3 Commits

Include renames

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
ChuckandClaude Opus 5	f6367d63ae	security: triage the CodeQL backlog — 129 alerts, three of them live (#561) ... * fix(web): escape quotes in every HTML escaper, not just & < > The escapers are all `div.textContent = x; return div.innerHTML`. That round-trip escapes &, < and > -- the only characters the HTML serializer must escape in a text node -- and leaves quotes alone. Every widget then interpolates the result into a quoted attribute value: value="${escapeHtml(v)}" title="${escapeHtml(v)}" so a value of `x" onmouseover="alert(1)` closes the attribute and adds an event handler of its own. CodeQL reported this 83 times (js/incomplete-html-attribute-sanitization) across the widget files. It is one bug, not 83: the widgets each carry a standalone fallback that did escape quotes, but they all prefer BaseWidget.escapeHtml when window.BaseWidget exists -- which it always does in the shipped page -- so the correct fallbacks were dead code and the incomplete shared one ran. Fixed at each source instead of at the call sites. app-shell.js already documented this exact gap in a comment and worked around it by building DOM nodes by hand; that workaround stays (setting a property cannot be got wrong), the comment is now accurate. cache.html's delete button interpolated the cache key into `onclick="deleteCacheFile('...')"`. Escaping cannot help there -- the browser HTML-decodes the attribute before parsing it as JS, so `&#39;` becomes a real `'` again -- so the key moves to a data-cache-key attribute that the handler reads back. url-input.js additionally wrote a value straight into an <a href> after validating it against a schema-supplied protocol list, and that list accepted any RFC 3986 scheme -- "javascript" included. Scriptable schemes (javascript, data, vbscript, blob, filesystem) are now refused both when the list is normalised and when a URL is checked against it, and the render path routes its href through the same check instead of emitting whatever was stored (js/xss-through-dom). test/js/unit/test_html_escaping.js reads each escaper out of the shipped file and runs it, so losing the quote handling again fails a test rather than a scan. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): stop request-supplied names from reaching paths outside their base Three of the py/path-injection alerts were live, not lint: * GET /api/v3/plugins/<plugin_id>/static/<path:file_path> read any file whose resolved path *string-prefixed* the plugin directory. Flask's default converter forbids a slash but not dots, and get_plugin_directory('..') returned the parent of the plugins directory because it exists -- so every file under the project root then prefixed that directory, config/config_secrets.json included. The prefix check was also wrong on its own terms: with plugin dir "plugin-repos/foo", "../foo-evil/x" resolves to "plugin-repos/foo-evil/x", whose string does start with "plugin-repos/foo". * POST /api/v3/plugins/of-the-day/json/delete interpolated the request body's file_id into f"{file_id}.json" and unlinked it, unvalidated. A file_id of "../../../../etc/something" deleted that file. This is the one finding in the batch that destroyed data rather than exposing it. * POST /api/v3/cache/delete passed the body's key through CacheManager.clear_cache to DiskCache, which joined it as a filename and called os.remove. Same shape, same result. The guard goes in DiskCache.get_cache_path, the single choke point get/set/clear share, so every caller is covered rather than just this route. Real keys are the stems of files already flat in the cache directory -- that is how list_cache_files derives them -- so nothing legitimate is turned away. The rest of the cluster (web_interface/app.py's asset route, the plugin update handler, _get_plugin_version, the plugin-schema read in config.py) was guarded in ways that held, but each had grown its own version of the check. They now go through one helper, src/common/path_safety.py, which returns the *sanitised value* rather than a verdict -- so a caller cannot validate one string and open another, which is how the two real bugs above were shaped. Also: WiFiManager.connect_to_network took the SSID and password straight from POST /api/v3/wifi/connect into nmcli's argv. There is no shell there, so CodeQL's py/command-line-injection alert overstates the risk -- but nmcli reads a leading "-" as an option, so an SSID of "--ask" asks nmcli to run differently rather than to join a network. Both values are now checked for shape (802.11's 32-octet SSID limit, WPA's 8-63 char passphrase or 64-char hex key, no control characters, no leading dash) before any subprocess runs. test/test_path_traversal_guards.py asserts on the filesystem, not just the status code: a handler that returns 403 and deletes the file anyway would pass the weaker check. Twelve of its cases fail against the unpatched code. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): refuse a plugin id that is not a plain name, don't truncate it pages_v3 and scripts/dev_server.py ran request ids through os.path.basename and carried on with what came out, so "../weather" rendered the config form for "weather". Nothing escaped the plugins directory -- the relative_to guards held -- but the handler answered a request nobody made, and validating one string while the filesystem sees another is the shape both live traversals earlier in this branch had. Same treatment as the rest: safe_path_component rejects rather than truncates, resolve_under returns the path it checked, and the call sites use what those return. The three handlers that had hand-rolled resolve-and-relative_to blocks lose about twenty lines to the shared one. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * docs(web): say what the plugin web_ui iframe actually is The docstring claimed the fragment runs "in a sandboxed iframe". The iframe in plugin_config.html carries no sandbox attribute, so the fragment runs with the interface's own origin. That is fine -- the file belongs to an installed plugin, and an installed plugin already runs Python on the device, so the trust boundary is install rather than this route -- but a comment promising containment that is not there is worse than no comment. This is the context for the py/reflective-xss alert on this handler. Also drops the now-unused os/os.path imports. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): inline url-input's scheme guard at the previewLink.href sink CodeQL flagged this line as a new high-severity js/xss-through-dom alert on this PR even though it is already covered by SCRIPTABLE_SCHEMES: the guard reached the sink through safeHref -> isValidUrl, two function calls away, which its DOM-based-XSS sanitizer recognition does not trace. Behavior is unchanged -- same scheme check, same SCRIPTABLE_SCHEMES list, same allowedProtocols gate -- just inlined directly above the previewLink.href assignment it guards, so the barrier is visible in the same scope as the sink. Added a regression test that runs the shipped onInput handler (not just the extracted helpers) against a mocked DOM, so a future change that reintroduces an unguarded previewLink.href assignment fails here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(security): address CodeRabbit findings on the CodeQL triage PR - src/wifi_manager.py: reject non-ASCII WPA-PSK passphrases before any credential-saving or connect flow runs. NetworkManager only accepts printable ASCII passphrases (or a 64-char hex key); a non-ASCII value was previously saved/attempted before nmcli itself rejected it. - web_interface/blueprints/api_v3/config.py: fail closed when the plugin config schema path can't be resolved under the plugins directory (e.g. a symlinked plugin dir). Previously this fell through with secret_fields left empty, so submitted credentials for that plugin were saved as ordinary, unencrypted configuration. - web_interface/static/v3/js/widgets/plugin-file-manager.js: stop splicing the JSON day/column key into an inline oninput="..." handler string. escHtml() escapes quotes for a normal HTML attribute, but the browser HTML-decodes the attribute before running it as script, which undoes that escaping and lets a crafted column name (e.g. from an uploaded JSON file) break out of the JS string and execute. Cell edits now travel through data-day/data-col attributes read by one delegated 'input' listener instead. While in this file: fixed 6 pre-existing missing-')' typos on multi-line safeSetHTML(...) calls (already flagged by Biome in this PR's own CodeRabbit run as syntax errors blocking its lint pass). These predate this PR (present on main too) but made the whole file fail to parse in any JS engine, which is a bigger problem than the XSS finding itself and directly touches the same lines. Added/extended regression tests for each fix; full suites pass (pytest: 4580 passed, 62 skipped; JS: 84 assertions). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-11 15:32:03 -04:00
ChuckandClaude Opus 5	5137e86d16	feat(tools): MQTT bridge and Pixlet editor, ported onto the api_v3 split (#554) ... * feat(tools): manage the MQTT bridge and Pixlet editor from the Tools tab PR #544's change, ported onto the api_v3 package split (#553). Identical behaviour; only the placement of the new code differs. The original added 508 lines to web_interface/blueprints/api_v3.py, which #553 deletes, so every hunk of it would conflict irreconcilably. Ported by AST: 26 new top-level items sorted to where the split puts each kind -- __init__.py 2 imports, 11 constants, 7 helpers starlark.py 4 routes (/starlark/editor/{apps,status,start,stop}) misc.py 2 routes (/integrations/mqtt-bridge{,/config}) Everything outside api_v3.py -- the Tools partial, the installer scripts, the JS tests -- applied unchanged. Routes: 111 from the split plus these 6 = 117, and the url-map snapshot is regenerated to match, which is exactly what test_api_v3_url_map.py is designed to make you do when routes are added. Full Python suite: 4,278 passed, 68 skipped, 0 failed. The JS tests this PR ships could not be run here -- node is not installed on this machine -- so test/js/dom/test_tools_sections.js is unverified. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014RRtqXDCnvnY6EQwhT5CV9 * fix(starlark): don't crash the pixlet editor's start/stop routes, and honor an operator-set PIXLET_EDITOR_HOST The AST-based port of #544 onto the api_v3 package split dropped `time` from starlark.py's import list. start_pixlet_editor() and stop_pixlet_editor() both call time.time()/time.sleep() directly, so every start (NameError building `state['started_at']`) and every stop that has to wait out the EXIT trap crashed with a 500. No test caught it because the route's own tests mock subprocess.Popen but never actually invoked it before now. Also carries over #544's later fix that this port branched before: env['PIXLET_EDITOR_HOST'] = '0.0.0.0' unconditionally overrode an operator who had already pinned PIXLET_EDITOR_HOST to loopback, forcing the unauthenticated `pixlet serve` process onto the LAN regardless (CodeQL CWE-1188). Switched to env.setdefault(...), same as api_v3.starlark.py's siblings already do for _pkg-owned names. Both fixes route the shared _pkg.time reference the rest of the package's route modules already use for anything a test might need to patch, rather than a bare `import time` local to this file. Ported the existing regression test from #544 (TestPixletEditorHostDefaultsButDoesNotOverride) onto this branch's module layout (web_interface.blueprints.api_v3.starlark instead of the old monolithic api_v3 module), which is what caught the NameError. Full suite: 4330 passed, 62 skipped, 2 failed -- identical on this branch and on origin/main (missing tzdata package breaks two timezone-alias tests in test_onboarding_checklist.py, unrelated to this change). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api-v3): clear the six lint errors this rebase introduced All six were introduced by rebasing this branch onto the merged blueprint split, not by the split itself. Confirmed by diffing pyflakes output against main with line numbers normalised -- everything else it reports is present on main too and is the package's deliberate re-export pattern. starlark.py used _STARLARK_APPS_DIR three times without importing it (F821). The rebase resolved an import-list conflict as a union of both sides, and that symbol was on neither side of the conflict hunk, so it was silently lost. It is defined in __init__.py and is now imported like its neighbours. This was the only one of the six that would fail at runtime rather than merely lint. __init__.py imported contextlib twice (F811): the cherry-pick added one next to the existing import. Removed the duplicate; the original at line 19 is used. __init__.py imported signal purely to re-export it to starlark.py, so pyflakes saw it as unused (F401). signal is stdlib and does not need routing through the blueprint package, so starlark.py imports it directly and __init__.py no longer does. contextlib stays re-exported because this module genuinely uses it. _read_mqtt_bridge_config()'s local `config` shadowed the `config` submodule this module imports at the bottom for its route side effects (F811). Renamed to `settings`, with a comment saying why, since the name is otherwise the obvious one to reach for. Verified: pyflakes now reports nothing on this branch that main does not, the package imports, all nine route modules load, and 117 routes register, matching the pinned URL-map snapshot. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api-v3): reject MQTT bridge bodies the endpoint cannot apply Two CodeRabbit findings on the bridge settings endpoint, both of which returned 200 while doing something other than what the caller asked. `request.get_json(silent=True) or {}` turned a missing or unparseable body -- and the JSON literals null, [] and false -- into an empty dict, which then satisfied the isinstance(data, dict) guard on the very next line. The guard was there to reject exactly those bodies. Dropping the `or {}` lets None fail it. The same `or {}` on /errors/clear is left alone: its docstring documents the body as optional, so an absent body legitimately means "use the defaults". The difference is that saving settings has nothing sensible to do with no body. `if data.get('clear_password'):` accepted any truthy value, and the string "false" is truthy in Python -- so a client echoing the field back as a string wiped a password it meant to keep. Now coerced through the package's existing _coerce_to_bool, which already maps 'true'/'on'/'1'/'yes' and nothing else. test_mqtt_bridge_config_endpoint.py covers both: five unusable body shapes plus a missing body, and clear_password across truthy and falsy spellings. Verified against the unfixed code -- reverting the body guard fails 5, reverting the coercion fails 3. Not changed here: CodeRabbit also asks this endpoint to reject MQTT credentials when TLS is off (CWE-319). That is a policy decision about the feature rather than a defect -- unencrypted MQTT on a trusted LAN is common and often deliberate -- so it is raised on the PR for a maintainer call instead. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix: work through the remaining review findings on the editor and bridge allow_insecure_mqtt (CWE-319, requested): a password with TLS disabled crosses the network in cleartext. Refused now rather than merely warned about -- but refused, not forbidden, because unencrypted MQTT on a trusted LAN is a normal deliberate setup. allow_insecure_mqtt is the explicit acknowledgement, defaults false, and is coerced like the other booleans so the string "false" cannot switch the guard off. starlark.py:796 -- the supported service runs Flask threaded, so two start requests could each see running=False, each launch an editor, and the second state write replace the first PID, orphaning a process that holds the display down with nothing recording it. The check-launch-write sequence now takes a module-level lock. starlark.py:848 -- if the state write failed the route returned success with an editor running and no PID recorded: status and stop both reported no session while the display stayed down until the timeout expired. It now terminates the process group and returns an error. starlark.py:890 -- SIGKILL gives the script's EXIT trap no chance to run, so nothing hands the display back, yet the response said "the display is restarting". After an escalation the display is now restarted explicitly, and a failure to do so returns an error naming the manual step instead of a success. pixlet_config_editor.sh:184 -- find_pixlet supports Darwin but macOS ships no timeout(1); GNU coreutils installs it as gtimeout. Resolved up front so the failure lands before the display is stopped rather than after. pixlet_config_editor.sh:154 -- wildcard, loopback and an explicit interface address are three cases, not two. Collapsing the last two printed a URL saying "localhost" whenever PIXLET_EDITOR_HOST named a LAN address. tools.html:1254 -- escHtml does not encode single quotes, and the app id was interpolated into an inline onclick="startPixletEditor('...')", so a directory containing an apostrophe could break out of the JS string and run script. The handler binds with addEventListener and reads the id from dataset, where it is only ever parsed as an HTML attribute. Tests: test_mqtt_bridge_config_endpoint.py grows to 23 cases covering the opt-in in both directions. The tools DOM suite gains three guards asserting the edit buttons carry no inline onclick and pass the id via dataset -- those need jsdom and did not run here, so CI verifies them. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api-v3): log the traceback on the editor state-write failure The 848 fix answers 500 when the session state cannot be written, and logged that at error level -- but without exc_info, so the traceback never reached the log. test_web_error_detail.py guards exactly this: a handler returning 5xx must write an error-level record *with* the traceback and return the sanitized detail, because checking that merely something was logged is too weak. Caught by Core unit tests on the previous commit, not locally: the guard parses every module under web_interface/blueprints/api_v3 as one source, so it only fires once the whole package is read together. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-11 11:32:12 -04:00
ChuckandClaude Opus 5	bdb9a94033	refactor(api-v3): split the 10,469-line blueprint into a package (#553) ... * refactor(api-v3): split the 10,469-line blueprint into a package web_interface/blueprints/api_v3.py held 111 routes, 56 helpers and 181 functions in one module -- 9% of the core by line count and three times the next largest file. It becomes a package of nine route modules grouped by path segment, plus __init__.py for the shared imports, constants, Blueprint and helpers. Every route module decorates the SAME api_v3 Blueprint object, so endpoint names stay api_v3.<function>, the URL map is unchanged and app.py is untouched. Verified: 111 routes before, 111 after, byte-identical rules, endpoints and methods, and every endpoint still on the one blueprint. plugins 3,867 config 1,178 starlark 692 system 619 fonts 452 misc 398 wifi 361 display 326 backup 212 __init__ 1,787 (imports, constants, Blueprint, 56 helpers) Two things the URL-map check could not catch, both found by running the suite: 1. PROJECT_ROOT = Path(__file__).parent.parent.parent. Moving the code one directory deeper made that resolve to web_interface/ instead of the project root. Nothing failed at import; it surfaced as ~110 tests failing with 404s and "installation script not found", because every path built from it was one level too shallow. Now parents[3], and test_api_v3_url_map.py asserts PROJECT_ROOT/run.py exists so the next move cannot repeat it. 2. Module-attribute patching. Tests do monkeypatch.setattr(api_v3_module, "_BACKUP_EXPORT_DIR", ...) and a route module that binds such a name by value never sees the patch. The shared code therefore stays in __init__.py rather than moving to a _common submodule -- it has to live on the module the tests patch -- and the eleven names tests patch are read back through the package (_pkg.X) instead of bound by value. Those eleven were found by AST-scanning every setattr in the test tree, not by guessing; "time" is among them, used to drive a fake clock through the second-resolution credential-backup filenames. Test changes are confined to what genuinely moved: patch targets that now name the owning route module, imports of helpers, and six tests that scan the api_v3 source as a file and now read the package directory. Full suite: 4,278 passed, 68 skipped, 0 failed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_014RRtqXDCnvnY6EQwhT5CV9 * fix(api-v3): address CodeRabbit findings from the blueprint-split review Fixes to the api_v3 package split (PR #553), one per finding verified against the actual code: - __init__.py: _redact_credentials only blanked scalar values under a credential-named key; a bare list of secrets under such a key (e.g. tokens: ["a", "b"]) passed through untouched, since the list branch recursed with no memory that its key looked like a credential. Nested dicts still walk normally (a documented, tested behaviour -- a container like secrets: {api_key: ..., note: ...} is a section name, not a value to blank outright), but any value reached under a credential-shaped key is now actually blanked. - __init__.py: the OAuth helper script's raw stderr/stdout went to logger.error unredacted (CWE-532) right next to a comment claiming this was deliberate; the HTTP response already used the existing redact_text helper. Routed the log line through the same helper. - __init__.py / starlark.py: the standalone Starlark manifest fallback (used when the plugin instance isn't loaded) read-modified-wrote manifest.json with no lock, unlike StarlarkAppsPlugin._update_manifest_safe (plugin-repos/starlark-apps/manager.py), which already holds an flock for the same file when the plugin is loaded. Added _starlark_manifest_lock, mirroring that pattern, and wrapped every standalone read-modify-write call site in it. The app-config update route also wrote config.json and the manifest as two separate, non-transactional writes (a second, distinct finding at the same call site); config.json is now rolled back if the manifest write that follows it fails. - backup.py: restore options used bare bool() on values from the request, so {"restore_secrets": "false"} restored secrets anyway (bool("false") is True). Switched to the existing _coerce_to_bool helper already used for this exact purpose elsewhere in the package. - config.py: an automated import-rewrite mangled four user-facing validation strings and their neighbouring comments -- "Invalid start time" had become "Invalid start _pkg.time" (and likewise for "end time") in both the schedule and dim-schedule per-day validation paths. - display.py: `import _pkg.time as time_module` -- _pkg is a local alias for the package, not a real importable module, so this raised ModuleNotFoundError whenever a caller restarted an already-running display service via /display/on-demand/start, after the on-demand request was already written to cache. Fixed to `import time`. Audited the rest of the package for the same `_pkg.<module>` import mistake; every other `_pkg.` reference is a legitimate attribute read-through (`_pkg.time.time()`, `_pkg._get_starlark_plugin()`, ...), not a broken import statement. - fonts.py: validate_file_upload's max_size_mb parameter is silently unused by that helper (it only checks filename/extension) -- the font upload route saved arbitrarily large files as a result. Added the same seek-and-check pattern already used for the sibling .star upload. - wifi.py: two ad hoc, inconsistent bool coercions. POST /wifi/ap/auto-enable used bare bool(), so a JSON string "false" enabled it. POST /wifi/radio's enabled/force parsing recognized real bool and some strings but not int 1/0 (1 is True is False in Python). Factored one small _parse_bool_ish helper local to this file and used it at all three sites. Not changed: the "unknown/misspelled restore option keys default to True" half of the backup.py finding -- the file's own comment documents that a missing key deliberately means "restore everything," matching the already-existing JSON-parse-failure guard a few lines above it; only the bool-coercion defect was a real bug. Added or extended regression tests for every fix, following each area's existing test conventions. Full suite: 4328 passed, 62 skipped, 2 failed on both this branch and origin/main (missing tzdata package breaks two timezone-alias tests in test_onboarding_checklist.py, unrelated to this change) -- no new failures. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01S3bPMESe2TfrGvbs1ef9c5 * fix(api-v3): reject unknown restore option keys CodeRabbit's review of the blueprint split (#553) asked that POST /backup/restore reject option keys outside RestoreOptions' known set. The follow-up commit fixed the bool("false")-is-True bug with _coerce_to_bool but never added the key check: a typo'd or renamed key (e.g. "restoreSecrets") is silently ignored by opts_dict.get(key, True), so the flag stays at its True default and secrets get restored despite the caller's request saying otherwise -- with no indication anything was wrong. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01Vmcwf5vMgYqdt8bJTZtiwb * fix(api-v3): address CodeRabbit findings on the blueprint split - _redact_credentials: blank scalar descendants of objects reached through a credential-owned list (e.g. tokens: [{"value": "secret"}]) regardless of field name -- the existing name-based walk only protected direct dict values under a credential key, not list items. - wifi.py: reject enabled/force/auto_enable_ap_mode values _parse_bool_ish can't recognize (400) instead of silently treating them as False, which could disable Wi-Fi or the radio itself. - Starlark manifest locking: lock a stable manifest.json.lock sidecar instead of manifest.json itself, in both the standalone route path (_starlark_manifest_lock) and the plugin path (StarlarkAppsPlugin._save_manifest / _update_manifest_safe). manifest.json is replaced by an atomic rename on every write, which swaps in a fresh inode; a lock held on the old inode does not exclude a second locker that opens the path afresh right after the rename and gets the new inode, so two writers could race despite each holding "a lock". A sidecar that no write ever touches always resolves to the same inode for every locker. Skipped as stale: the "serialize the complete manifest read-modify-write" finding at api_v3/__init__.py -- every standalone handler that calls _write_starlark_manifest is already wrapped in _starlark_manifest_lock() on this branch. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(api-v3): re-check reconciliation findings by the reconciler's own rules Both CodeRabbit findings on the merge commit, verified against the code first. Major, plugins.py: the stale-findings filter derived its own notion of "in config" and "on disk", and both were looser than the reconciliation module's. set(load_config()) also contains system keys, the secrets-file keys load_config() merges in, and non-dict values; and any directory holding a manifest.json counted as installed even when that manifest does not parse. Either looseness clears a finding that is still true -- and a secrets key read as a plugin is the precise bug the filter exists to stop reporting, so reintroducing that asymmetry while re-checking was the wrong way round. The two extractions now live in state_reconciliation.py as config_plugin_ids() and disk_plugin_ids(), with ignored_config_keys() and secrets_top_level_keys() alongside. _get_config_state() and _get_disk_state() use them too, so there is one definition rather than two that can drift. _get_disk_state() re-reads each manifest for version/name after taking membership from the shared extractor; that costs one extra small read per plugin on a path that runs once per boot. Minor, the new test: the fixture assigned api_v3.config_manager and api_v3.plugin_manager directly. Those live on a module-level blueprint singleton, so the mocks leaked into every later test that imports api_v3 -- pointing at a tmp_path already deleted. Both now go through monkeypatch.setattr, which restores them. This is the same pollution class that made an earlier test in this session break seven unrelated ones, so it is worth getting right. Five cases added for the parity itself: a secrets key, a system key and a non-dict value must not clear an "installed but missing from config" finding, and neither an unparseable manifest nor a .standalone-backup- directory may count as installed. All five fail against the looser version. Linux CI on the preceding commit: Core unit tests, plugin harness, CodeQL and CodeRabbit all pass. Codacy reads action_required on every commit of this branch including the first, so it is pre-existing and not from this work. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-09-11 10:07:38 -04:00