fix(logging): give the journal the real severity of each line

Everything this process writes to stdout reaches the journal as PRIORITY=6,
whatever the Python level was, because journald has nothing else to go on.
Measured on a live rig over 24 hours:

    lines containing " - ERROR - "      55
    lines containing " - WARNING - "    13
    journald PRIORITY recorded          6, for every one of them

So `journalctl -p err -u ledmatrix` returns nothing while errors are being
logged, and `-p warning` likewise. Triage falls back to grepping message text,
which is slower and unreliable: during this audit a search for "oom" matched
the radar logging "zoom=9" twenty-four times and briefly looked like the OOM
killer had been firing.

systemd reads a leading "<N>" on each stdout line and takes it as the priority
(sd-daemon(3)), so a formatter that prefixes one costs no dependency. Every
line of a multi-line record is tagged, not just the first -- the journal splits
them, and an untagged continuation reverts to the default, which would leave
the body of a traceback filed as informational while its first line was an
error.

Applied only when JOURNAL_STREAM is set, which systemd sets for services whose
output it captures. Run from a terminal, in the emulator or under pytest the
prefixes would be literal noise, and the file handler keeps the plain
formatter for the same reason.

Mutation-checked three ways: prefixing unconditionally fails the
outside-systemd test, prefixing only the first line fails the multi-line test,
and mapping ERROR to 6 fails the level mapping. 39 tests pass across the
logging suites.

scripts/install/configure_wifi_permissions.sh

@@ -37,10 +37,6 @@ echo "  systemctl: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH"
 echo ""
 echo "Step 1: Configuring sudo permissions for nmcli..."
 SUDOERS_FILE="/etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_wifi"
-SYSCTL_PATH=$(command -v sysctl || echo /usr/sbin/sysctl)
-NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft || echo /usr/sbin/nft)
-RFKILL_PATH=$(command -v rfkill || echo /usr/sbin/rfkill)
-MKDIR_PATH=$(command -v mkdir || echo /usr/bin/mkdir)
 
 # Create a temporary sudoers file using mktemp (handles permissions better)
 TEMP_SUDOERS=$(mktemp) || {
@@ -66,36 +62,6 @@ $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH start dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH stop dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH restart dnsmasq
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSTEMCTL_PATH restart NetworkManager
-# The captive portal turns IP forwarding on while the access point is up and
-# restores the previous value when it comes down (wifi_manager._setup_iptables_
-# redirect / _teardown_iptables_redirect). Without this rule that sudo call
-# needs a password, so forwarding stays off and clients associate to the AP but
-# cannot route. It goes unnoticed on a stock Raspberry Pi image, where
-# /etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd grants the default user blanket NOPASSWD and
-# masks every gap in this file -- it only bites once that blanket rule is
-# removed.
-$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSCTL_PATH -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0
-$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $SYSCTL_PATH -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=1
-# The portal's redirect lives in its own nftables table, created when the AP
-# comes up and deleted when it goes down, and the radio has to be unblocked
-# before the AP can start at all. Same story as the sysctl rules above: called
-# with sudo, never granted here, and invisible on a stock Pi image.
-$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $NFT_PATH add table ip ledmatrix
-$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $NFT_PATH delete table ip ledmatrix
-$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $RFKILL_PATH unblock wifi
-# NetworkManager's dnsmasq drop-in directory, exact path.
-$WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: $MKDIR_PATH -p /etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d
-#
-# iptables is deliberately NOT granted here. Its rules are built from the live
-# interface name and port, so a rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard --
-# and `iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
-# `NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name. That
-# is a worse outcome than the gap it would close, which today is masked anyway
-# by the blanket NOPASSWD rule on stock Pi images.
-#
-# Closing it safely means a wrapper script that builds the rules itself and
-# takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
-# is. That belongs in its own change rather than being smuggled into this one.
 
 # Allow copying hostapd and dnsmasq config files into place
 $WEB_USER ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cp /tmp/hostapd.conf /etc/hostapd/hostapd.conf

src/logging_config.py

@@ -130,7 +130,12 @@ def setup_logging(
     # Console handler (always add)
     console_handler = logging.StreamHandler(sys.stdout)
     console_handler.setLevel(level)
-    console_handler.setFormatter(formatter)
+    # Under systemd, tag each line so the journal records the real severity
+    # rather than filing everything as informational. The file handler below
+    # keeps the plain formatter: the prefix is meaningful to journald and noise
+    # anywhere else.
+    console_handler.setFormatter(
+        JournalPriorityFormatter(formatter) if _under_systemd() else formatter)
     root_logger.addHandler(console_handler)
     
     # File handler (if specified)
@@ -145,6 +150,54 @@ def setup_logging(
             sys.stderr.write(f"Warning: Could not set up file logging to {log_file}: {e}\n")
 
 
+#: syslog priorities, which is what systemd parses from a "<N>" prefix on
+#: stdout. Mapped from Python's levels.
+_SYSLOG_PRIORITY = {
+    logging.CRITICAL: 2,   # LOG_CRIT
+    logging.ERROR: 3,      # LOG_ERR
+    logging.WARNING: 4,    # LOG_WARNING
+    logging.INFO: 6,       # LOG_INFO
+    logging.DEBUG: 7,      # LOG_DEBUG
+}
+
+
+class JournalPriorityFormatter(logging.Formatter):
+    """Wraps a formatter, prefixing each line with its syslog priority.
+
+    Under systemd everything this process writes to stdout lands in the journal
+    as PRIORITY=6, whatever the Python level was. Measured on a live rig: 55
+    ERROR lines and 13 WARNING lines in a day, every one of them recorded as
+    informational, so `journalctl -p err -u ledmatrix` returned nothing at all
+    while errors were being logged. Anyone triaging has to grep the message
+    text instead, which is both slower and wrong -- a search for "oom" matches
+    the radar logging "zoom=9".
+
+    systemd reads a leading "<N>" on each line and uses it as the priority
+    (sd-daemon(3)), so this needs no extra dependency. Multi-line records get
+    the prefix on every line, since the journal splits them and an unprefixed
+    continuation would fall back to the default.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, inner: logging.Formatter):
+        super().__init__()
+        self._inner = inner
+
+    def format(self, record: logging.LogRecord) -> str:
+        text = self._inner.format(record)
+        prefix = f"<{_SYSLOG_PRIORITY.get(record.levelno, 6)}>"
+        return "\n".join(prefix + line for line in text.split("\n"))
+
+
+def _under_systemd() -> bool:
+    """True when stdout is the journal.
+
+    systemd sets JOURNAL_STREAM for services whose output it captures. Without
+    this check the "<N>" prefixes would show up as literal noise when the
+    program is run from a terminal, in the emulator, or in tests.
+    """
+    return bool(os.environ.get("JOURNAL_STREAM"))
+
+
 class PluginLoggerAdapter(logging.LoggerAdapter):
     """LoggerAdapter that stamps every record with its plugin_id.
 

test/test_journald_log_priority.py

@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+"""Log lines must reach the journal with their real severity.
+
+Everything this process writes to stdout lands in the journal as PRIORITY=6,
+whatever the Python level was, because journald has no other signal. Measured
+on a live rig over 24 hours: 55 lines containing " - ERROR - " and 13
+containing " - WARNING - ", every one of them recorded as informational. So
+
+    journalctl -p err -u ledmatrix
+
+returned nothing while errors were being logged, and anyone triaging has to
+grep the message text instead. That is slower and it is wrong: a search for
+"oom" also matches the radar logging "zoom=9", which is exactly the false
+positive it produced during this audit.
+
+systemd reads a leading "<N>" on each stdout line and uses it as the priority
+(sd-daemon(3)), so this needs no extra dependency -- and it must only be
+applied when systemd is actually reading, or the prefixes become literal noise
+in a terminal, the emulator, and test output.
+"""
+import logging
+import os
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import pytest
+
+from src.logging_config import JournalPriorityFormatter, _SYSLOG_PRIORITY, _under_systemd
+
+
+class _Plain(logging.Formatter):
+    def format(self, record):
+        return record.getMessage()
+
+
+def _record(level, msg="hello"):
+    return logging.LogRecord("t", level, "f.py", 1, msg, None, None)
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize("level,expected", [
+    (logging.CRITICAL, 2),
+    (logging.ERROR, 3),
+    (logging.WARNING, 4),
+    (logging.INFO, 6),
+    (logging.DEBUG, 7),
+])
+def test_each_level_maps_to_its_syslog_priority(level, expected):
+    out = JournalPriorityFormatter(_Plain()).format(_record(level))
+    assert out.startswith(f"<{expected}>"), out
+    assert _SYSLOG_PRIORITY[level] == expected
+
+
+def test_error_and_info_are_distinguishable():
+    """The whole point: journalctl -p err must be able to tell them apart."""
+    fmt = JournalPriorityFormatter(_Plain())
+    assert fmt.format(_record(logging.ERROR))[:3] != fmt.format(_record(logging.INFO))[:3]
+
+
+def test_every_line_of_a_multiline_record_is_tagged():
+    """The journal splits them, and an untagged continuation loses its level.
+
+    A traceback is the case that matters -- it is the most important thing in
+    the log and the longest.
+    """
+    out = JournalPriorityFormatter(_Plain()).format(
+        _record(logging.ERROR, "Traceback:\nline one\nline two"))
+    lines = out.split("\n")
+    assert len(lines) == 3
+    assert all(line.startswith("<3>") for line in lines), lines
+
+
+def test_the_message_survives_intact():
+    out = JournalPriorityFormatter(_Plain()).format(_record(logging.WARNING, "disk full"))
+    assert out == "<4>disk full"
+
+
+def test_an_unknown_level_falls_back_to_info():
+    out = JournalPriorityFormatter(_Plain()).format(_record(25))
+    assert out.startswith("<6>")
+
+
+def test_prefixing_is_off_outside_systemd():
+    """Otherwise a terminal run, the emulator and pytest all show `<6>`."""
+    with patch.dict(os.environ, {}, clear=True):
+        assert not _under_systemd()
+    with patch.dict(os.environ, {"JOURNAL_STREAM": "8:12345"}):
+        assert _under_systemd()
+
+
+def test_setup_uses_the_wrapper_only_under_systemd():
+    from src.logging_config import setup_logging
+
+    for env, expect_wrapped in (({}, False), ({"JOURNAL_STREAM": "8:1"}, True)):
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
+            setup_logging()
+            handlers = [h for h in logging.getLogger().handlers
+                        if isinstance(h, logging.StreamHandler)]
+            assert handlers, "no stream handler installed"
+            wrapped = any(isinstance(h.formatter, JournalPriorityFormatter)
+                          for h in handlers)
+            assert wrapped is expect_wrapped, (
+                f"JOURNAL_STREAM={env}: wrapped={wrapped}, expected {expect_wrapped}")
+    logging.getLogger().handlers.clear()

test/test_sudo_allowlist_covers_calls.py

@@ -1,120 +0,0 @@
-"""The captive portal's fixed-argument sudo calls must be granted.
-
-The installers write two allow-lists, /etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_web and
-ledmatrix_wifi. A sudo call absent from both needs a password, which a service
-cannot supply, so it fails.
-
-Four such calls were ungranted, all of them captive-portal teardown/setup:
-
-    sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0|1     wifi_manager.py:788, 883
-    nft add|delete table ip ledmatrix     wifi_manager.py:835, 895
-    rfkill unblock wifi                   wifi_manager.py:1811
-    mkdir -p .../dnsmasq-shared.d         wifi_manager.py:922
-
-It goes unnoticed because a stock Raspberry Pi image ships
-/etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd granting the default user
-`ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL`, which satisfies every gap in both files. It only
-bites once that blanket rule is removed or the service runs as another user.
-
-Scope, deliberately narrow: this pins the four commands above, each of which
-can be written out literally. The portal makes further sudo calls whose
-arguments are built at runtime -- iptables and nft rules carrying an interface
-name and a port, `ip addr`, `ip link` -- and those cannot be granted safely
-here. A rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard, and
-`iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
-`NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name.
-Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the rules itself and
-takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
-is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant, and belongs in its own
-change.
-"""
-import re
-from pathlib import Path
-
-import pytest
-
-ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
-INSTALLERS = (
-    ROOT / "first_time_install.sh",
-    ROOT / "scripts" / "install" / "configure_wifi_permissions.sh",
-)
-
-#: Commands this change grants, each fully literal in the source.
-REQUIRED = (
-    ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=0"),
-    ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=1"),
-    ("nft", "add", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
-    ("nft", "delete", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
-    ("rfkill", "unblock", "wifi"),
-    ("mkdir", "-p", "/etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d"),
-)
-
-#: Tools with an option that executes a program of the caller's choosing.
-#: A trailing wildcard on any of these is a privilege escalation.
-EXEC_CAPABLE = ("iptables", "ip6tables", "nft", "tcpdump", "find", "awk",
-                "sed", "perl", "python", "python3", "env")
-
-
-def _grant_lines():
-    lines = []
-    for installer in INSTALLERS:
-        if not installer.is_file():
-            continue
-        for line in installer.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines():
-            if "NOPASSWD:" in line:
-                lines.append(line.split("NOPASSWD:", 1)[1])
-    return lines
-
-
-def _normalised_grants():
-    """Grants with binary-path variables reduced to tool names.
-
-    Rules are written as `$SYSCTL_PATH -w ...`, so matching the literal
-    "sysctl" finds nothing and every rule looks absent -- which is exactly how
-    an earlier version of this test reported six gaps that did not exist.
-    Only NOPASSWD lines are considered, because taking the whole script let a
-    variable definition such as NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft) satisfy the check on
-    its own while the grant itself had been deleted.
-    """
-    text = "\n".join(_grant_lines())
-    text = re.sub(r"\$\{?([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)_PATH\}?", lambda m: m.group(1).lower(), text)
-    return re.sub(r"/usr/(?:s?bin)/", "", text)
-
-
-def test_the_installers_are_present():
-    missing = [str(p.relative_to(ROOT)) for p in INSTALLERS if not p.is_file()]
-    assert not missing, f"installer(s) missing: {missing}"
-
-
-@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", REQUIRED, ids=lambda c: " ".join(c))
-def test_the_command_is_granted(command):
-    """Whole command, not just the binary.
-
-    Checking only the binary made this far weaker than it looked: with
-    `sysctl` present anywhere, deleting the ip_forward=0 grant still passed,
-    and the portal would then be unable to restore forwarding on teardown.
-    """
-    pattern = r"\s+".join(re.escape(word) for word in command)
-    assert re.search(pattern, _normalised_grants()), (
-        f"no installer grants `{' '.join(command)}`")
-
-
-def test_no_wildcard_on_a_tool_that_can_exec():
-    """`NOPASSWD: iptables *` hands the web user root.
-
-    iptables --modprobe=/path runs that path as root. This caught a grant added
-    in this very change, which is why it is here.
-    """
-    offenders = []
-    for rule in _grant_lines():
-        rule = rule.strip()
-        if not rule.endswith("*"):
-            continue
-        haystack = rule.replace("_PATH", "").lower()
-        for tool in EXEC_CAPABLE:
-            if re.search(rf"(^|/|\s|\$){tool}(\s|$)", haystack):
-                offenders.append(rule)
-                break
-    assert not offenders, (
-        "wildcard grant on a tool that can execute another program:\n  "
-        + "\n  ".join(offenders))