rick/LEDMatrix
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/ChuckBuilds/LEDMatrix.git synced 2026-08-21 02:19:07 +00:00
Code Issues Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

fix(web): stop /config/secrets handing out every credential it holds

Browse Source 
GET /api/v3/config/secrets returned config_secrets.json in full to anyone who
could reach the port, and this interface has no authentication. Probed against
a real rig it produced six populated credential fields: a 40-character GitHub
token, a 183-character Home Assistant token, and Jellyfin and weather API keys.
This is the second door onto the same credentials; #477 closes the first.

Masking the response alone would have been worse than the leak. The only
client fetches every secret, edits one field and posts all of them back, and
save_raw_file_content replaces the file wholesale -- so a masked GET followed
by the client's own save would write the mask over every credential the user
had not touched. That is why this was left open when the leak was found; it
needs both halves.

Read side: mask_all_secret_values(), which already existed for exactly this
endpoint -- its docstring names it -- and had never been wired to a call site.
It leaves empty values and YOUR_* placeholders alone, so a client can still
tell "set" from "not set" without being told the secret.

Write side: strip the echoed mask and blanks from the submission, then merge
onto what is stored, so "unchanged" means unchanged. The cost is that a secret
can no longer be cleared by blanking it; that wants its own affordance, since
a control that erases credentials as a side effect of saving an unrelated one
is not one.

Browser side: the token field is now left empty rather than filled from the
response. Filling it with the mask would have stored eight bullet characters
as the token the next time the user pressed Save, and filling it with the real
value is the thing being fixed. It reports whether a token is saved instead.

Verified end to end through the Flask endpoints, not the helpers. Reverting
the masking fails the leak tests; reverting the merge fails the preservation
tests; both halves are independently guarded. 278 web tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01STMbQE4YctTacQXfbYqKuW
This commit is contained in:
ChuckBuilds
2026-08-20 12:13:12 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5
parent cf0a551f7b
commit d2379a1eb6
5 changed files with 145 additions and 11 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
web_interface/static/v3/plugins_manager.js
+8 -6
View File
@@ -4622,15 +4622,17 @@ window.loadGithubToken = function() {
// Handle empty data (secrets file doesn't exist) - API returns {} in this case
const secrets = data.data || {};
const token = secrets.github?.api_token || '';
const configured = token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN';
if (input) {
if (token && token !== 'YOUR_GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN') {
// Token exists and is valid
input.value = token;
showNotification('GitHub token loaded successfully', 'success');
// The endpoint masks what it returns, so this never holds
// the real token -- and the field is deliberately left
// empty rather than filled with the mask, which would be
// saved verbatim the next time the user pressed Save.
input.value = '';
if (configured) {
showNotification('A GitHub token is saved. Enter a new one to replace it.', 'success');
} else {
// No token configured or placeholder value
input.value = '';
showNotification('No GitHub token configured. Enter a new token to save.', 'info');
}
}