Files
LEDMatrix/test/test_web_error_detail.py
T
ChuckandClaude Opus 5 bdb9a94033 refactor(api-v3): split the 10,469-line blueprint into a package (#553)
* refactor(api-v3): split the 10,469-line blueprint into a package

web_interface/blueprints/api_v3.py held 111 routes, 56 helpers and 181
functions in one module -- 9% of the core by line count and three times the
next largest file. It becomes a package of nine route modules grouped by path
segment, plus __init__.py for the shared imports, constants, Blueprint and
helpers.

Every route module decorates the SAME api_v3 Blueprint object, so endpoint
names stay api_v3.<function>, the URL map is unchanged and app.py is untouched.
Verified: 111 routes before, 111 after, byte-identical rules, endpoints and
methods, and every endpoint still on the one blueprint.

  plugins   3,867   config    1,178   starlark  692   system  619
  fonts       452   misc        398   wifi      361   display 326   backup 212
  __init__  1,787 (imports, constants, Blueprint, 56 helpers)

Two things the URL-map check could not catch, both found by running the suite:

1. PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent. Moving the code one
   directory deeper made that resolve to web_interface/ instead of the project
   root. Nothing failed at import; it surfaced as ~110 tests failing with 404s
   and "installation script not found", because every path built from it was
   one level too shallow. Now parents[3], and test_api_v3_url_map.py asserts
   PROJECT_ROOT/run.py exists so the next move cannot repeat it.

2. Module-attribute patching. Tests do
   monkeypatch.setattr(api_v3_module, "_BACKUP_EXPORT_DIR", ...) and a route
   module that binds such a name by value never sees the patch. The shared code
   therefore stays in __init__.py rather than moving to a _common submodule --
   it has to live on the module the tests patch -- and the eleven names tests
   patch are read back through the package (_pkg.X) instead of bound by value.
   Those eleven were found by AST-scanning every setattr in the test tree, not
   by guessing; "time" is among them, used to drive a fake clock through the
   second-resolution credential-backup filenames.

Test changes are confined to what genuinely moved: patch targets that now name
the owning route module, imports of helpers, and six tests that scan the api_v3
source as a file and now read the package directory.

Full suite: 4,278 passed, 68 skipped, 0 failed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014RRtqXDCnvnY6EQwhT5CV9

* fix(api-v3): address CodeRabbit findings from the blueprint-split review

Fixes to the api_v3 package split (PR #553), one per finding verified
against the actual code:

- __init__.py: _redact_credentials only blanked scalar values under a
  credential-named key; a bare list of secrets under such a key (e.g.
  tokens: ["a", "b"]) passed through untouched, since the list branch
  recursed with no memory that its key looked like a credential. Nested
  dicts still walk normally (a documented, tested behaviour -- a container
  like secrets: {api_key: ..., note: ...} is a section name, not a value to
  blank outright), but any value reached under a credential-shaped key is
  now actually blanked.

- __init__.py: the OAuth helper script's raw stderr/stdout went to
  logger.error unredacted (CWE-532) right next to a comment claiming this
  was deliberate; the HTTP response already used the existing redact_text
  helper. Routed the log line through the same helper.

- __init__.py / starlark.py: the standalone Starlark manifest fallback
  (used when the plugin instance isn't loaded) read-modified-wrote
  manifest.json with no lock, unlike StarlarkAppsPlugin._update_manifest_safe
  (plugin-repos/starlark-apps/manager.py), which already holds an flock for
  the same file when the plugin is loaded. Added _starlark_manifest_lock,
  mirroring that pattern, and wrapped every standalone read-modify-write
  call site in it. The app-config update route also wrote config.json and
  the manifest as two separate, non-transactional writes (a second,
  distinct finding at the same call site); config.json is now rolled back
  if the manifest write that follows it fails.

- backup.py: restore options used bare bool() on values from the request,
  so {"restore_secrets": "false"} restored secrets anyway (bool("false") is
  True). Switched to the existing _coerce_to_bool helper already used for
  this exact purpose elsewhere in the package.

- config.py: an automated import-rewrite mangled four user-facing
  validation strings and their neighbouring comments -- "Invalid start
  time" had become "Invalid start _pkg.time" (and likewise for "end time")
  in both the schedule and dim-schedule per-day validation paths.

- display.py: `import _pkg.time as time_module` -- _pkg is a local alias
  for the package, not a real importable module, so this raised
  ModuleNotFoundError whenever a caller restarted an already-running
  display service via /display/on-demand/start, after the on-demand
  request was already written to cache. Fixed to `import time`. Audited
  the rest of the package for the same `_pkg.<module>` import mistake;
  every other `_pkg.` reference is a legitimate attribute read-through
  (`_pkg.time.time()`, `_pkg._get_starlark_plugin()`, ...), not a broken
  import statement.

- fonts.py: validate_file_upload's max_size_mb parameter is silently
  unused by that helper (it only checks filename/extension) -- the font
  upload route saved arbitrarily large files as a result. Added the same
  seek-and-check pattern already used for the sibling .star upload.

- wifi.py: two ad hoc, inconsistent bool coercions. POST
  /wifi/ap/auto-enable used bare bool(), so a JSON string "false" enabled
  it. POST /wifi/radio's enabled/force parsing recognized real bool and
  some strings but not int 1/0 (1 is True is False in Python). Factored one
  small _parse_bool_ish helper local to this file and used it at all three
  sites.

Not changed: the "unknown/misspelled restore option keys default to True"
half of the backup.py finding -- the file's own comment documents that a
missing key deliberately means "restore everything," matching the
already-existing JSON-parse-failure guard a few lines above it; only the
bool-coercion defect was a real bug.

Added or extended regression tests for every fix, following each area's
existing test conventions. Full suite: 4328 passed, 62 skipped, 2 failed
on both this branch and origin/main (missing tzdata package breaks two
timezone-alias tests in test_onboarding_checklist.py, unrelated to this
change) -- no new failures.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S3bPMESe2TfrGvbs1ef9c5

* fix(api-v3): reject unknown restore option keys

CodeRabbit's review of the blueprint split (#553) asked that
POST /backup/restore reject option keys outside RestoreOptions'
known set. The follow-up commit fixed the bool("false")-is-True
bug with _coerce_to_bool but never added the key check: a typo'd
or renamed key (e.g. "restoreSecrets") is silently ignored by
opts_dict.get(key, True), so the flag stays at its True default
and secrets get restored despite the caller's request saying
otherwise -- with no indication anything was wrong.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vmcwf5vMgYqdt8bJTZtiwb

* fix(api-v3): address CodeRabbit findings on the blueprint split

- _redact_credentials: blank scalar descendants of objects reached
  through a credential-owned list (e.g. tokens: [{"value": "secret"}])
  regardless of field name -- the existing name-based walk only
  protected direct dict values under a credential key, not list items.
- wifi.py: reject enabled/force/auto_enable_ap_mode values
  _parse_bool_ish can't recognize (400) instead of silently treating
  them as False, which could disable Wi-Fi or the radio itself.
- Starlark manifest locking: lock a stable manifest.json.lock sidecar
  instead of manifest.json itself, in both the standalone route path
  (_starlark_manifest_lock) and the plugin path
  (StarlarkAppsPlugin._save_manifest / _update_manifest_safe).
  manifest.json is replaced by an atomic rename on every write, which
  swaps in a fresh inode; a lock held on the old inode does not
  exclude a second locker that opens the path afresh right after the
  rename and gets the new inode, so two writers could race despite
  each holding "a lock". A sidecar that no write ever touches always
  resolves to the same inode for every locker.

Skipped as stale: the "serialize the complete manifest
read-modify-write" finding at api_v3/__init__.py -- every standalone
handler that calls _write_starlark_manifest is already wrapped in
_starlark_manifest_lock() on this branch.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(api-v3): re-check reconciliation findings by the reconciler's own rules

Both CodeRabbit findings on the merge commit, verified against the code first.

Major, plugins.py: the stale-findings filter derived its own notion of "in
config" and "on disk", and both were looser than the reconciliation module's.
set(load_config()) also contains system keys, the secrets-file keys load_config()
merges in, and non-dict values; and any directory holding a manifest.json
counted as installed even when that manifest does not parse. Either looseness
clears a finding that is still true -- and a secrets key read as a plugin is the
precise bug the filter exists to stop reporting, so reintroducing that asymmetry
while re-checking was the wrong way round.

The two extractions now live in state_reconciliation.py as config_plugin_ids()
and disk_plugin_ids(), with ignored_config_keys() and secrets_top_level_keys()
alongside. _get_config_state() and _get_disk_state() use them too, so there is
one definition rather than two that can drift. _get_disk_state() re-reads each
manifest for version/name after taking membership from the shared extractor;
that costs one extra small read per plugin on a path that runs once per boot.

Minor, the new test: the fixture assigned api_v3.config_manager and
api_v3.plugin_manager directly. Those live on a module-level blueprint
singleton, so the mocks leaked into every later test that imports api_v3 --
pointing at a tmp_path already deleted. Both now go through monkeypatch.setattr,
which restores them. This is the same pollution class that made an earlier test
in this session break seven unrelated ones, so it is worth getting right.

Five cases added for the parity itself: a secrets key, a system key and a
non-dict value must not clear an "installed but missing from config" finding,
and neither an unparseable manifest nor a .standalone-backup- directory may
count as installed. All five fail against the looser version.

Linux CI on the preceding commit: Core unit tests, plugin harness, CodeQL and
CodeRabbit all pass. Codacy reads action_required on every commit of this
branch including the first, so it is pre-existing and not from this work.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-11 10:07:38 -04:00

303 lines
13 KiB
Python

"""Tests for surfacing the underlying error in web responses.
Regression under test: every failing endpoint returned "An error occurred; see
logs for details" and nothing else. On a device whose storage was failing that
sentence came back from the restart action, from /system/status, and from
/logs -- the log viewer itself -- because journalctl could not be executed. The
exception underneath said `[Errno 5] Input/output error: 'systemctl'`, which
names the fault outright, and nine handlers were discarding it entirely rather
than even logging it.
"""
import pytest
from src.web_interface.error_handler import describe_exception
class TestDescribeException:
def test_names_the_type_and_message(self):
detail = describe_exception(OSError(5, "Input/output error", "systemctl"))
assert detail == "OSError: [Errno 5] Input/output error: 'systemctl'"
def test_the_reported_failure_is_legible(self):
# The whole point: this string is the diagnosis.
assert "Input/output error" in describe_exception(
OSError(5, "Input/output error", "systemctl"))
def test_a_bare_exception_still_names_its_type(self):
# A PermissionError with no message still says more than "unknown".
assert describe_exception(PermissionError()) == "PermissionError"
assert describe_exception(Exception()) == "Exception"
def test_message_is_kept_when_present(self):
assert describe_exception(ValueError("bad port")) == "ValueError: bad port"
class TestCredentialRedaction:
"""Exception text quotes URLs, and plugins authenticate by query string."""
@pytest.mark.parametrize("secret_text,leaked", [
("failed: https://api.x.com/v1?api_key=SEC123&city=Tampa", "SEC123"),
("token=abcdef123456 was rejected", "abcdef123456"),
("connect failed password=hunter2", "hunter2"),
("GET /?access_token=zzz999", "zzz999"),
('{"secret": "topsecret"}', "topsecret"),
# requests quotes the URL it failed on, and both of these forms turn
# up in real client exceptions.
("401 for https://user:hunter2@example.com/api", "hunter2"),
("headers: {'Authorization': 'Bearer eyJ.SECRET.sig'}", "eyJ.SECRET.sig"),
("Authorization: Basic dXNlcjpwYXNzd29yZA==", "dXNlcjpwYXNzd29yZA=="),
("Proxy-Authorization: Bearer ptok999", "ptok999"),
# Any scheme, not a fixed list -- a list silently leaks whatever it
# does not name, and plugin APIs invent their own.
("Authorization: ApiKey SECRET123", "SECRET123"),
("Authorization: Negotiate YIIZnegotiateblob", "YIIZnegotiateblob"),
("Authorization: NTLM TlRMTVNTUAAB", "TlRMTVNTUAAB"),
("authorization: barecredential", "barecredential"),
])
def test_credentials_never_reach_the_response(self, secret_text, leaked):
detail = describe_exception(RuntimeError(secret_text))
assert leaked not in detail
assert "<redacted>" in detail
def test_the_parameter_name_survives_redaction(self):
# Knowing *which* credential was involved is part of the diagnosis.
detail = describe_exception(RuntimeError("https://x/y?api_key=SEC123"))
assert "api_key" in detail
def test_unknown_schemes_keep_their_name(self):
for scheme in ("ApiKey", "Negotiate", "NTLM", "AWS4-HMAC-SHA256"):
detail = describe_exception(
RuntimeError("Authorization: %s SECRETVALUE" % scheme))
assert scheme in detail, detail
assert "SECRETVALUE" not in detail, detail
def test_auth_scheme_and_username_survive(self):
# Which kind of credential, and whose, without the credential itself.
assert "Bearer" in describe_exception(
RuntimeError("Authorization: Bearer eyJ.SECRET.sig"))
assert "user" in describe_exception(
RuntimeError("https://user:hunter2@example.com"))
def test_non_secret_context_is_preserved(self):
detail = describe_exception(RuntimeError("https://api.x.com/v1?city=Tampa"))
assert "city=Tampa" in detail
assert "<redacted>" not in detail
class TestBounds:
def test_long_messages_are_truncated(self):
detail = describe_exception(ValueError("x" * 5000))
assert len(detail) <= 400
def test_newlines_are_collapsed_to_one_line(self):
detail = describe_exception(ValueError("line one\nline two\tthree"))
assert "\n" not in detail and "\t" not in detail
assert detail == "ValueError: line one line two three"
def test_custom_length_is_honoured(self):
assert len(describe_exception(ValueError("y" * 500), max_length=50)) <= 50
class TestHandlersCarryDetail:
"""The response shape callers actually see."""
def test_no_api_v3_handler_discards_its_exception(self):
"""Every generic-message handler must log a traceback and return detail.
Nine of them bound `e` and never used it, so the promised log entry was
never written either. Checking merely that *something* was logged is
too weak -- a `logger.info("failed")` would satisfy it while throwing
the exception away just as completely, so this asserts the two things
that actually make the failure diagnosable: an error-level record with
the traceback, and the sanitized detail in the response.
"""
import ast
# api_v3 is a package; the routes are spread across its modules.
import pathlib
src = "\n".join(
p.read_text() for p in
sorted(pathlib.Path("web_interface/blueprints/api_v3").glob("*.py")))
tree = ast.parse(src)
# This used to match one exact message string, so a handler that wrote
# its own wording was never checked. All thirteen Starlark routes did
# -- "Failed to browse repository" and friends -- and every one of them
# answered a 500 with no detail at all, which is how the app store
# spent three releases failing for reasons nobody could read. The rule
# is now the shape that matters: if it returns 5xx, it says why.
PRE_EXISTING = {
# Not part of this change. This set may shrink, never grow.
'backup_delete', 'backup_export', 'backup_list', 'backup_preview',
'backup_restore', 'backup_validate', 'checkout_branch',
'execute_system_action', 'get_git_branches', 'get_git_info',
'get_hardware_status', 'get_logs', 'get_system_status',
'get_system_version', 'scan_wifi_networks',
}
def enclosing_function(handler):
"""Innermost function containing `handler`."""
best = None
for fn in [n for n in ast.walk(tree)
if isinstance(n, (ast.FunctionDef, ast.AsyncFunctionDef))]:
if any(h is handler for h in ast.walk(fn)):
if best is None or fn.lineno > best.lineno:
best = fn
return best.name if best else '<module>'
def only_catches_importerror(handler):
"""An `except ImportError` arm and nothing else.
A missing optional dependency is a configuration fact, not a
crash: the module name is the whole diagnosis and it is already
in the response, so a stack trace would be noise. Detail is still
required -- only the traceback log is excused.
"""
t = handler.type
names = ([t] if isinstance(t, ast.Name)
else list(t.elts) if isinstance(t, ast.Tuple) else [])
return bool(names) and all(
isinstance(n, ast.Name) and n.id == 'ImportError' for n in names)
def returns_5xx(handler):
for r in [n for n in ast.walk(handler) if isinstance(n, ast.Return)]:
v = r.value
if isinstance(v, ast.Tuple) and len(v.elts) == 2:
code = v.elts[1]
if (isinstance(code, ast.Constant)
and isinstance(code.value, int)
and 500 <= code.value < 600):
return True
return False
def logs_a_traceback(handler):
"""An error/exception-level log call carrying exc_info."""
for call in [n for n in ast.walk(handler) if isinstance(n, ast.Call)]:
func = call.func
if not isinstance(func, ast.Attribute):
continue
if func.attr == "exception": # implies exc_info
return True
if func.attr not in ("error", "critical"):
continue
if any(kw.arg == "exc_info" and getattr(kw.value, "value", False) is True
for kw in call.keywords):
return True
return False
def describes_this_exception(node, bound):
"""A describe_exception(<bound>) call anywhere under `node`."""
for call in [n for n in ast.walk(node) if isinstance(n, ast.Call)]:
if not (isinstance(call.func, ast.Name)
and call.func.id == "describe_exception"):
continue
if bound is None:
return True # bare `except:` cannot name it; accept
if any(isinstance(a, ast.Name) and a.id == bound
for a in call.args):
return True
return False
def returns_the_detail(handler):
"""The detail must be inside what the handler actually returns.
Looking anywhere in the handler is too weak: a handler could
compute describe_exception(e), drop it on the floor, and return the
generic message with no details field, while still passing. So the
call has to appear within a `return` expression.
"""
returns = [n for n in ast.walk(handler) if isinstance(n, ast.Return)]
if not returns:
return False
return all(describes_this_exception(r, handler.name) for r in returns)
offenders = []
for h in [n for n in ast.walk(tree) if isinstance(n, ast.ExceptHandler)]:
if not returns_5xx(h):
continue
if enclosing_function(h) in PRE_EXISTING:
continue
missing = []
if not logs_a_traceback(h) and not only_catches_importerror(h):
missing.append("error-level log with exc_info")
if not returns_the_detail(h):
missing.append("describe_exception(e) in the response")
if missing:
offenders.append((h.lineno, missing))
assert not offenders, (
"handlers returning the generic message without %s: %r"
% ("both a traceback log and the detail", offenders))
def test_client_errors_keep_their_own_status(self):
"""A 405 must not be reported as a server-side UNKNOWN_ERROR.
Werkzeug's HTTPExceptions subclass Exception, so the catch-all saw them
too: a GET on a POST-only route came back 500 "an error occurred",
which tells the caller nothing and blames the wrong side. Found while
probing a device whose POST-only config endpoints answered every GET
with UNKNOWN_ERROR.
"""
from flask import Flask, jsonify
from werkzeug.exceptions import HTTPException
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle(error):
if isinstance(error, HTTPException):
return jsonify({
"status": "error",
"error_code": (error.name or "HTTP_ERROR").upper().replace(" ", "_"),
"message": error.description,
}), error.code or 500
return jsonify({
"status": "error",
"error_code": "UNKNOWN_ERROR",
"message": "An error occurred; see logs for details",
"details": describe_exception(error),
}), 500
@app.route("/only-post", methods=["POST"])
def only_post():
return jsonify({"ok": True})
@app.route("/boom")
def boom():
raise OSError(5, "Input/output error", "systemctl")
client = app.test_client()
resp = client.get("/only-post")
assert resp.status_code == 405, "a wrong method must stay a 405"
assert resp.get_json()["error_code"] == "METHOD_NOT_ALLOWED"
# A genuine server fault still reports as one, with its detail.
resp = client.get("/boom")
assert resp.status_code == 500
assert "Input/output error" in resp.get_json()["details"]
def test_global_handler_reports_the_underlying_error(self):
from flask import Flask, jsonify
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.errorhandler(Exception)
def handle(error):
return jsonify({
"status": "error",
"error_code": "UNKNOWN_ERROR",
"message": "An error occurred; see logs for details",
"details": describe_exception(error),
}), 500
@app.route("/boom")
def boom():
raise OSError(5, "Input/output error", "systemctl")
client = app.test_client()
body = client.get("/boom").get_json()
assert body["error_code"] == "UNKNOWN_ERROR"
assert "Input/output error" in body["details"]