2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
ChuckandClaude Opus 5.5 a8b3e86775 refactor(web): delete dead routes, JS files and duplicate definitions (#609)
* refactor(web): drop validators nothing calls

escape_html, validate_image_url, validate_font_awesome_class,
validate_mime_type, validate_numeric_range, validate_string_length and
sanitize_plugin_config had no callers outside their own tests. Only
validate_file_upload (fonts upload) is imported by the web interface.

dedup_unique_arrays is kept: its one caller in save_plugin_config was
removed by the unrelated sync PR (#330), which looks accidental.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): remove the music-auth and of-the-day JSON routes

POST /plugins/authenticate/spotify and /plugins/authenticate/ytm had no
caller but their tests: the music plugin authenticates through its
web_ui_actions (authenticate_spotify.py / authenticate_ytm.py) via
/plugins/action.

POST /plugins/of-the-day/json/upload and /json/delete looked the plugin
up by the id ledmatrix-of-the-day (its manifest id is of-the-day), were
reachable only from a file_type "json" upload field that no schema
declares, and put the plugin directory on sys.path per request to
import scripts.update_config. of-the-day manages its files through
plugin-file-manager and its own web_ui_actions.

The of-the-day branch of GET /plugins/config stays: it matches the real
manifest id and still merges the on-disk category files into the form.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(api): read managers only from the blueprints

api_v3/__init__.py and pages_v3.py declared module globals
(plugin_store_manager, saved_repositories_manager, schema_manager,
operation_queue, plugin_state_manager, operation_history, sync_manager,
config_manager, plugin_manager) that nothing assigns: app.py sets the
managers as attributes on the Blueprint objects, and every route reads
them there. The one reader, backup restore's fallback to the module
plugin_store_manager, could only ever fall back to None.

_ensure_cache_manager() built a second CacheManager in the web process
instead of using the one app.py puts on api_v3. The display routes now
read api_v3.cache_manager, creating it on the blueprint only when
nothing set it (the same None handling as the /cache routes).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(web): drop run.sh and the unused log_config_change

web_interface/run.sh was referenced only by web_interface/README.md;
the service starts the UI through scripts/utils/start_web_conditionally.py
and the README already documents `python3 web_interface/start.py`.
log_config_change() in web_interface/logging_config.py was never called.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(web): delete unreferenced store_manager.js, diff_viewer.js, htmx-sse.js

- js/plugins/store_manager.js (window.PluginStoreManager) and
  js/config/diff_viewer.js (window.ConfigDiffViewer) were loaded on every
  page but nothing reads either global.
- htmx-sse.js (plus its CDN fallback) was loaded after HTMX, but no
  template or plugin page uses sse-connect / hx-ext="sse": the live
  streams run through LEDStreams in app-shell.js.

js/plugins/state_manager.js stays: install_manager.js's updateAll()
reads and refreshes window.PluginStateManager.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(web): remove app.js helpers nothing calls

- hexToRgb, rgbToHex, validateForm, uploadFont and switchTab (whose
  'switch-tab' event had no listener) have no caller in the templates,
  static JS or the plugin monorepo.
- installPlugin: plugins_manager.js (loaded last) assigns
  window.installPlugin, and its own store cards are the only callers.
- The showNotification fallback could never install: app-shell.js is
  deferred ahead of app.js and defines the same fallback at top level.
- performanceMonitor only logged with ?debug=perf and read an unset
  this.measures; the marks it took on every load had no reader.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(web): drop app-shell.js refreshPlugin

A top-level function in app-shell.js, so a window global, but nothing
calls it (no inline handler, no window lookup, no string-built name).

The other plugin actions in that block stay. updatePlugin is the live
window.updatePlugin: plugins_manager.js only installs its own copy when
none exists. uninstallPlugin/pollUninstallOperation, updateAllPlugins,
executePluginAction and toggleNestedSection are replaced by later
deferred scripts, but a click that lands while those scripts are still
downloading reaches the app-shell copies, so removing them is not a
pure no-op.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(web): remove definitions plugins_manager.js always overrides

All of these are replaced before anything can call them, checked
against the load order in base.html and the live window.* values:

- openOnDemandModal/requestOnDemandStop stubs: the IIFE later in the
  same script assigns the real functions synchronously.
- updatePlugin and uninstallPlugin stubs (`window.X || stub`): app-shell.js
  already defined both, so the fallback never installed. Same for the
  later updatePlugin override, gated on the live function containing
  '[UPDATE]', which app-shell.js's never does.
- The first addArrayObjectItem/removeArrayObjectItem: reassigned by the
  top-level copies after the IIFE.
- The first `function formatDate` in the IIFE: a later declaration of
  the same name in the same scope wins.
- deleteUploadedImage, getCurrentImages, showUploadProgress,
  formatFileSize and getScheduleSummary: character-for-character
  copies of js/widgets/file-upload.js, which stays the owner.
- `typeof X === 'undefined'` fallbacks and `typeof X !== 'undefined'`
  re-exports after the IIFE: always false, or a self-assignment.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor(web): render the shell directly and delete index.html

index.html extended base.html with {% block content %}, but base.html
defines no blocks, so none of index.html ever rendered: rendering both
with jinja2 gives byte-identical output. index() still loaded the config,
read config.json and config_secrets.json raw and json.dumps'd them on
every page load for variables base.html never reads, and flashed errors
that base.html never shows. It now renders base.html with no context.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(web): stop htmx-config.js replacing console.error and console.warn

It swapped both globals for filters that dropped any error mentioning
insertBefore / "Cannot read properties of null" when "htmx" appeared in
the message or stack, and a list of Permissions-Policy warnings. That
hid real errors from every script on the page, and made every logged
error and warning report htmx-config.js as its source. The beforeSwap
target validation above it, which prevents the insertBefore errors in
the first place, stays.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* chore(web): quiet the widget load announcements and debug logs

About 30 lines hit the console on every page load: one "... widget
registered" per widget file, one "[WidgetRegistry] Registered widget: X"
per registration, plus the registry, base widget and plugin loader
announcing themselves. The load-time announcements are removed; the
per-call ones (registry register, plugin widget loads, "Render called")
now go through the page's debugLog switch (localStorage.pluginDebug),
guarded because the widgets also load in node tests without it.
fonts.html and wifi.html debug logging goes through debugLog as well.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* docs(api): drop the removed music-auth and of-the-day JSON routes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-09-23 12:36:53 -04:00
ChuckandClaude Opus 5 10e75b977f Cover the next tier of untested modules and endpoints, and fix the 43 bugs that surfaced (#459)
* test(sync): cover the display sync protocol, and fix what that surfaced

DisplaySyncManager had no tests at all — it appeared in the suite only as
a MagicMock() stand-in, so none of its framing, handshake, or socket
handling was ever exercised. Writing that coverage surfaced three bugs.

Both receive loops caught the generic Exception and immediately retried.
A socket left in a bad state raises on every call, so the thread spun at
100% CPU logging the same line; the reverted-code run of the new
regression test takes 24 seconds where the fixed one takes 0.2. Both now
back off briefly before retrying.

The follower dispatched on `data[:8] == _RAW_MAGIC or len(data) > 512`.
That size threshold is not part of either wire format: a control message
over 512 bytes — a hello_ack carrying a long incompatibility error, for
instance — went to the image decoder and was dropped, and a raw frame
under 512 bytes went to the JSON parser. Both formats are already
self-describing, so dispatch on the magic prefix and treat a JSON parse
failure as the legacy unmarked PNG, with the shared frame bookkeeping
factored into _handle_received_frame().

_oversized_frame_warned was created on first use through
getattr(self, ..., False) rather than in __init__, alone among the
instance attributes.

75 tests: role parsing, the hello compatibility matrix, watchdog
timeouts, both receive loops, the TCP image server's length and
dimension caps and decompression-bomb guard, status shape per role, and
one end-to-end loopback handshake so the wire format is exercised for
real and not only against mocks.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(logos): cover LogoHelper, and stop bad downloads poisoning the cache

Nothing in test/ referenced logo_helper.py, so its caching, resizing and
download-fallback logic was entirely unexercised. Two bugs surfaced.

_download_logo wrote response.content to disk with no size limit and no
check that the bytes were an image. A logo URL is remote input, so the
response chose how much went into the assets directory; worse, an
undecodable one stayed there, and because load_logo() only reports the
decode failure and returns None, every later call re-read the same
corrupt file. The download path never retried, so a single bad response
made a logo permanently blank rather than falling back to the
placeholder. Cap the response, verify it decodes, and delete it if not,
which lets the existing fallback in load_logo_with_download do its job.

get_cache_stats() divided by self.cache_size with no guard, so a helper
built with cache_size=0 raised ZeroDivisionError from what is only a
stats call.

37 tests: size-qualified cache keys, LRU eviction and refresh, the four
load_logo_with_download paths, download permissions and timeout,
placeholder generation, and the abbreviation normalizer — including a
test pinning its deliberate divergence from
LogoDownloader.normalize_abbreviation, since logo filenames on existing
installs depend on both behaviors staying put.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(web): cover the error and response builders, and stop dropping empty values

errors.py and error_handler.py's response builders had no direct tests,
though every API response passes through them. Two bugs surfaced.

WebInterfaceError set suggested_fixes with `or`, so a caller passing []
to mean "I have no suggestions for this one" got the default list
instead. Only None should fall back.

create_success_response gated `data` on `is not None` but `message` and
`metadata` on truthiness, so an explicitly-passed "" or {} vanished from
the response while 0 and False survived — the response shape depended on
the value. api_helpers.success_response() then re-gated metadata the same
way, which is the path every api_v3 endpoint actually calls, so fixing
only the inner function would have changed nothing observable. Both now
use `is not None`.

That wrapper also merged request timing into the caller's own metadata
dict in place. A caller reusing a dict across requests would accumulate
previous responses' timings; it now copies before adding.

79 tests: category inference for every error code, mapped vs fallback
suggestions, the JSON shape including which keys are omitted when empty,
exception-to-code inference, and the success/error builders end to end.
Two behaviours are pinned as deliberate rather than fixed: an empty
context stays out of the response body, and from_exception's `message`
is the fixed per-code string, never the raw exception text.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(web): cover the input validators, and close three holes in them

validators.py had tests for dedup_unique_arrays only; the other eight
functions were untested. Three bugs surfaced.

validate_image_url checked for '..' only inside its relative-path
branch, so http://host/../secret passed validation while /../secret was
rejected — the traversal check now runs before the branch split, which
is where a safety check on the whole URL belongs.

validate_file_upload lowercased the uploaded filename's extension but
compared it against the caller's list verbatim, so allowed_extensions of
['.TTF'] rejected every valid .ttf file. Both sides are lowercased now.
The one in-tree caller passes lowercase already, so this only widens what
future callers can hand it.

validate_numeric_range accepted True and False, because bool subclasses
int; a boolean then compared as 1 or 0 against the range and validated
cleanly. Excluded explicitly, matching how base_plugin.py already handles
the same trap for display_duration.

84 tests. Two behaviours are pinned rather than changed:
sanitize_plugin_config deliberately does not HTML-escape strings, since
escaping at this layer would store the escaped form in config.json — the
docstring said "prevent injection", which read as a promise it does not
keep, and now says what it actually does. validate_font_awesome_class's
second 'fa-' check is unreachable behind its own regex; harmless, so
characterized rather than removed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(api): cover wifi and registry endpoints, and fix bodyless POSTs

The /wifi/* routes drive the host's real networking and the registry
routes reach GitHub, and neither had endpoint-level tests. Covering them
surfaced a bug affecting six endpoints.

Six handlers read their body as `request.get_json() or {}`. The `or {}`
says every field is optional and a missing body should fall back to
defaults — but get_json() without silent=True raises UnsupportedMediaType
when there is no JSON Content-Type, and it raises before `or {}` is ever
evaluated. Each handler's catch-all then reported that as a 500. So
POSTing with no body — what curl sends by default, and what a fetch()
without options sends — failed on /plugins/store/refresh,
/display/on-demand/start, /plugins/config/reset,
/plugins/of-the-day/json/delete, /plugins/{id}/limits and
/plugins/authenticate/spotify. The shipped UI always sends a JSON object,
which is why this stayed hidden.

All six now use silent=True. test_api_v3_optional_body.py covers the
affected endpoints and adds a source check, since the combination of
`or <default>` with a non-silent read is self-contradictory wherever it
appears and is easier to catch by inspection than by exercising each
endpoint by hand.

Also adds test/_api_v3_test_helpers.py: the blueprint holds its managers
on a module-level singleton rather than in Flask app state, so a test
that mocks them leaks into every later test unless the originals are
restored. The existing _make_client() does this for unittest classes;
this is the pytest-fixture equivalent, for the five suites still to come.

69 endpoint tests: connect/disconnect/AP/radio including the string-aware
boolean coercion these endpoints deliberately use, the radio's
lockout-refusal path, registry refresh and fetch-from-URL, and a guard
that WiFiManager is never constructed for real.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(api): cover the music auth endpoints, and always clean up the wrapper

The Spotify step-2 handler writes a Python wrapper script to a temp file
with the user's redirect URL embedded in its source, then executes it.
That is the most dangerous shape in the blueprint and had no tests.

The wrapper was deleted in the success/failure branch and again in the
TimeoutExpired handler. Any other failure from subprocess.run — no
interpreter, a fork failure, an interrupted call — reached neither, and
left a world-readable temp file containing the user's redirect URL on
disk. Cleanup moves to a finally block, which is what "delete this
whatever happens" should have been from the start.

The injection tests are the point of this file. Eight adversarial
redirect URLs (embedded quotes, backslashes, newlines, triple quotes, a
full `"; import os; os.system("id"); "`) are each pushed through the
endpoint and the generated wrapper is parsed with ast: it must still be
valid Python, the URL must still be a single string literal bound to
redirect_url, and no os.system call may appear anywhere in the tree.
json.dumps holds up, but nothing was checking that it does.

40 tests. Also pins that the two endpoints are not symmetrical despite
the matching names — only Spotify has a two-step flow and a wrapper; YTM
runs its script directly — so a later change does not "restore" a parity
that was never there.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(api): cover the credentials upload, and stop it hoarding secrets

The endpoint that receives the user's Google OAuth credentials file had
no tests. Two bugs surfaced.

The OAuth-shape check ran inside `except Exception: pass`. A JSON
document that parses but is not an object — a bare 42, true, null, a
list — makes `'installed' not in creds_data` raise TypeError, which the
bare except swallowed, and the file was then written out as
credentials.json regardless. The check now decides the outcome instead
of being advisory, so anything not credentials-shaped is refused up
front rather than failing later inside the calendar plugin.

Every overwrite copies the old file to credentials.json.backup.<ts> and
nothing removed them, so a user who re-uploaded ten times had ten
complete sets of OAuth client credentials sitting in the plugin
directory, indefinitely. Keep the newest five. Pruning is housekeeping,
so a backup that cannot be removed logs and leaves the upload alone.

27 tests: size and extension limits, malformed JSON, the shape check,
0600 permissions on the written file, backup-on-overwrite, and pruning
including the repeated-upload case that stays bounded.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(api): cover the install endpoints, and make 14 dead guards reachable

/plugins/install and /plugins/install-from-url were tested only at the
PluginStoreManager layer, so the route logic — the queue-versus-direct
branch, schema invalidation, discovery, state and history recording — was
unexercised.

Covering them surfaced the wider form of the body-parsing bug fixed for
the `or {}` handlers in the previous commit. Fourteen handlers read
`data = request.get_json()` and immediately guard with `if not data:
return 400, 'No data provided'`. That guard cannot run: get_json()
without silent=True raises UnsupportedMediaType for a request with no
JSON body, so the catch-all answered 500 "an error occurred; see logs
for details" where the handler plainly meant to answer 400 and say
which field was missing. Every one of these endpoints told a caller who
simply forgot the body to go read the server logs.

All fourteen now use silent=True, so the guard each author already wrote
is the one that runs. This covers /config/raw/main and /config/raw/secrets
among them, whose own bodyless case had the same shape.

The two remaining bare reads are left alone: neither declares what a
missing body should do, so there is no stated intent to honour.

31 install tests plus 17 body tests. The install pair is checked against
each other rather than only individually — the same install logic is
written twice, once in the queue callback and once in the fallback, so
the tests assert both produce identical schema, discovery, state and
history effects. They agree today; the one difference is the success
message wording, which is characterized rather than changed.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(api): cover the raw config write endpoints

/config/raw/main and /config/raw/secrets write whatever JSON they are
given straight to config.json and config_secrets.json, bypassing the
secret-separation path the rest of the config surface goes through. Given
how carefully that surface keeps secrets out of config.json, the pair
that skips it was worth pinning precisely. Backed by a real
ConfigManager over tmp_path, so the assertions are against files on disk.

20 tests covering both routes: what lands in which file, that a raw
secrets write never touches config.json and vice versa, the GitHub token
reload, the uninitialized-manager and empty-body branches, and the
ConfigError path that carries config_path through to the response.

The bypass itself is pinned as intentional rather than changed — these
back the raw JSON editor, so writing the body verbatim is the feature.
The test says so explicitly, because the failure mode is someone later
routing plugin config through here as a convenience and silently losing
secret separation.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(api): cover backup restore and path containment, and fix restore scope

Restore is the most destructive thing the web interface can do — it
overwrites config, secrets, WiFi settings and fonts, then reinstalls
plugins — and neither it nor the file routes beside it had tests.

A malformed `options` field fell back to {}. Every RestoreOptions flag
defaults to True, so a caller who asked for a narrow restore and
mis-serialized the request got a full one instead, secrets included, and
was told it succeeded. Valid JSON that is not an object was worse:
`"null"` or `"[1,2]"` reached .get() on a non-dict and raised, so the
request died as a generic 500. Both are now refused with a 400 that says
what was wrong, and restore_backup is never reached.

The other file routes take a filename straight out of the URL and turn it
into a path — one to read, one to unlink. _safe_backup_path is the only
thing keeping those inside the export directory, and it was untested. No
bypass was found; the thirteen traversal shapes are pinned so a later
loosening of that pattern has to argue with something. The delete route's
by-name enumeration is covered too, including that a directory sharing a
backup's name is not removed.

84 tests. Two behaviours are pinned as intentional: a failed plugin
reinstall turns the whole restore into an error even though file
restoration succeeded, and omitting `options` entirely still means
restore everything — that is the documented default, and it is only the
mis-serialized case that was wrong.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* ci: raise coverage floor to 52%

Measured 54.45% after the Tier 1 and Tier 2 suites, up from 50%. Keeping
the same two points of headroom the 45 -> 48 ratchet used.

The modules this branch set out to cover: sync_manager 0 -> 97%,
logo_helper 0 -> 98%, errors and error_handler 0 -> 100%, validators
0 -> 97%. api_v3 moved less in percentage terms because it is 4,341
statements, but the endpoints covered are the destructive and
credential-handling ones.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(sync): probe for a free port on loopback, not every interface

CodeQL flagged the ephemeral-port probe in the handshake test for
binding to all interfaces. The probe only needs a free port number, so
loopback is both sufficient and correct — a test should not open a port
to the network to discover one.

The manager under test still binds to all interfaces, which is
deliberate and already marked nosec: a follower has to receive the
leader's UDP broadcast.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* fix: bound the logo download, and stop malformed input reading as a fault

Review findings on the coverage branch.

The download size cap I added checked len(response.content), which has
already buffered the whole body -- it stopped the bytes reaching disk but
not memory, which was the point. A server that omits Content-Length and
never stops sending would still exhaust the process. Stream it instead,
counting as it arrives, into a sibling .part file that is replaced over
the target only once it decodes. A transfer that dies midway now leaves
nothing behind rather than a truncated logo for load_logo() to cache.

The follower's control-message handler caught three exception types, but
two reachable UDP payloads raise others: a bare JSON scalar makes
msg.get() raise AttributeError, and an "sx" carrying a non-numeric x
raises ValueError or TypeError from float(). Those escaped to the outer
handler, skipping the legacy-PNG fallback and -- since this branch added
a backoff there -- charging one malformed packet a 0.1s stall on the
receive path. The legacy-PNG path also decoded without the dimension cap
its TCP counterpart applies, so a crafted 65KB frame could force a large
allocation on the render thread; both paths now share one constant.

Three repo_url handlers called .strip() on client input without checking
it was a string, so {"repo_url": 12345} answered 500. The credentials
upload parsed the same file twice, the second time inside a bare except
that a preceding parse had already made unreachable. And both raw-config
handlers kept a json.JSONDecodeError arm that get_json(silent=True) had
turned into dead code, collapsing "sent something unparseable" into "sent
nothing" -- they now say which.

Two of the new tests were not testing what they claimed. The pruning
round-trip wrote ten backups inside one second, so all ten landed on the
same int(time.time()) filename and overwrote each other; it never reached
the limit it asserted. And the sync clock helper patched attributes on the
stdlib time module, freezing time process-wide for every daemon thread
earlier tests had left running.

Full suite: 3352 passed, coverage 54%.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(sync): probe broadcast by sending, not by listening

The broadcast check added in the previous commit bound INADDR_ANY to
receive its own probe datagram, and the free-port probe did the same to
pick a port. CodeQL flagged both, correctly: a test suite has no reason
to open a socket the whole network can reach.

Sending is enough for what the probe is actually for. An environment
that refuses broadcast raises on sendto, which is the case that occurs
in sandboxes and is the one worth skipping over; confirming delivery
would have required the listening socket. A network that accepts the
send and silently drops it still reaches the assertion, exactly as it
did before either commit. The port probe binds loopback -- it only needs
a number, and the manager's own bind is the one that has to succeed, with
the retry loop already covering a port taken elsewhere.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* fix: keep callback faults out of the frame-decode fallback

Review follow-up on the previous two commits.

Widening the control-message except tuple put the callback dispatch
inside it, so an _on_new_cycle() that raised ValueError, TypeError or
AttributeError sent a perfectly good control packet to the legacy PNG
decoder -- which reported it as an image decode error and buried the
real fault. Split the two: whether the payload parses as JSON decides
frame vs control message, a second guard covers reading the fields of an
attacker-shaped body, and the callback fires outside both. It still
cannot kill the receive thread; the loop's own handler catches it, and
now says what actually went wrong.

The logo download's temp file was a fixed "<name>.part". Two plugins
asking for the same logo at once would interleave writes into it,
publish the mixture, or delete each other's partial. mkstemp gives each
download its own name in the same directory, so os.replace stays atomic.
Its descriptor is adopted by fdopen before the request runs, since a
request that raises before the write would otherwise leak the fd --
quietly, because load_logo_with_download swallows that.

Two test fixes: the oversized-frame test replaced PIL.Image.open
process-wide, the same hazard the clock helper documents, and Ruff B007
on an unused loop variable.

Full suite: 3355 passed, coverage 54%.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

* test(sync): cover the announce loop, and reject non-finite scroll positions

Three review findings from the follower receive path.

Non-finite scroll x reached follower rendering. json.loads accepts the
bare NaN/Infinity literals and float() accepts them as strings, so
"x": NaN arrived as a real float and was stored verbatim. NaN loses
every comparison the scroll code makes, so a follower given one sits on
a position it can never advance past. It now raises through the existing
malformed-control-message guard, which logs and drops the packet and
leaves the last good position in place.

_broadcast_available() only proves the host accepts sendto() for a
broadcast; a network that accepts the send and drops the packet would
let TestRealSocketHandshake run to its five-second deadline and fail on
assertions the code did not break. The deadline now distinguishes the
two: if not one packet crossed in either direction, that is the
environment, and the test skips rather than reporting a protocol
failure.

That skip could hide a real regression in the announcing side, so
TestFollowerAnnounceLoop covers it on mock sockets, where no network is
involved and nothing can skip: hello carries this display's hardware
config and goes to the broadcast address, heartbeats follow, an empty
hardware config falls back to 32x64x1, hello is not resent before its
interval, and a send failure is swallowed rather than killing the loop.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01NohXi78cwsAKtN1sCfxjUh

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 11:16:52 -04:00