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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
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 ChuckandClaude Opus 5
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a6b3384032 |
fix(web): show the action script's error in the file-manager widgets (#574)
A failing plugin action returns a 400 whose JSON body carries the script's own message, but both file-manager widgets threw it away: plugin-file-manager's toggle always said "Toggle failed", and json-file-manager's request helper threw "Server error 400" before reading the body. That hid of-the-day's "Category ... not found in config", which is why its toggles looked broken for no reason. Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ChuckandClaude Opus 5
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d1e821c625 |
fix(web): harden, polish and optimize the web UI per the Sept 2026 audit (#568)
* fix(web): harden, polish and optimize the web UI per the September 2026 audit Works through docs/archive/WEB_UI_AUDIT_2026-09.md (health 8/20). Implementation integrity (P0) - app.css now defines every utility class the templates and JS use, including .hidden, so the ~145 JS show/hide toggles work. Button reset, and base component rules (.btn, .form-control) wrapped in :where() so utility classes on the same element win. New static-audit test fails when a used utility class has no rule. Accessibility - Focus rings render (the old ring rule referenced undefined variables); one :focus-visible outline everywhere; skip link; labelled nav landmarks. - Shared dialog helper (js/utils/dialog.js): role/aria-modal, focus trap, Escape, focus return, applied to every modal. - Named icon-only buttons and labelled ~70 form fields. - Toasts announced once; errors persist >= 10s; one showNotification. - Captive WiFi page: live region, timeouts, dark mode, 16px inputs. Performance (Pi Zero 2 W) - SSE streams and tab timers pause when hidden or off-tab; the display stream only runs while a preview is visible. app-shell.js deferred. - Widget scripts served as one versioned bundle (/assets/widgets.js): 52 -> 21 script tags, 66 -> 35 requests on first load. - Stdlib gzip fallback when flask-compress is missing: first-load JS/CSS 1358 KB -> 291 KB on the wire. SSE untouched. Theming and responsive - File managers, form fields and Fonts upload on theme tokens; bare inputs themed in dark mode; no more white surfaces. - No horizontal overflow at 375px on any tab; 44px touch targets on coarse pointers; reduced-motion respected; header title truncates. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): clear Codacy findings on #568 - json-file-manager: focus-trap releases kept in a Map (no dynamic property access or delete; no value-returning forEach callback) - notification / schedule-picker: style and day-label lookups via Map - app.js: move the pending-queue assignment out of the expression - diff_viewer / error_handler: named function declarations instead of arrow consts No behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * test: check the OAuth widget ships in the widget bundle base.html no longer tags widget scripts one by one; they load through /assets/widgets.js. Assert the page requests the bundle and the bundle contains google-oauth.js, which is what the test was protecting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): address review feedback on #568 - widget bundle version fingerprints every file (name, mtime_ns, size) - gzip fallback appends Accept-Encoding to an existing Vary header - dialog helper: releasing a non-top dialog no longer moves focus out of the dialog the user is in - labels: file-upload targets its file input; fallback config fields get label for/id pairs; native color input has a fallback name - utility audit also reads class names inside bound :class expressions Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): give the native color-picker input an accessible name CodeRabbit flagged this on PR #568 as an outside-diff finding (never posted inline, so it was missed in the round of fixes that addressed the other 6 review comments). The <input type="color"> only carried a title attribute; screen readers don't reliably announce title, and there's no other label naming the control when showHexInput is false. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): clear Codacy findings in app-shell.js - drop the unused catch binding on the SSE JSON parse - move the pending-notification queue assignment out of the expression No behavior change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(web): contain plugin widgets/ dir and bound style-editor retries From CodeRabbit review on #568 (code that arrived with the main merge): - serve_plugin_widget resolves widgets/ with resolve_under before resolving the manifest script under it, so a symlinked widgets directory can't become the containment base (CWE-22). New test. - style-editor init stops polling after ~10s when the widget never registers and leaves the plain fallback fields in place. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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ChuckandClaude Opus 5
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f6367d63ae |
security: triage the CodeQL backlog — 129 alerts, three of them live (#561)
* fix(web): escape quotes in every HTML escaper, not just & < >
The escapers are all `div.textContent = x; return div.innerHTML`. That
round-trip escapes &, < and > -- the only characters the HTML serializer
must escape in a text node -- and leaves quotes alone. Every widget then
interpolates the result into a quoted attribute value:
value="${escapeHtml(v)}" title="${escapeHtml(v)}"
so a value of `x" onmouseover="alert(1)` closes the attribute and adds an
event handler of its own. CodeQL reported this 83 times
(js/incomplete-html-attribute-sanitization) across the widget files.
It is one bug, not 83: the widgets each carry a standalone fallback that
did escape quotes, but they all prefer BaseWidget.escapeHtml when
window.BaseWidget exists -- which it always does in the shipped page -- so
the correct fallbacks were dead code and the incomplete shared one ran.
Fixed at each source instead of at the call sites.
app-shell.js already documented this exact gap in a comment and worked
around it by building DOM nodes by hand; that workaround stays (setting a
property cannot be got wrong), the comment is now accurate.
cache.html's delete button interpolated the cache key into
`onclick="deleteCacheFile('...')"`. Escaping cannot help there -- the
browser HTML-decodes the attribute before parsing it as JS, so `'`
becomes a real `'` again -- so the key moves to a data-cache-key
attribute that the handler reads back.
url-input.js additionally wrote a value straight into an <a href> after
validating it against a schema-supplied protocol list, and that list
accepted any RFC 3986 scheme -- "javascript" included. Scriptable schemes
(javascript, data, vbscript, blob, filesystem) are now refused both when
the list is normalised and when a URL is checked against it, and the
render path routes its href through the same check instead of emitting
whatever was stored (js/xss-through-dom).
test/js/unit/test_html_escaping.js reads each escaper out of the shipped
file and runs it, so losing the quote handling again fails a test rather
than a scan.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): stop request-supplied names from reaching paths outside their base
Three of the py/path-injection alerts were live, not lint:
* GET /api/v3/plugins/<plugin_id>/static/<path:file_path> read any file
whose resolved path *string-prefixed* the plugin directory. Flask's
default converter forbids a slash but not dots, and
get_plugin_directory('..') returned the parent of the plugins directory
because it exists -- so every file under the project root then prefixed
that directory, config/config_secrets.json included. The prefix check
was also wrong on its own terms: with plugin dir "plugin-repos/foo",
"../foo-evil/x" resolves to "plugin-repos/foo-evil/x", whose string does
start with "plugin-repos/foo".
* POST /api/v3/plugins/of-the-day/json/delete interpolated the request
body's file_id into f"{file_id}.json" and unlinked it, unvalidated. A
file_id of "../../../../etc/something" deleted that file. This is the
one finding in the batch that destroyed data rather than exposing it.
* POST /api/v3/cache/delete passed the body's key through
CacheManager.clear_cache to DiskCache, which joined it as a filename and
called os.remove. Same shape, same result. The guard goes in
DiskCache.get_cache_path, the single choke point get/set/clear share, so
every caller is covered rather than just this route. Real keys are the
stems of files already flat in the cache directory -- that is how
list_cache_files derives them -- so nothing legitimate is turned away.
The rest of the cluster (web_interface/app.py's asset route, the plugin
update handler, _get_plugin_version, the plugin-schema read in config.py)
was guarded in ways that held, but each had grown its own version of the
check. They now go through one helper, src/common/path_safety.py, which
returns the *sanitised value* rather than a verdict -- so a caller cannot
validate one string and open another, which is how the two real bugs
above were shaped.
Also: WiFiManager.connect_to_network took the SSID and password straight
from POST /api/v3/wifi/connect into nmcli's argv. There is no shell there,
so CodeQL's py/command-line-injection alert overstates the risk -- but
nmcli reads a leading "-" as an option, so an SSID of "--ask" asks nmcli
to run differently rather than to join a network. Both values are now
checked for shape (802.11's 32-octet SSID limit, WPA's 8-63 char
passphrase or 64-char hex key, no control characters, no leading dash)
before any subprocess runs.
test/test_path_traversal_guards.py asserts on the filesystem, not just
the status code: a handler that returns 403 and deletes the file anyway
would pass the weaker check. Twelve of its cases fail against the
unpatched code.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(web): refuse a plugin id that is not a plain name, don't truncate it
pages_v3 and scripts/dev_server.py ran request ids through
os.path.basename and carried on with what came out, so "../weather"
rendered the config form for "weather". Nothing escaped the plugins
directory -- the relative_to guards held -- but the handler answered a
request nobody made, and validating one string while the filesystem sees
another is the shape both live traversals earlier in this branch had.
Same treatment as the rest: safe_path_component rejects rather than
truncates, resolve_under returns the path it checked, and the call sites
use what those return. The three handlers that had hand-rolled
resolve-and-relative_to blocks lose about twenty lines to the shared one.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* docs(web): say what the plugin web_ui iframe actually is
The docstring claimed the fragment runs "in a sandboxed iframe". The
iframe in plugin_config.html carries no sandbox attribute, so the
fragment runs with the interface's own origin. That is fine -- the file
belongs to an installed plugin, and an installed plugin already runs
Python on the device, so the trust boundary is install rather than this
route -- but a comment promising containment that is not there is worse
than no comment. This is the context for the py/reflective-xss alert on
this handler.
Also drops the now-unused os/os.path imports.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(web): inline url-input's scheme guard at the previewLink.href sink
CodeQL flagged this line as a new high-severity js/xss-through-dom alert
on this PR even though it is already covered by SCRIPTABLE_SCHEMES: the
guard reached the sink through safeHref -> isValidUrl, two function calls
away, which its DOM-based-XSS sanitizer recognition does not trace.
Behavior is unchanged -- same scheme check, same SCRIPTABLE_SCHEMES list,
same allowedProtocols gate -- just inlined directly above the
previewLink.href assignment it guards, so the barrier is visible in the
same scope as the sink.
Added a regression test that runs the shipped onInput handler (not just
the extracted helpers) against a mocked DOM, so a future change that
reintroduces an unguarded previewLink.href assignment fails here.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
* fix(security): address CodeRabbit findings on the CodeQL triage PR
- src/wifi_manager.py: reject non-ASCII WPA-PSK passphrases before any
credential-saving or connect flow runs. NetworkManager only accepts
printable ASCII passphrases (or a 64-char hex key); a non-ASCII value
was previously saved/attempted before nmcli itself rejected it.
- web_interface/blueprints/api_v3/config.py: fail closed when the
plugin config schema path can't be resolved under the plugins
directory (e.g. a symlinked plugin dir). Previously this fell
through with secret_fields left empty, so submitted credentials for
that plugin were saved as ordinary, unencrypted configuration.
- web_interface/static/v3/js/widgets/plugin-file-manager.js: stop
splicing the JSON day/column key into an inline oninput="..." handler
string. escHtml() escapes quotes for a normal HTML attribute, but the
browser HTML-decodes the attribute before running it as script, which
undoes that escaping and lets a crafted column name (e.g. from an
uploaded JSON file) break out of the JS string and execute. Cell
edits now travel through data-day/data-col attributes read by one
delegated 'input' listener instead.
While in this file: fixed 6 pre-existing missing-')' typos on
multi-line safeSetHTML(...) calls (already flagged by Biome in this
PR's own CodeRabbit run as syntax errors blocking its lint pass).
These predate this PR (present on main too) but made the whole file
fail to parse in any JS engine, which is a bigger problem than the
XSS finding itself and directly touches the same lines.
Added/extended regression tests for each fix; full suites pass
(pytest: 4580 passed, 62 skipped; JS: 84 assertions).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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7603909c59 |
feat(ui): add reusable json-file-manager widget (#352)
* feat(ui): add reusable json-file-manager widget for plugin file management Introduces JsonFileManager — a zero-CDN, keyboard-accessible, configurable widget for managing JSON data files from plugin configuration forms. web_interface/static/v3/js/widgets/json-file-manager.js (new): - Self-contained class with scoped CSS (no global leakage) - File list with cards: enable/disable toggle, entry count, size, date - Drag-and-drop + click-to-browse JSON upload - Textarea-based JSON editor (no CDN); Format + Validate buttons - Ctrl+S to save, Escape to close any open modal - Create-new-file modal with configurable fields and validation - Delete confirmation modal - All actions (list/get/save/upload/delete/create/toggle) are configurable via x-widget-config in config_schema.json — no plugin-ID hardcoding web_interface/static/v3/plugins_manager.js: - New handler for x-widget: "json-file-manager" — renders mount div, instantiates JsonFileManager with x-widget-config and plugin ID web_interface/templates/v3/base.html: - Include json-file-manager.js (defer) before plugins_manager.js Usage: set x-widget: "json-file-manager" + x-widget-config in any plugin's config_schema.json (see ledmatrix-plugins of-the-day for a complete example). Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(json-file-manager): review fixes — type=button, finally, display_name, instance tracking - Add type="button" to every button in the template (replace_all) so none default to submit inside the plugin-config-form - Wrap _doSave/_doDelete/_doCreate fetch blocks in try/finally so _idle() always fires, not only on the error path - _doCreate validation: skip the required-check for display_name (f.key !== 'display_name') and only validate pattern when val is non-empty, so the auto-derive logic at the end of the loop can run; simplify the derive block to a single conditional instead of nested DOM lookups - plugins_manager.js: track instances in window.__jfmInstances[safeFieldId] and call _destroy() on any previous instance before mounting a new one, preventing duplicate keydown handlers when the config form is re-rendered Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(json-file-manager): use validity.patternMismatch; destroy all instances on remount - Replace `new RegExp(f.pattern).test(val)` with `el.validity.patternMismatch` to avoid potential SyntaxError from untrusted pattern strings and rely on the browser's already-validated pattern attribute instead - plugins_manager.js: iterate all window.__jfmInstances and call _destroy() on every entry before mounting, then reset the map, so no orphaned keydown handlers survive when any plugin config form is re-rendered Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(plugins_manager): scope jfm instance teardown to current mount key only The global sweep (Object.values + window.__jfmInstances = {}) destroyed sibling file-manager widgets when any one of them was remounted. Replace with a targeted destroy of window.__jfmInstances[safeFieldId] only, leaving all other entries untouched. Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(json-file-manager): address Codacy security warnings - Replace Math.random() with crypto.getRandomValues() for UID generation - Remove unused variable `u` in _card() - Guard this.actions property access with hasOwnProperty - Replace btn.innerHTML in _busy/_idle with DOM manipulation + textContent Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Chuck <chuck@example.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com> |