Files
LEDMatrix/test/test_permission_utils.py
T
ChuckBuilds 2a99cf6e64 fix(security): redact URL credentials from pip subprocess output before logging
CodeQL flagged 3 clear-text-logging-of-secrets alerts in
install_requirements_file() (src/common/permission_utils.py:353,360,371).
Pre-existing on main, unrelated to this PR's own diff, but now visible
since the path-injection alerts that previously took priority in the
annotation list are fixed.

The underlying risk is real: pip can echo a private index URL's embedded
basic-auth credentials (from a requirements.txt --index-url line or
PIP_INDEX_URL) back verbatim in its own stderr/stdout on failure, and this
function both logs that output directly and returns it to callers --
store_manager.py's _install_dependencies() logs result.stderr from this
same function too.

Added _redact_url_credentials(), applied immediately after each of the two
subprocess.run() calls (mutating result.stderr/stdout in place) rather
than patching each log call site individually. This closes the leak at
the source: every downstream use -- the three flagged log lines, the
"note" string embedded in the returned stdout, and store_manager.py's own
logging of the returned result -- gets the redacted text for free.

Verified the fixed-phrase "denied" check (`"a password is required" in
result.stderr`) is unaffected, since URL syntax and those phrases don't
overlap -- covered explicitly by
test_does_not_touch_denied_check_phrases. Added
test/test_permission_utils.py (6 tests) covering the redaction helper
directly and both subprocess.run() call sites (the sudo-wrapper branch,
which this repo's scripts/fix_perms/safe_pip_install.sh makes live, and
the no-wrapper fallback branch). All pass.
2026-07-10 16:18:51 -04:00

84 lines
3.7 KiB
Python

"""
Tests for src.common.permission_utils's URL-credential redaction.
Covers the fix for a CodeQL clear-text-logging-of-secrets alert:
install_requirements_file() must never let a private index URL's embedded
user:pass@ credentials reach logs or its returned CompletedProcess, since
pip can echo that URL back verbatim in its own stderr/stdout on failure.
"""
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
from src.common.permission_utils import _redact_url_credentials, install_requirements_file
class TestRedactUrlCredentials:
def test_redacts_embedded_basic_auth(self):
text = "Could not fetch URL https://alice:s3cr3t@pypi.example.com/simple/: 403"
redacted = _redact_url_credentials(text)
assert "s3cr3t" not in redacted
assert "alice" not in redacted
assert "https://***:***@pypi.example.com/simple/" in redacted
def test_leaves_credential_free_text_unchanged(self):
text = "ERROR: Could not find a version that satisfies the requirement foo==1.0"
assert _redact_url_credentials(text) == text
def test_handles_none_and_empty(self):
assert _redact_url_credentials(None) == ""
assert _redact_url_credentials("") == ""
def test_does_not_touch_denied_check_phrases(self):
"""The fixed phrases install_requirements_file greps for must survive
redaction untouched -- they don't overlap with URL syntax, but this
pins that assumption so a regex change can't silently break it."""
text = "sudo: a password is required"
assert _redact_url_credentials(text) == text
class TestInstallRequirementsFileRedaction:
@patch('src.common.permission_utils.subprocess.run')
def test_wrapper_path_redacts_stderr_and_stdout(self, mock_run, tmp_path):
"""safe_pip_install.sh exists in this repo, so install_requirements_file
takes the sudo-wrapper branch; a failing result must come back
with any embedded index-URL credentials already redacted."""
req_file = tmp_path / "requirements.txt"
req_file.write_text("requests\n")
mock_run.return_value = MagicMock(
returncode=1,
stdout="Looking in indexes: https://bob:hunter2@pypi.internal/simple\n",
stderr="ERROR https://bob:hunter2@pypi.internal/simple/foo: 401",
)
result = install_requirements_file(req_file, timeout=5)
assert "hunter2" not in result.stdout
assert "hunter2" not in result.stderr
assert "https://***:***@pypi.internal" in result.stdout
assert "https://***:***@pypi.internal" in result.stderr
@patch('src.common.permission_utils.subprocess.run')
@patch('src.common.permission_utils.Path.exists', return_value=False)
def test_no_wrapper_fallback_path_redacts_stderr_and_stdout(self, mock_exists, mock_run, tmp_path):
"""No safe_pip_install.sh wrapper -> falls straight to the
sys.executable pip fallback (the second subprocess.run call site);
its result must come back redacted too, independent of the wrapper
branch's own redaction above."""
req_file = tmp_path / "requirements.txt"
req_file.write_text("requests\n")
mock_run.return_value = MagicMock(
returncode=1,
stdout="Looking in indexes: https://carol:swordfish@pypi.internal/simple\n",
stderr="ERROR https://carol:swordfish@pypi.internal/simple/foo: 401",
)
result = install_requirements_file(req_file, timeout=5)
assert "swordfish" not in result.stdout
assert "swordfish" not in result.stderr
assert "https://***:***@pypi.internal" in result.stdout
assert "https://***:***@pypi.internal" in result.stderr