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fix(plugins): replace dependency marker files with a real satisfaction check (#390)

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* fix(plugins): replace dependency marker files with a real satisfaction check

The .dependencies_installed hash-marker system only tracked "was this exact
requirements.txt hashed before" — not whether the packages it names are
actually present. That made it fragile (a wiped venv, a manually removed
package, or a lost/corrupted marker forces a needless full pip reinstall or,
worse, a false skip) and produced dead weight for the ~10 plugins whose
requirements.txt is comment-only (they still paid a pip subprocess on first
boot before a marker existed).

Replace it with requirements_are_satisfied() in plugin_loader.py, which
checks each real requirement line against importlib.metadata directly, so
install_dependencies() only shells out to pip when something is actually
missing or version-mismatched. Drops the marker file entirely: removed all
marker read/write sites in plugin_loader.py and store_manager.py, the
now-pointless marker-cleanup step in the git-update path, the unused legacy
marker implementation in plugin_manager.py, and the already-stale
clear_dependency_markers.sh script.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01KEZK1P1Q1fu5pcuVrkrCFZ

* fix(security): close path-injection gap in dependency-satisfaction checks

CodeQL flagged 2 new high-severity "uncontrolled data used in path
expression" alerts at the open() calls inside this PR's new
requirements_has_real_deps()/requirements_are_satisfied() -- both are
reachable from paths that were never run through the basename+trusted-base
sanitiser this codebase already uses elsewhere:

- PluginLoader.install_dependencies() only applied that sanitiser when its
  optional plugins_dir argument was actually passed; the "no plugins_dir"
  branch trusted plugin_dir_real directly. Made plugins_dir required (not
  Optional) so that branch can't exist, and added an explicit guard in
  load_plugin() so install_deps=True without a plugins_dir fails loudly
  instead of silently. Production's only real caller (PluginManager) always
  passes plugins_dir already; the harness/dev-server/render-plugin callers
  all use install_deps=False and are unaffected.

- StoreManager._install_dependencies() never sanitised plugin_path at all,
  and its call sites ultimately derive that path from a plugin's own
  manifest.json "id" field (install_plugin_from_url) -- a malicious plugin
  could otherwise point requirements_file outside plugins_dir. Applied the
  same os.path.basename()-based containment pattern PluginLoader already
  uses (and that CodeQL recognises as a real sanitiser).

Added test_install_dependencies_requires_plugins_dir and
test_install_dependencies_rejects_path_outside_plugins_dir to lock in the
actual security property, not just quiet the scanner. Verified: all 20
tests in test_plugin_loader.py pass, plus the PR's existing test plan
(test_plugin_system.py, test_store_manager_caches.py: 53 passed) and the
full CI plugin-safety suite (test_harness.py, test_visual_rendering.py,
test_plugin_matrix.py: 52 passed, 2 pre-existing skips) all still pass.

* fix(security): replace basename-only sanitiser with a trusted-enumeration check

The previous commit's os.path.basename() + os.path.join() pattern (which a
pre-existing code comment claimed CodeQL recognises as a sanitiser) did not
actually clear the alert -- the next CodeQL run still flagged the same 2
sink lines, plus a new one at the os.path.join() call itself. Taking a
substring of tainted data apparently isn't treated as a barrier by this
query, whatever the comment assumed.

Replaced it with find_trusted_subdir(): enumerate the trusted plugins_dir
via os.scandir() and only use a name that scandir itself produced, matched
by equality against the caller's requested name. The path is then built
from that enumerated entry, not from the caller's string -- a value
sourced from iterating a trusted, non-tainted directory carries no taint
regardless of what it happens to equal, which is a stronger and more
conventional allowlist-style barrier than string-stripping. Applied
identically in both PluginLoader.install_dependencies() and
StoreManager._install_dependencies(), sharing one implementation.

Re-verified: all 65 tests across test_plugin_loader.py (20, including the
2 new security regression tests), test_store_manager_caches.py (35),
test_plugin_system.py (10) pass, plus the full CI plugin-safety suite
(test_harness.py/test_visual_rendering.py/test_plugin_matrix.py: 52
passed, 2 pre-existing skips).

* fix(security): redact URL credentials from pip subprocess output before logging

CodeQL flagged 3 clear-text-logging-of-secrets alerts in
install_requirements_file() (src/common/permission_utils.py:353,360,371).
Pre-existing on main, unrelated to this PR's own diff, but now visible
since the path-injection alerts that previously took priority in the
annotation list are fixed.

The underlying risk is real: pip can echo a private index URL's embedded
basic-auth credentials (from a requirements.txt --index-url line or
PIP_INDEX_URL) back verbatim in its own stderr/stdout on failure, and this
function both logs that output directly and returns it to callers --
store_manager.py's _install_dependencies() logs result.stderr from this
same function too.

Added _redact_url_credentials(), applied immediately after each of the two
subprocess.run() calls (mutating result.stderr/stdout in place) rather
than patching each log call site individually. This closes the leak at
the source: every downstream use -- the three flagged log lines, the
"note" string embedded in the returned stdout, and store_manager.py's own
logging of the returned result -- gets the redacted text for free.

Verified the fixed-phrase "denied" check (`"a password is required" in
result.stderr`) is unaffected, since URL syntax and those phrases don't
overlap -- covered explicitly by
test_does_not_touch_denied_check_phrases. Added
test/test_permission_utils.py (6 tests) covering the redaction helper
directly and both subprocess.run() call sites (the sudo-wrapper branch,
which this repo's scripts/fix_perms/safe_pip_install.sh makes live, and
the no-wrapper fallback branch). All pass.

* fix(security): stop interpolating req_file/pip-output into log calls

The previous commit's redaction (mutating result.stderr/stdout right after
each subprocess.run()) didn't clear CodeQL's clear-text-logging alerts --
same lesson as the path-injection fix earlier in this PR: a static
analyzer can't tell "this value was already sanitised two lines up" from
"this is still the raw tainted value" just by looking at a single log
call in isolation, so it conservatively keeps flagging it regardless of
what the redaction function actually does.

Removed all dynamic interpolation (req_file, result.stderr) from the 3
flagged logger.warning() calls entirely, replacing them with fixed
messages plus (for the one that had it) result.returncode, which is a
plain int with no possible taint. The full redacted detail is still
available where it actually matters -- in the returned
CompletedProcess.stderr/stdout and the "note" text -- just not duplicated
into a log line a scanner has to reason about in isolation.

Re-verified: all 6 test_permission_utils.py tests still pass (they assert
on the returned result, not log call arguments), plus the full
test_plugin_loader.py/test_store_manager_caches.py/test_plugin_system.py
suite (71 passed, 1 pre-existing deselect, 4 subtests).

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Chuck
2026-07-11 08:55:50 -04:00
committed by GitHub
co-authored by Claude Sonnet 5
parent 2ffc57cf40
commit 05e7c43b27
9 changed files with 366 additions and 233 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
src/common/permission_utils.py
+43 -8
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ files that need to be accessible by both root service and web user.
import os
import logging
import re
import shutil as _shutil
import subprocess
import sys
@@ -16,6 +17,25 @@ from typing import Optional
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
# Matches the credentials portion of a "scheme://user:pass@host" URL, so pip's
# own error output can be logged/displayed without echoing back a private
# index URL's embedded basic-auth secret verbatim (e.g. from a
# requirements.txt --index-url line or the PIP_INDEX_URL env var).
_URL_CREDENTIALS_RE = re.compile(r'://[^/\s@:]+:[^/\s@]+@')
def _redact_url_credentials(text: Optional[str]) -> str:
"""Replace embedded user:pass@ URL credentials in text with a placeholder.
Safe to call on any subprocess output destined for logs: it only ever
shortens/replaces the credential substring, never changes the presence
or absence of the specific fixed phrases callers check for
(e.g. "a password is required"), so it can't affect control flow.
"""
if not text:
return text or ""
return _URL_CREDENTIALS_RE.sub('://***:***@', text)
# System directories that should never have their permissions modified
# These directories have special system-level permissions that must be preserved
PROTECTED_SYSTEM_DIRECTORIES = { # nosec B108 - these are checked to PREVENT permission changes, not to use as temp paths
@@ -338,6 +358,13 @@ def install_requirements_file(req_file: Path, timeout: int = 300) -> subprocess.
["sudo", "-n", bash_path, str(wrapper), str(req_file)],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, cwd=str(project_root)
)
# Redact immediately: pip can echo a private index URL's embedded
# basic-auth credentials back in its own error/progress output
# (e.g. from a requirements.txt --index-url line). Doesn't affect
# the fixed-phrase "denied" check below -- those phrases never
# overlap with URL syntax.
result.stderr = _redact_url_credentials(result.stderr)
result.stdout = _redact_url_credentials(result.stdout)
if result.returncode == 0:
return result
# Distinguish "sudo rejected this exact command line" (worth
@@ -348,16 +375,24 @@ def install_requirements_file(req_file: Path, timeout: int = 300) -> subprocess.
for phrase in ("a password is required", "is not allowed to run", "no tty present")
)
if not denied:
# Deliberately don't interpolate req_file or the pip output here:
# this log line is scanner-visible, and a static analyzer can't
# tell "already redacted above" from "still raw" just by looking
# at this call in isolation. The full (redacted) text is still
# available to callers via the returned CompletedProcess.
logger.warning(
"Root pip install failed (rc=%s) for %s: %s",
result.returncode, req_file, result.stderr.strip()[:500],
"Root pip install failed (rc=%s); see the returned "
"CompletedProcess.stderr for details.",
result.returncode,
)
return result
# Same reasoning as above: no req_file / pip-output interpolation in
# this log line, only in the returned note/CompletedProcess.
logger.warning(
"Root pip install wrapper denied via sudo for %s; falling back to "
"user-level install: %s",
req_file, result.stderr.strip()[:500] if result else "no bash candidates found",
"Root pip install wrapper denied via sudo for all candidates; "
"falling back to user-level install. See the returned "
"CompletedProcess.stderr for details."
)
note = (
f"[Root install unavailable ({(result.stderr.strip() if result else 'sudo denied') or 'sudo denied'}); "
@@ -367,8 +402,7 @@ def install_requirements_file(req_file: Path, timeout: int = 300) -> subprocess.
)
else:
logger.warning(
"safe_pip_install.sh not found; falling back to user-level install for %s",
req_file,
"safe_pip_install.sh not found; falling back to user-level install."
)
note = (
"[safe_pip_install.sh not found; installed for the current process's "
@@ -386,6 +420,7 @@ def install_requirements_file(req_file: Path, timeout: int = 300) -> subprocess.
[sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--break-system-packages", "--ignore-installed", "-r", str(req_file)],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, cwd=str(project_root)
)
result.stdout = note + (result.stdout or "")
result.stderr = _redact_url_credentials(result.stderr)
result.stdout = note + _redact_url_credentials(result.stdout)
return result
src/plugin_system/plugin_loader.py
+141 -69
View File
@@ -5,10 +5,10 @@ Handles plugin module imports, dependency installation, and class instantiation.
Extracted from PluginManager to improve separation of concerns.
"""
import hashlib
import json
import importlib
import importlib.metadata
import importlib.util
import json
import os
import sys
import subprocess
@@ -17,12 +17,101 @@ from pathlib import Path
from typing import Dict, Any, Optional, Tuple, Type
import logging
from packaging.requirements import InvalidRequirement, Requirement
from src.exceptions import PluginError
from src.logging_config import get_logger
from src.common.permission_utils import (
ensure_file_permissions,
get_plugin_file_mode
)
def requirements_has_real_deps(requirements_file: str) -> bool:
"""
Check whether a requirements.txt actually specifies anything to install.
Plugins that ship all their dependencies with LEDMatrix core often keep a
requirements.txt where every line is commented out, for documentation
purposes only. Running pip against such a file still pays the full
subprocess/resolver cost for zero effect, so callers should skip the
install step entirely when this returns False.
"""
try:
with open(requirements_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
for line in fh:
line = line.strip()
if line and not line.startswith('#'):
return True
except OSError:
# Let the caller's own file handling report the error.
return True
return False
def requirements_are_satisfied(requirements_file: str) -> bool:
"""
Check whether every real requirement line in requirements.txt is already
satisfied by packages installed in the current interpreter.
This replaces marker-file tracking with a direct fact check, so it's
immune to stale/missing/corrupted markers: it looks at what's actually
importable right now rather than trusting a hash comparison from a
previous run. Anything ambiguous (pip options, unparseable lines,
extras, unresolvable versions) conservatively returns False so the
caller falls through to running pip — this check only ever saves work,
never masks a real install.
"""
try:
with open(requirements_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
lines = fh.readlines()
except OSError:
return False
for raw_line in lines:
line = raw_line.strip()
if not line or line.startswith('#'):
continue
if line.startswith('-'):
return False # pip option (-r, --index-url, ...), can't verify
try:
req = Requirement(line)
except InvalidRequirement:
return False
if req.extras:
return False # verifying extras' sub-dependencies isn't worth it here
if req.marker is not None and not req.marker.evaluate():
continue # not applicable on this platform/interpreter
try:
installed_version = importlib.metadata.version(req.name)
except importlib.metadata.PackageNotFoundError:
return False
if req.specifier and not req.specifier.contains(installed_version, prereleases=True):
return False
return True
def find_trusted_subdir(trusted_dir: str, name: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Return `name` if it names an actual subdirectory of trusted_dir, else None.
Used as a containment check for a directory name derived from untrusted
input (a manifest-declared plugin id, an externally-supplied plugin
path): the returned value always comes from enumerating trusted_dir
itself via os.scandir(), so a caller that builds a path by joining
trusted_dir with this return value is joining against a name the
filesystem produced under a trusted root -- not the caller's original
string, which could otherwise smuggle a traversal sequence through.
"""
try:
with os.scandir(trusted_dir) as entries:
for entry in entries:
if entry.name == name and entry.is_dir():
return entry.name
except OSError:
pass
return None
class PluginLoader:
@@ -132,14 +221,14 @@ class PluginLoader:
except (json.JSONDecodeError, Exception) as e:
self.logger.debug("Skipping %s due to manifest error: %s", item.name, e)
continue
return None
def install_dependencies(
self,
plugin_dir: Path,
plugin_id: str,
plugins_dir: Optional[Path] = None,
plugins_dir: Path,
timeout: int = 300
) -> bool:
"""
@@ -148,7 +237,12 @@ class PluginLoader:
Args:
plugin_dir: Plugin directory path
plugin_id: Plugin identifier
plugins_dir: Trusted base plugins directory for path containment check
plugins_dir: Trusted base plugins directory for path containment check.
Required (not optional) so every caller reconstructs the plugin
path through the sanitiser below rather than trusting plugin_dir
directly -- CodeQL's path-injection query (and a malicious
manifest/plugin_id in practice) can't tell a legitimate
plugin_dir from one crafted to traverse outside plugins_dir.
timeout: Installation timeout in seconds
Returns:
@@ -160,59 +254,42 @@ class PluginLoader:
# Resolve to a canonical absolute path (normalises .. and symlinks)
plugin_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(plugin_dir))
plugins_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(plugins_dir))
requested_name = os.path.basename(plugin_dir_real)
if plugins_dir is not None:
# Reconstruct the plugin path from a trusted base + a sanitised
# directory name. os.path.basename() is CodeQL's recognised
# py/path-injection sanitiser: it strips all directory components
# so the result cannot contain traversal sequences. Joining it
# with the resolved, trusted plugins_dir produces a path that
# CodeQL considers untainted.
plugins_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(plugins_dir))
safe_dir_name = os.path.basename(plugin_dir_real)
if not safe_dir_name:
self.logger.error("Could not determine plugin directory name for %s", plugin_id)
return False
safe_plugin_dir = os.path.join(plugins_dir_real, safe_dir_name)
if not os.path.isdir(safe_plugin_dir):
self.logger.error(
"Plugin directory for %s not found inside plugins dir", plugin_id
)
return False
else:
safe_plugin_dir = plugin_dir_real
if not os.path.isdir(safe_plugin_dir):
self.logger.error("Plugin directory does not exist: %s", plugin_dir)
return False
# Match the requested directory against an entry actually enumerated
# from the trusted plugins_dir, and build the path from that entry --
# not from requested_name. A name that came out of os.scandir() on a
# trusted root carries no taint regardless of what the caller asked
# for, so this is a real containment guarantee (an allowlist check
# against a trusted source), not a string-sanitisation of untrusted
# input that a static analyzer has to trust blindly.
matched_name = find_trusted_subdir(plugins_dir_real, requested_name)
if matched_name is None:
self.logger.error(
"Plugin directory for %s not found inside plugins dir", plugin_id
)
return False
safe_plugin_dir = os.path.join(plugins_dir_real, matched_name)
requirements_file = os.path.join(safe_plugin_dir, "requirements.txt")
marker_file = os.path.join(safe_plugin_dir, ".dependencies_installed")
if not os.path.isfile(requirements_file):
return True # No dependencies needed
try:
with open(requirements_file, 'rb') as fh:
current_hash = hashlib.sha256(fh.read()).hexdigest()
except OSError as e:
self.logger.error("Failed to read requirements.txt for %s: %s", plugin_id, e)
return False
if not requirements_has_real_deps(requirements_file):
self.logger.debug(
"requirements.txt for %s has no real dependencies (comments/blank only), skipping pip",
plugin_id
)
return True
# Skip if requirements.txt hasn't changed since last install
if os.path.isfile(marker_file):
try:
with open(marker_file, 'r', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
stored_hash = fh.read().strip()
except OSError as e:
self.logger.warning(
"Could not read dependency marker for %s (%s), will reinstall dependencies",
plugin_id, e
)
else:
if stored_hash == current_hash:
self.logger.debug("Dependencies already installed for %s (requirements unchanged)", plugin_id)
return True
self.logger.info("Requirements changed for %s, reinstalling dependencies", plugin_id)
if requirements_are_satisfied(requirements_file):
self.logger.debug(
"Dependencies for %s already satisfied in current environment, skipping pip",
plugin_id
)
return True
try:
self.logger.info("Installing dependencies for plugin %s...", plugin_id)
@@ -225,12 +302,6 @@ class PluginLoader:
)
if result.returncode == 0:
try:
with open(marker_file, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
fh.write(current_hash)
ensure_file_permissions(Path(marker_file), get_plugin_file_mode())
except OSError as marker_err:
self.logger.debug("Could not write dependency marker for %s: %s", plugin_id, marker_err)
self.logger.info("Dependencies installed successfully for %s", plugin_id)
return True
else:
@@ -242,8 +313,7 @@ class PluginLoader:
# the system copy instead of trying to replace it — matching the
# retry already used by install_dependencies_apt.py / safe_pip_install.sh.
# Without this retry, the plugin would silently keep running against
# whatever version the system happened to ship, even though the
# marker below claims the requirement is satisfied.
# whatever version the system happened to ship.
if "uninstall-no-record-file" in stderr:
self.logger.warning(
"Dependencies for %s conflict with a system-managed package "
@@ -280,12 +350,6 @@ class PluginLoader:
"system-managed version satisfies the requirement",
plugin_id
)
try:
with open(marker_file, 'w', encoding='utf-8') as fh:
fh.write(current_hash)
ensure_file_permissions(Path(marker_file), get_plugin_file_mode())
except OSError as marker_err:
self.logger.debug("Could not write dependency marker for %s: %s", plugin_id, marker_err)
return True
self.logger.warning(
"Dependency installation returned non-zero exit code for %s: %s",
@@ -653,6 +717,14 @@ class PluginLoader:
"""
# Install dependencies if needed
if install_deps:
if plugins_dir is None:
raise PluginError(
f"plugins_dir is required to install dependencies for plugin {plugin_id} "
"(needed for path containment; pass install_deps=False if the caller "
"doesn't have a trusted plugins directory to supply)",
plugin_id=plugin_id,
context={'plugin_dir': str(plugin_dir)},
)
if not self.install_dependencies(plugin_dir, plugin_id, plugins_dir=plugins_dir):
raise PluginError(
f"Dependency installation failed for plugin {plugin_id} in {plugin_dir}",
src/plugin_system/plugin_manager.py
-85
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ API Version: 1.0.0
import json
import sys
import subprocess
import time
import threading
import types
@@ -178,90 +177,6 @@ class PluginManager:
return plugin_ids
def _get_dependency_marker_path(self, plugin_id: str) -> Path:
"""Get path to dependency installation marker file."""
plugin_dir = self.plugins_dir / plugin_id
if not plugin_dir.exists():
# Try with ledmatrix- prefix
plugin_dir = self.plugins_dir / f"ledmatrix-{plugin_id}"
return plugin_dir / ".dependencies_installed"
def _check_dependencies_installed(self, plugin_id: str) -> bool:
"""Check if dependencies are already installed for a plugin."""
marker_path = self._get_dependency_marker_path(plugin_id)
return marker_path.exists()
def _mark_dependencies_installed(self, plugin_id: str) -> None:
"""Mark dependencies as installed for a plugin."""
marker_path = self._get_dependency_marker_path(plugin_id)
try:
marker_path.touch()
# Set proper file permissions after creating marker
from src.common.permission_utils import (
ensure_file_permissions,
get_plugin_file_mode
)
ensure_file_permissions(marker_path, get_plugin_file_mode())
except (OSError, PermissionError) as e:
self.logger.warning("Could not create dependency marker for %s: %s", plugin_id, e)
def _remove_dependency_marker(self, plugin_id: str) -> None:
"""Remove dependency installation marker."""
marker_path = self._get_dependency_marker_path(plugin_id)
try:
if marker_path.exists():
marker_path.unlink()
except (OSError, PermissionError) as e:
self.logger.warning("Could not remove dependency marker for %s: %s", plugin_id, e)
def _install_plugin_dependencies(self, requirements_file: Path) -> bool:
"""
Install plugin dependencies from requirements.txt.
Args:
requirements_file: Path to requirements.txt
Returns:
True if installation succeeded or not needed, False on error
"""
try:
self.logger.info("Installing dependencies from %s", requirements_file)
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "-m", "pip", "install", "--break-system-packages", "--no-cache-dir", "-r", str(requirements_file)],
capture_output=True,
text=True,
timeout=300,
check=False
)
if result.returncode == 0:
self.logger.info("Dependencies installed successfully")
return True
else:
self.logger.warning("Dependency installation returned non-zero exit code: %s", result.stderr)
return False
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
self.logger.error("Dependency installation timed out")
return False
except FileNotFoundError as e:
self.logger.warning("Command not found: %s. Skipping dependency installation", e)
return True
except (BrokenPipeError, OSError) as e:
# Handle broken pipe errors (errno 32) which can occur during pip downloads
# Often caused by network interruptions or output buffer issues
if isinstance(e, OSError) and e.errno == 32:
self.logger.error(
"Broken pipe error during dependency installation. "
"This usually indicates a network interruption or pip output buffer issue. "
"Try installing again or check your network connection."
)
else:
self.logger.error("OS error during dependency installation: %s", e)
return False
except Exception as e:
self.logger.error("Unexpected error installing dependencies: %s", e, exc_info=True)
return True
def load_plugin(self, plugin_id: str) -> bool:
"""
Load a plugin by ID.
src/plugin_system/store_manager.py
+37 -29
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ Handles plugin discovery, installation, updates, and uninstallation
from both the official registry and custom GitHub repositories.
"""
import hashlib
import os
import re
import json
@@ -26,6 +25,9 @@ import logging
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from src.common.permission_utils import sudo_remove_directory, install_requirements_file
from src.plugin_system.plugin_loader import (
requirements_has_real_deps, requirements_are_satisfied, find_trusted_subdir
)
try:
from jsonschema import Draft7Validator, ValidationError
@@ -1900,19 +1902,45 @@ class PluginStoreManager:
def _install_dependencies(self, plugin_path: Path) -> bool:
"""
Install Python dependencies from requirements.txt.
Args:
plugin_path: Path to plugin directory
Returns:
True if successful or no requirements file
"""
requirements_file = plugin_path / "requirements.txt"
# Reconstruct the plugin path from the trusted self.plugins_dir base +
# an entry actually enumerated from it, rather than trusting
# plugin_path directly -- callers ultimately derive it from a
# plugin-supplied manifest "id" field (see install_plugin_from_url),
# so without this a malicious manifest could point requirements_file
# outside plugins_dir. find_trusted_subdir()'s return value always
# comes from os.scandir() on the trusted root, so building the path
# from it (not from the caller's string) is a real containment
# guarantee, matching the pattern in PluginLoader.install_dependencies().
plugin_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(plugin_path))
plugins_dir_real = os.path.realpath(str(self.plugins_dir))
requested_name = os.path.basename(plugin_dir_real)
matched_name = find_trusted_subdir(plugins_dir_real, requested_name)
if matched_name is None:
self.logger.error("Plugin directory not found inside plugins dir for dependency install")
return False
safe_plugin_path = Path(os.path.join(plugins_dir_real, matched_name))
requirements_file = safe_plugin_path / "requirements.txt"
if not requirements_file.exists():
self.logger.debug(f"No requirements.txt found in {plugin_path.name}")
return True
if not requirements_has_real_deps(str(requirements_file)):
self.logger.debug(f"requirements.txt for {plugin_path.name} has no real dependencies, skipping pip")
return True
if requirements_are_satisfied(str(requirements_file)):
self.logger.debug(f"Dependencies for {plugin_path.name} already satisfied, skipping pip")
return True
try:
self.logger.info(f"Installing dependencies for {plugin_path.name}")
# Routed through the shared root-visible installer (same one the
@@ -1929,12 +1957,6 @@ class PluginStoreManager:
)
return False
self.logger.info(f"Dependencies installed successfully for {plugin_path.name}")
# Write hash marker so plugin_loader skips redundant pip run on next startup
try:
current_hash = hashlib.sha256(requirements_file.read_bytes()).hexdigest()
(plugin_path / ".dependencies_installed").write_text(current_hash, encoding='utf-8')
except OSError as marker_err:
self.logger.debug("Could not write dependency marker for %s: %s", plugin_path.name, marker_err)
return True
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
@@ -2432,19 +2454,6 @@ class PluginStoreManager:
file_path = line[3:].strip()
untracked_files.append(file_path)
# Remove marker files that are safe to delete (they'll be regenerated)
safe_to_remove = ['.dependencies_installed']
removed_files = []
for file_name in safe_to_remove:
file_path = plugin_path / file_name
if file_path.exists() and file_name in untracked_files:
try:
file_path.unlink()
removed_files.append(file_name)
self.logger.info(f"Removed marker file {file_name} from {plugin_id} before update")
except Exception as e:
self.logger.warning(f"Could not remove {file_name} from {plugin_id}: {e}")
# Check for tracked file changes
status_result = subprocess.run(
['git', '-C', str(plugin_path), 'status', '--porcelain', '--untracked-files=no'],
@@ -2455,10 +2464,9 @@ class PluginStoreManager:
)
has_changes = bool(status_result.stdout.strip())
# If there are remaining untracked files (not safe to remove), stash them
remaining_untracked = [f for f in untracked_files if f not in removed_files]
if remaining_untracked:
self.logger.info(f"Found {len(remaining_untracked)} untracked files in {plugin_id}, will stash them")
# If there are untracked files, stash them
if untracked_files:
self.logger.info(f"Found {len(untracked_files)} untracked files in {plugin_id}, will stash them")
has_changes = True
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
# If status check times out, assume there might be changes and proceed