HTML attribute, but the
  browser HTML-decodes the attribute before running it as script, which
  undoes that escaping and lets a crafted column name (e.g. from an
  uploaded JSON file) break out of the JS string and execute. Cell
  edits now travel through data-day/data-col attributes read by one
  delegated 'input' listener instead.

  While in this file: fixed 6 pre-existing missing-')' typos on
  multi-line safeSetHTML(...) calls (already flagged by Biome in this
  PR's own CodeRabbit run as syntax errors blocking its lint pass).
  These predate this PR (present on main too) but made the whole file
  fail to parse in any JS engine, which is a bigger problem than the
  XSS finding itself and directly touches the same lines.

Added/extended regression tests for each fix; full suites pass
(pytest: 4580 passed, 62 skipped; JS: 84 assertions).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 15:32:03 -04:00

631 lines
30 KiB
Python

"""
Disk Cache
Handles persistent disk-based caching with atomic writes and error recovery.
"""
import json
import math
import os
import time
import tempfile
import logging
import threading
import zlib
from typing import Dict, Any, Optional, Protocol
from datetime import datetime
from src.common.path_safety import safe_path_component
try: # optional: large speedup on the cache write path, see _dumps below
import orjson
except ImportError: # pragma: no cover - exercised on hosts without the wheel
orjson = None
# How old an abandoned write's temp file must be before the sweep removes it.
# A real write holds its temp file for milliseconds, so an hour is far beyond
# any in-flight write while still clearing the same day's debris. Deliberately
# not tied to the retention policies: those describe how long data stays
# useful, and a half-written file was never useful.
_ORPHAN_TEMP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 3600
class CacheStrategyProtocol(Protocol):
"""Protocol for cache strategy objects that categorize cache keys."""
def get_data_type_from_key(self, key: str) -> str:
"""
Determine the data type from a cache key.
Args:
key: Cache key
Returns:
Data type string for strategy lookup
"""
...
class DateTimeEncoder(json.JSONEncoder):
"""JSON encoder that handles datetime objects.
Retained for the stdlib fallback path and for any caller importing it.
"""
def default(self, obj: Any) -> Any:
if isinstance(obj, datetime):
return obj.isoformat()
return super().default(obj)
def _datetime_default(obj: Any) -> Any:
"""Serialise datetimes exactly as DateTimeEncoder did."""
if isinstance(obj, datetime):
return obj.isoformat()
raise TypeError(f"Object of type {type(obj).__name__} is not JSON serializable")
def _replace_nonfinite(obj: Any) -> Any:
"""Non-finite floats -> None, matching what ``orjson.dumps`` writes.
Only reached once a strict pass has proved there is something to replace,
so the ordinary write path never pays for this walk.
"""
if isinstance(obj, float):
return obj if math.isfinite(obj) else None
if isinstance(obj, dict):
return {k: _replace_nonfinite(v) for k, v in obj.items()}
if isinstance(obj, (list, tuple)):
return [_replace_nonfinite(v) for v in obj]
return obj
# NON-FINITE FLOATS
# -----------------
# JSON has no NaN or Infinity. The stdlib emits them anyway as an extension;
# orjson refuses to and writes null. That divergence is not acceptable in a
# cache whose files outlive the decision of which encoder is installed, so the
# policy here is one behaviour on both paths:
#
# writing non-finite floats become null, whichever encoder is in use
# reading files already on disk that carry the stdlib's NaN/Infinity
# tokens stay readable, whichever encoder is in use
#
# Without the write half, installing orjson silently changed cached values.
# Without the read half, installing orjson turned every legacy record holding a
# NaN into a "corrupted cache file" that DiskCache.get logged as an error and
# deleted. Both halves are covered by test/test_cache_nonfinite_floats.py.
if orjson is not None:
# Encoding the cache record dominated the background fetch worker: on a
# Pi 4, stdlib json.dumps runs ~12ms per MB and holds the GIL for all of
# it, which stalls the render thread mid-scroll. orjson measures ~7x
# faster on the same payloads (11.9ms -> 1.6ms for 985KB). Decoding gains
# far less (~1.3x on large payloads) because the cost there is building
# the Python objects, not scanning the text, but it is still free to take.
#
# OPT_NON_STR_KEYS: stdlib json coerces int/float dict keys to strings;
# orjson raises without this, and cache records do carry numeric keys.
# OPT_PASSTHROUGH_DATETIME: orjson would otherwise emit its own RFC 3339
# form for datetimes instead of calling default(). Routing them through
# _datetime_default keeps byte-for-byte parity with the records already
# on disk.
_DUMPS_OPTS = orjson.OPT_NON_STR_KEYS | orjson.OPT_PASSTHROUGH_DATETIME
def _dumps(data: Any) -> bytes:
return orjson.dumps(data, default=_datetime_default, option=_DUMPS_OPTS)
def _loads(raw: bytes) -> Any:
try:
return orjson.loads(raw)
except orjson.JSONDecodeError:
# Legacy record written by the stdlib path, carrying NaN or
# Infinity. Genuinely malformed files raise again from here, as
# json.JSONDecodeError, which is what DiskCache.get expects.
return json.loads(raw)
else:
def _dumps(data: Any) -> bytes:
try:
return json.dumps(data, cls=DateTimeEncoder,
allow_nan=False).encode("utf-8")
except ValueError:
# allow_nan=False is what detects the non-finite values; the walk
# runs only now that we know there is one to replace.
return json.dumps(_replace_nonfinite(data), cls=DateTimeEncoder,
allow_nan=False).encode("utf-8")
def _loads(raw: bytes) -> Any:
return json.loads(raw)
class DiskCache:
"""Manages persistent disk-based cache."""
def __init__(self, cache_dir: Optional[str], logger: Optional[logging.Logger] = None) -> None:
"""
Initialize disk cache.
Args:
cache_dir: Directory for cache files (None = disabled)
logger: Optional logger instance
"""
self.cache_dir = cache_dir
self.logger = logger or logging.getLogger(__name__)
self._lock = threading.Lock()
# key -> adler32 of the last payload successfully written to the
# primary cache path; lets set() skip rewriting identical data
# (per-process only — worst case another process rewrites, never
# a missed write). Guarded by _lock.
self._write_digests: Dict[str, int] = {}
def get_cache_path(self, key: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""
Get the path for a cache file.
The key becomes a filename, so it has to be one. Keys reach this
method from the web API -- POST /api/v3/cache/delete passes the
request body's ``key`` straight through CacheManager.clear_cache to
os.remove -- and a key of ``../../../../etc/whatever`` named a file
well outside the cache directory. Every real key is the stem of a
file already sitting flat in cache_dir (that is how list_cache_files
derives them), so rejecting anything with a path component turns
away only inputs that could never have been written here.
Args:
key: Cache key
Returns:
Path to cache file, or None if cache is disabled or the key is
not a usable filename
"""
if not self.cache_dir:
return None
safe_key = safe_path_component(key)
if safe_key is None:
self.logger.warning("Rejected unsafe cache key %r", key)
return None
return os.path.join(self.cache_dir, f"{safe_key}.json")
def get(self, key: str, max_age: Optional[int] = 300) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""
Get data from disk cache.
Args:
key: Cache key
max_age: Maximum age in seconds; None disables age-based expiry
(the record never counts as stale). Mirrors MemoryCache.get.
Returns:
Cached data or None if not found or expired
"""
cache_path = self.get_cache_path(key)
if not cache_path or not os.path.exists(cache_path):
return None
try:
with self._lock:
with open(cache_path, 'rb') as f:
record = _loads(f.read())
# Determine record timestamp (prefer embedded, else file mtime)
record_ts = None
if isinstance(record, dict):
record_ts = record.get('timestamp')
if record_ts is None:
try:
record_ts = os.path.getmtime(cache_path)
except OSError:
record_ts = None
if record_ts is not None:
try:
record_ts = float(record_ts)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
record_ts = None
now = time.time()
# An explicit per-entry ttl wins over the caller's max_age. The
# caller that wrote the record knows what its data is; max_age is
# inferred from substrings in the key ("live", "odds", "stock") and
# is only a fallback for records that never said. Until now the ttl
# was stored and ignored, so `set(key, data, ttl=...)` did nothing
# at all -- 48 plugin call sites and 4 in the core were writing a
# number no read path consulted.
effective_max_age = max_age
if isinstance(record, dict):
stored_ttl = record.get('ttl')
if isinstance(stored_ttl, (int, float)) and not isinstance(stored_ttl, bool) \
and stored_ttl >= 0:
effective_max_age = stored_ttl
max_age = effective_max_age
# max_age=None means "never expires" (mirrors MemoryCache and the
# cache_manager docstring). Guard it explicitly — otherwise the
# comparison below raises TypeError and the record is treated as a
# miss, which silently breaks callers that persist long-lived state
# via get(key, max_age=None) (e.g. plugin health/metrics that must
# survive restarts and be read cross-process).
if record_ts is None or max_age is None or (now - record_ts) <= max_age:
return record
else:
# Stale on disk; keep file for potential diagnostics but treat as miss
return None
except json.JSONDecodeError as e:
self.logger.error("Error parsing cache file for %s at %s: %s", key, cache_path, e, exc_info=True)
# If the file is corrupted, remove it
try:
os.remove(cache_path)
self.logger.info("Removed corrupted cache file: %s", cache_path)
except OSError as remove_error:
self.logger.warning("Could not remove corrupted cache file %s: %s", cache_path, remove_error)
return None
except PermissionError as e:
# Permission errors are recoverable - cache just won't be available
self.logger.warning("Permission denied loading cache for %s from %s: %s. Cache unavailable for this key.", key, cache_path, e)
return None
except (IOError, OSError) as e:
self.logger.error("Error loading cache for %s from %s: %s", key, cache_path, e, exc_info=True)
return None
except Exception as e:
self.logger.error("Unexpected error loading cache for %s from %s: %s", key, cache_path, e, exc_info=True)
return None
def set(self, key: str, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
"""
Save data to disk cache with atomic write.
This method gracefully handles permission errors. If the cache directory
is not writable, it will log a warning and return silently rather than
raising an exception. This allows the application to continue functioning
even when running as a non-root user without write access to system cache
directories.
Args:
key: Cache key
data: Data to cache
"""
cache_path = self.get_cache_path(key)
if not cache_path:
return
# Serialize once, compact (no indent): the payload is reused by every
# write path below, and cache files are machine-read only — indenting
# them just multiplied the bytes written to the SD card.
try:
payload = _dumps(data)
except (TypeError, ValueError) as e:
self.logger.warning("Cache data for key '%s' not serializable: %s", key, e)
return
digest = zlib.adler32(payload)
try:
# Atomic write to avoid partial/corrupt files
with self._lock:
# Skip the disk entirely when this exact payload was already
# written for this key (plugins re-save unchanged API data
# every update cycle — each write is real SD-card wear).
# Refresh the file mtime so records that rely on it for TTL
# (no embedded 'timestamp') don't expire early; a metadata
# touch is journal-cheap compared to rewriting the data.
if self._write_digests.get(key) == digest:
try:
os.utime(cache_path, None)
return
except OSError:
# File vanished or perms changed — fall through and write
self._write_digests.pop(key, None)
tmp_dir = os.path.dirname(cache_path)
# Try to create temp file in cache directory first
# If that fails due to permissions, fall back to direct write
tmp_path = None
fd = None
try:
# First try the cache directory
if os.access(tmp_dir, os.W_OK):
try:
fd, tmp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=f".{os.path.basename(cache_path)}.", dir=tmp_dir)
except (IOError, OSError, PermissionError):
# If temp file creation fails, try direct write as fallback
self.logger.warning("Could not create temp file in %s, using direct write for %s", tmp_dir, key)
tmp_path = None
fd = None
else:
# Directory not writable, use direct write
self.logger.warning("Cache directory %s not writable, using direct write for %s", tmp_dir, key)
tmp_path = None
fd = None
if tmp_path and fd is not None:
# Atomic write with temp file. No fsync: os.replace
# already guarantees readers never see a torn file,
# and cache data is re-fetchable — forcing a disk
# flush per write was the single biggest SD-card
# wear source (dozens of fsyncs/min on API-heavy
# installs) for data that can be re-downloaded.
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as tmp_file:
tmp_file.write(payload)
os.replace(tmp_path, cache_path)
self._write_digests[key] = digest
# Set proper permissions: 660 (rw-rw----) for group-readable cache files
try:
os.chmod(cache_path, 0o660) # nosec B103 - intentional; web UI and service share a group
except OSError:
pass # Non-critical if chmod fails
finally:
if os.path.exists(tmp_path):
try:
os.remove(tmp_path)
except OSError:
pass
else:
# Fallback: direct write (not atomic, but better than failing)
try:
with open(cache_path, 'wb') as cache_file:
cache_file.write(payload)
self._write_digests[key] = digest
# Set proper permissions: 660 (rw-rw----) for group-readable cache files
try:
os.chmod(cache_path, 0o660) # nosec B103 - intentional; web UI and service share a group
except OSError:
pass # Non-critical if chmod fails
self.logger.debug("Wrote cache for %s directly (non-atomic)", key)
except (IOError, OSError, PermissionError) as write_error:
# If direct write also fails, try fallback location
self.logger.warning("Direct write failed for key '%s' to %s: %s", key, cache_path, write_error)
raise # Re-raise to trigger fallback logic
except (IOError, OSError, PermissionError):
# Attempt one-time fallback write to user's home cache directory
try:
# Try user's home cache directory as fallback
home_dir = os.path.expanduser('~')
fallback_dir = os.path.join(home_dir, '.ledmatrix_cache')
# Ensure fallback directory exists
try:
os.makedirs(fallback_dir, exist_ok=True)
except (OSError, PermissionError):
pass
if os.path.isdir(fallback_dir) and os.access(fallback_dir, os.W_OK):
# NOTE: no digest record here — the fallback file
# is a different path, so future sets must keep
# retrying the primary location.
fallback_path = os.path.join(fallback_dir, os.path.basename(cache_path))
with open(fallback_path, 'wb') as tmp_file:
tmp_file.write(payload)
# Set proper permissions: 660 (rw-rw----) for group-readable cache files
try:
os.chmod(fallback_path, 0o660) # nosec B103 - intentional; web UI and service share a group
except OSError:
pass # Non-critical if chmod fails
self.logger.debug("Cache wrote to fallback location: %s", fallback_path)
return # Successfully wrote to fallback, exit gracefully
except (IOError, OSError, PermissionError) as e2:
self.logger.debug("Fallback cache write also failed for key '%s': %s", key, e2)
# If all write attempts failed, log warning but don't raise exception
# Cache is a performance optimization, not critical for operation
self.logger.warning(
"Could not write cache for key '%s' to %s (permission denied). "
"Cache will be unavailable for this key, but application will continue.",
key, cache_path
)
return # Exit gracefully without raising exception
except Exception as e:
# For any other unexpected errors, log but don't crash
self.logger.warning(
"Unexpected error saving cache for key '%s' to %s: %s. "
"Application will continue without caching for this key.",
key, cache_path, e, exc_info=True
)
return # Exit gracefully without raising exception
def clear(self, key: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
"""
Clear cache entry or all entries.
Args:
key: Specific key to clear, or None to clear all
"""
if not self.cache_dir:
return
with self._lock:
if key:
self._write_digests.pop(key, None)
cache_path = self.get_cache_path(key)
if cache_path and os.path.exists(cache_path):
try:
os.remove(cache_path)
except OSError as e:
self.logger.warning("Could not remove cache file %s: %s", cache_path, e)
else:
# Clear all cache files
self._write_digests.clear()
if os.path.exists(self.cache_dir):
for filename in os.listdir(self.cache_dir):
if filename.endswith('.json'):
try:
os.remove(os.path.join(self.cache_dir, filename))
except OSError as e:
self.logger.warning("Could not remove cache file %s: %s", filename, e)
def get_cache_dir(self) -> Optional[str]:
"""Get the cache directory path."""
return self.cache_dir
@staticmethod
def _is_orphaned_temp(filename: str) -> bool:
"""Whether a name is one of set()'s temp files rather than real data.
Matches only what this class creates: mkstemp with a prefix of
".<cache filename>." , so ".weather.json.a1b2c3d4". The shape is
checked rather than just the leading dot, because this predicate
deletes things -- a stray dotfile someone left in the cache directory
is not ours to remove, and a completed ".json" never is either.
"""
if not filename.startswith('.') or filename.endswith('.json'):
return False
head, sep, suffix = filename.rpartition('.json.')
# head is the key (non-empty after the leading dot), suffix is
# mkstemp's random component.
return bool(sep) and len(head) > 1 and bool(suffix)
def cleanup_expired_files(self, cache_strategy: CacheStrategyProtocol, retention_policies: Dict[str, int]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""
Clean up expired cache files based on retention policies.
Args:
cache_strategy: Object implementing CacheStrategyProtocol for categorizing files
retention_policies: Dict mapping data types to retention days
Returns:
Dictionary with cleanup statistics:
- files_scanned: Total files checked
- files_deleted: Files removed
- space_freed_bytes: Bytes freed
- errors: Number of errors encountered
"""
if not self.cache_dir or not os.path.exists(self.cache_dir):
self.logger.warning("Cache directory not available for cleanup")
return {'files_scanned': 0, 'files_deleted': 0, 'space_freed_bytes': 0, 'errors': 0}
stats = {
'files_scanned': 0,
'files_deleted': 0,
'space_freed_bytes': 0,
'errors': 0
}
current_time = time.time()
try:
# Collect files to process outside the lock to avoid blocking cache operations
# Only hold lock during directory listing to get snapshot of files
try:
with self._lock:
# Get snapshot of files while holding lock briefly
entries = os.listdir(self.cache_dir)
except OSError as list_error:
self.logger.error("Error listing cache directory %s: %s", self.cache_dir, list_error, exc_info=True)
stats['errors'] += 1
return stats
filenames = [f for f in entries if f.endswith('.json')]
# Sweep temp files abandoned by a write that never finished. set()
# removes its own in a finally, so these are the ones where the
# process died between mkstemp and os.replace -- a SIGKILL, a lost
# restart race, a power cut. Nothing ever collected them: they are
# named ".<key>.json.<random>", and the scan above only matches
# names ending in .json, so they accumulated indefinitely. Measured
# on a live rig: 76 files, 1,050 MB, 81% of the whole cache
# directory, the oldest six months old.
stats['orphan_temp_files_deleted'] = 0
for filename in (f for f in entries if self._is_orphaned_temp(f)):
# Counted as scanned like any other candidate, so files_deleted
# can never exceed files_scanned and the summary line reads
# honestly ("77/8864", not "77/0").
stats['files_scanned'] += 1
path = os.path.join(self.cache_dir, filename)
try:
# An in-flight write lives for milliseconds, so anything
# this old is certainly abandoned rather than in progress.
if (current_time - os.path.getmtime(path)) <= _ORPHAN_TEMP_MAX_AGE_SECONDS:
continue
with self._lock:
size = os.path.getsize(path)
os.remove(path)
stats['files_deleted'] += 1
stats['orphan_temp_files_deleted'] += 1
stats['space_freed_bytes'] += size
except FileNotFoundError:
continue # another sweep got there first
except OSError as e:
stats['errors'] += 1
self.logger.warning("Error deleting orphaned temp file %s: %s", filename, e)
if stats['orphan_temp_files_deleted']:
self.logger.info(
"Removed %d abandoned cache temp file(s)",
stats['orphan_temp_files_deleted'])
# Process files outside the lock to avoid blocking get/set operations
for filename in filenames:
stats['files_scanned'] += 1
file_path = os.path.join(self.cache_dir, filename)
try:
# Get file age (outside lock - stat operations are generally atomic)
file_mtime = os.path.getmtime(file_path)
file_age_days = (current_time - file_mtime) / 86400 # Convert to days
# Extract cache key from filename (remove .json extension)
cache_key = filename[:-5]
# Determine data type and retention policy
data_type = cache_strategy.get_data_type_from_key(cache_key)
retention_days = retention_policies.get(data_type, retention_policies.get('default', 30))
# Delete if older than retention period
# Only hold lock during actual file deletion to ensure atomicity
if file_age_days > retention_days:
try:
# Hold lock only during delete operation (get size and remove atomically)
with self._lock:
# Double-check file still exists (may have been deleted by another process)
if os.path.exists(file_path):
try:
file_size = os.path.getsize(file_path)
os.remove(file_path)
# Only increment stats if removal succeeded
stats['files_deleted'] += 1
stats['space_freed_bytes'] += file_size
self.logger.debug(
"Deleted expired cache file: %s (age: %.1f days, type: %s, retention: %d days)",
filename, file_age_days, data_type, retention_days
)
except FileNotFoundError:
# File was deleted by another process between exists check and remove
# This is a benign race condition, silently continue
pass
else:
# File was deleted by another process before lock was acquired
# This is a benign race condition, silently continue
pass
except FileNotFoundError:
# File was already deleted by another process, skip it
# This is a benign race condition, silently continue
continue
except OSError as e:
# Other file system errors, log but don't fail the entire cleanup
stats['errors'] += 1
self.logger.warning("Error deleting cache file %s: %s", filename, e)
continue
except FileNotFoundError:
# File was deleted by another process between listing and processing
# This is a benign race condition, silently continue
continue
except OSError as e:
stats['errors'] += 1
self.logger.warning("Error processing cache file %s: %s", filename, e)
continue
except Exception as e:
stats['errors'] += 1
self.logger.error("Unexpected error processing cache file %s: %s", filename, e, exc_info=True)
continue
except OSError as e:
self.logger.error("Error listing cache directory %s: %s", self.cache_dir, e, exc_info=True)
stats['errors'] += 1
return stats