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ChuckBuildsandClaude Sonnet 5 cd7e16e58e fix(security): validate plugin_id before path construction in /api/install
CodeQL flagged 16 high-severity "path depends on user-provided value"
alerts. Investigated each:

- install_locally() (/api/install) built a filesystem path from
  metadata.id without validating it at that point -- it was only
  implicitly safe because _generate_plugin_files() validates the same
  field (re-extracted independently) earlier in the same request. That's
  a real gap: reorder or change that earlier call and it's an exploitable
  path traversal / arbitrary file write. Fixed by validating plugin_id
  directly against _PLUGIN_ID_RE at the point the path is built, matching
  the pattern already used correctly in validate_id() and load_plugin().
- The other 10 flagged locations (serve_font's allowlist check,
  validate_id, load_plugin and its downstream reads) were already
  guarded by an explicit check earlier in the same function -- false
  positives from CodeQL not modeling those as sanitizers.

Also fixed 2 of the 5 "stack trace exposed" warnings that were genuine:
install_locally() and load_plugin() returned raw OSError/Exception text
to the client in a 500 response; now logged server-side with a generic
client-facing message. The other 3 (generate_zip/install_locally/
preview_code returning str(ValueError) from _generate_plugin_files) are
deliberate, human-authored validation messages, not exception internals
-- left as-is.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KEZK1P1Q1fu5pcuVrkrCFZ
2026-07-14 17:23:25 -04:00
..
2025-12-27 14:15:49 -05:00