feat(web): optional web login and API tokens, off by default (stacked on #674) (#683)

Optional web login, off by default: a device that sets no password behaves
exactly as before. Set under General > Security; then every page and API
route needs a session login or an API token (Authorization: Bearer).
Loopback, the Wi-Fi setup flow in AP mode, static files, captive-portal
probes and a reduced /api/v3/health stay open. Secrets live in the web_auth
section of config_secrets.json and no API returns them.
scripts/reset_web_password.py turns login off. Stacked on #674.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chuck
2026-09-30 09:09:40 -04:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent ba38a83c2c
commit e3c85cece6
23 changed files with 2310 additions and 26 deletions
+35
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,41 @@ accepts both, but the store flags the old spelling as deprecated
TLS-terminating proxy needs nothing more: a portless `Host` matches an
`https://` page.
### Optional web login
- The web interface can require a password, **off by default**: a device that
does not set one behaves exactly as before. Set it under **General >
Security**; from then on every page and API route needs a login (a session
cookie, 30 days, kept across restarts) or an API token. Unauthenticated page
loads go to the new `/login` page, HTMX requests get `HX-Redirect` to it,
and API calls get `401` JSON (`AUTH_REQUIRED` / `INVALID_TOKEN`). Wrong
passwords are rate-limited per address (5 a minute, 30 an hour, through the
existing flask-limiter). Log out from the header. Changing the password
signs every other browser out. (`web_interface/auth.py`)
- **API tokens** for Home Assistant, scripts and the MQTT bridge: create,
list and revoke them in the same section, send them as
`Authorization: Bearer <token>`. A token is shown once; only its SHA-256 is
stored. Tokens cannot change login settings. The MQTT bridge takes one as
`ledmatrix_api_token` (or `LEDMATRIX_MQTT_LEDMATRIX_API_TOKEN`, or the
Tools tab); it needs one only when it runs on another machine.
- Always open, login or not: requests from the Pi itself (loopback, without
proxy headers), the Wi-Fi setup flow (`/setup` and the Wi-Fi status, scan
and connect routes) while the Pi is in access-point mode, static files, the
captive-portal probe URLs, and `/api/v3/health`, which then answers only
`{"status": "healthy" | "degraded"}` to a caller that is not logged in.
- The password hash (werkzeug), the token hashes and the cookie-signing key
live in the `web_auth` section of `config/config_secrets.json`. No API
returns them: `GET /api/v3/config/main`, `GET /api/v3/config/secrets` and
the raw JSON editor leave the section out, the raw secrets save keeps the
stored one, a `/config/main` save drops a `web_auth` key, and orphaned-plugin
cleanup no longer treats it as a plugin (`CORE_SECRETS_KEYS`).
- **Lost password:** `sudo python3 scripts/reset_web_password.py` on the Pi
turns login off (`--revoke-tokens` also deletes the tokens), or open the
interface from the Pi itself.
- New routes: `/login`, `/logout`, `GET /api/v3/auth/status`,
`POST /api/v3/auth/password`, `POST /api/v3/auth/disable`,
`GET|POST /api/v3/auth/tokens`, `DELETE /api/v3/auth/tokens/<id>`.
### Fixes
- On-demand no longer restarts a running display. `POST