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fix(security): close path-injection gap in dependency-satisfaction checks
CodeQL flagged 2 new high-severity "uncontrolled data used in path expression" alerts at the open() calls inside this PR's new requirements_has_real_deps()/requirements_are_satisfied() -- both are reachable from paths that were never run through the basename+trusted-base sanitiser this codebase already uses elsewhere: - PluginLoader.install_dependencies() only applied that sanitiser when its optional plugins_dir argument was actually passed; the "no plugins_dir" branch trusted plugin_dir_real directly. Made plugins_dir required (not Optional) so that branch can't exist, and added an explicit guard in load_plugin() so install_deps=True without a plugins_dir fails loudly instead of silently. Production's only real caller (PluginManager) always passes plugins_dir already; the harness/dev-server/render-plugin callers all use install_deps=False and are unaffected. - StoreManager._install_dependencies() never sanitised plugin_path at all, and its call sites ultimately derive that path from a plugin's own manifest.json "id" field (install_plugin_from_url) -- a malicious plugin could otherwise point requirements_file outside plugins_dir. Applied the same os.path.basename()-based containment pattern PluginLoader already uses (and that CodeQL recognises as a real sanitiser). Added test_install_dependencies_requires_plugins_dir and test_install_dependencies_rejects_path_outside_plugins_dir to lock in the actual security property, not just quiet the scanner. Verified: all 20 tests in test_plugin_loader.py pass, plus the PR's existing test plan (test_plugin_system.py, test_store_manager_caches.py: 53 passed) and the full CI plugin-safety suite (test_harness.py, test_visual_rendering.py, test_plugin_matrix.py: 52 passed, 2 pre-existing skips) all still pass.
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@@ -1900,15 +1900,35 @@ class PluginStoreManager:
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def _install_dependencies(self, plugin_path: Path) -> bool:
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"""
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Install Python dependencies from requirements.txt.
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Args:
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plugin_path: Path to plugin directory
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Returns:
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True if successful or no requirements file
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"""
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requirements_file = plugin_path / "requirements.txt"
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# Reconstruct the plugin path from the trusted self.plugins_dir base +
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# a sanitised directory name rather than trusting plugin_path directly
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# -- callers ultimately derive it from a plugin-supplied manifest "id"
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# field (see install_plugin_from_url), so without this a malicious
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# manifest could point requirements_file outside plugins_dir.
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# os.path.basename() is CodeQL's recognised py/path-injection
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# sanitiser: it strips all directory components so the result cannot
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# contain traversal sequences, matching the pattern already used in
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# PluginLoader.install_dependencies().
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plugin_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(plugin_path))
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plugins_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(self.plugins_dir))
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safe_dir_name = os.path.basename(plugin_dir_real)
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if not safe_dir_name:
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self.logger.error("Could not determine plugin directory name for dependency install")
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return False
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safe_plugin_path = Path(os.path.join(plugins_dir_real, safe_dir_name))
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if not safe_plugin_path.is_dir():
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self.logger.error("Plugin directory not found inside plugins dir: %s", safe_plugin_path)
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return False
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requirements_file = safe_plugin_path / "requirements.txt"
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if not requirements_file.exists():
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self.logger.debug(f"No requirements.txt found in {plugin_path.name}")
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return True
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