Follow-up from testing the previous commit on real hardware, where the
secrets fix turned out to be both too narrow and slightly wrong.
Too narrow: config.json, wifi_config.json and ytm_auth.json are installed
root-owned and group-readable exactly like the secrets file, so all four
were unrestorable by the web service, not just one. `shutil.copy2` opens
the destination for writing, which needs permission on the *existing
file*; the web user could create files in that directory all day and
still not replace them.
Slightly wrong: the previous commit loosened the secrets file to
group-writable. That was treating the symptom. The real error was
deciding ownership from `ledmatrix.service` -- the display service, which
runs as root and only ever *reads* secrets -- when the account that
*writes* them is the web interface, which deliberately does not run as
root. Ownership now follows the web service's user and the mode stays
640.
`_copy_file` writes a temporary file alongside the target and renames
over it. That needs only directory permission, so a restore no longer
cares who owns the destination, and it is atomic: a crash mid-restore can
no longer leave a half-written config. The destination's mode is carried
across so restoring secrets does not widen them to the umask, and its
owner is carried across too when the OS allows it -- only root can hand a
file to another user, so a restore run by the web service keeps its own
ownership rather than pretending to preserve root's.
Verified on a device with all four config files set root-owned 640 and
unwritable by the web user: before, every one failed with EACCES; after,
the restore reports success with no errors and all four sections
restored, mode still 640, root still able to read them and the web
service still able to write them.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Udr6MfaFLUPhX5Fgo67Jf5