fix(web): refuse cross-site state-changing requests (Origin/Referer check)

The web interface had no CSRF protection, on the reasoning that anyone who
can forge a request on the LAN can also send it directly. That misses the
browser as a confused deputy: any website a LAN user opens can make their
browser POST a plain HTML form to http://<pi>:5000. CORS does not stop that
request, only hides its answer, and /api/v3/system/action accepted form
bodies, so a hostile page could reboot or power off the Pi, pull code, or
reach any other mutating route.

- web_interface/origin_guard.py: an app-wide before_request hook refuses
  POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE whose Origin (or, without one, Referer) is not the
  host the request was addressed to, and Origin "null", with 403
  CROSS_SITE_REQUEST. Requests with neither header (curl, Home Assistant,
  the MQTT bridge) are not from a browser and pass. Host and port are
  compared, not the scheme, so a TLS proxy that passes Host through works;
  X-Forwarded-Host is not trusted (no ProxyFix).
- /api/v3/system/action refuses a non-JSON body (415) unless HX-Request is
  set; every caller in the interface already sends JSON.
- app.py comment states the real threat model; SECURITY.md,
  REST_API_REFERENCE.md, WEB_INTERFACE_GUIDE.md and CHANGELOG updated.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chuck
2026-09-29 13:41:38 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 5.5
parent da9a999102
commit 43b63483cf
8 changed files with 459 additions and 10 deletions
+8
View File
@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@ are intentional rather than vulnerabilities:
- **No web UI authentication.** The web interface assumes the network
it's running on is trusted. Don't expose port 5000 to the internet.
"Trusted network" does not mean "trusted websites", though: any page
a LAN user opens could make their browser POST to the Pi. So the
interface refuses a `POST`/`PUT`/`PATCH`/`DELETE` whose `Origin` (or
`Referer`) header names another site (`web_interface/origin_guard.py`),
and `/api/v3/system/action` only accepts JSON or HTMX requests. Tools
that send neither header (curl, Home Assistant, the MQTT bridge) are
unaffected. Not covered: DNS rebinding, and anyone who can reach the
port directly.
- **Plugins run unsandboxed.** Installed plugins execute in the same
Python process as the display loop with full file-system and
network access. Review plugin code (especially third-party plugins