"""The captive portal's fixed-argument sudo calls must be granted.

The installers write two allow-lists, /etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_web and
ledmatrix_wifi. A sudo call absent from both needs a password, which a service
cannot supply, so it fails.

Four such calls were ungranted, all of them captive-portal teardown/setup:

    sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0|1     wifi_manager.py:788, 883
    nft add|delete table ip ledmatrix     wifi_manager.py:835, 895
    rfkill unblock wifi                   wifi_manager.py:1811
    mkdir -p .../dnsmasq-shared.d         wifi_manager.py:922

It goes unnoticed because a stock Raspberry Pi image ships
/etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd granting the default user
`ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL`, which satisfies every gap in both files. It only
bites once that blanket rule is removed or the service runs as another user.

Scope, deliberately narrow: this pins the four commands above, each of which
can be written out literally. The portal makes further sudo calls whose
arguments are built at runtime -- iptables and nft rules carrying an interface
name and a port, `ip addr`, `ip link` -- and those cannot be granted safely
here. A rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard, and
`iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so
`NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name.
Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the rules itself and
takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already
is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant, and belongs in its own
change.
"""
import re
from pathlib import Path

import pytest

ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
INSTALLERS = (
    ROOT / "first_time_install.sh",
    ROOT / "scripts" / "install" / "configure_wifi_permissions.sh",
)

#: Commands this change grants, each fully literal in the source.
REQUIRED = (
    ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=0"),
    ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=1"),
    ("nft", "add", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
    ("nft", "delete", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"),
    ("rfkill", "unblock", "wifi"),
    ("mkdir", "-p", "/etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d"),
)

#: Tools with an option that executes a program of the caller's choosing.
#: A trailing wildcard on any of these is a privilege escalation.
EXEC_CAPABLE = ("iptables", "ip6tables", "nft", "tcpdump", "find", "awk",
                "sed", "perl", "python", "python3", "env")


def _grant_lines():
    lines = []
    for installer in INSTALLERS:
        if not installer.is_file():
            continue
        for line in installer.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines():
            if "NOPASSWD:" in line:
                lines.append(line.split("NOPASSWD:", 1)[1])
    return lines


def _normalise(rule):
    """One rule with binary-path variables reduced to bare tool names.

    Rules are written as `$SYSCTL_PATH -w ...` or `${NFT_PATH} ...`, so
    matching the literal "sysctl" finds nothing and every rule looks absent --
    which is exactly how an earlier version of this test reported six gaps
    that did not exist. Both spellings are handled: shell expands them
    identically, and a check that understood only one silently skipped the
    other.
    """
    rule = re.sub(r"\$\{?([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)_PATH\}?",
                  lambda m: m.group(1).lower(), rule)
    return re.sub(r"/usr/(?:s?bin)/", "", rule)


def _granted_commands():
    """The command each NOPASSWD rule actually grants, normalised.

    _grant_lines() already returns everything after "NOPASSWD:", so what
    arrives here is the command, possibly preceded by the NOEXEC tag and
    possibly still carrying the closing quote of an `echo "..."` that wrote
    it. Both are stripped so the result is comparable to a plain command.
    """
    commands = []
    for rule in _grant_lines():
        command = _normalise(rule).strip()
        command = re.sub(r"^NOEXEC:\s*", "", command)
        command = command.rstrip('"').rstrip("'").strip()
        if command:
            commands.append(" ".join(command.split()))
    return commands


def test_the_installers_are_present():
    missing = [str(p.relative_to(ROOT)) for p in INSTALLERS if not p.is_file()]
    assert not missing, f"installer(s) missing: {missing}"


@pytest.mark.parametrize("command", REQUIRED, ids=lambda c: " ".join(c))
def test_the_command_is_granted(command):
    """Whole command, not just the binary.

    Checking only the binary made this far weaker than it looked: with
    `sysctl` present anywhere, deleting the ip_forward=0 grant still passed,
    and the portal would then be unable to restore forwarding on teardown.
    """
    wanted = " ".join(command)
    granted = _granted_commands()
    # Exact match, not a prefix. A substring search was satisfied by
    # `sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0 *`, and that trailing wildcard lets the
    # caller append whatever they like to a command running as root -- a far
    # wider grant than the one this test is meant to be confirming.
    assert wanted in granted, (
        f"no installer grants exactly `{wanted}`; closest matches: "
        + str([g for g in granted if g.startswith(command[0])])[:200])


def test_no_wildcard_on_a_tool_that_can_exec():
    """`NOPASSWD: iptables *` hands the web user root.

    iptables --modprobe=/path runs that path as root. This caught a grant added
    in this very change, which is why it is here.
    """
    offenders = []
    for rule in _grant_lines():
        rule = rule.strip()
        if not rule.endswith("*"):
            continue
        # Normalised the same way as everything else: `${NFT_PATH} *` left a
        # brace before the tool name, and the word-boundary check below does
        # not treat "{" as a boundary, so that spelling slipped through.
        haystack = _normalise(rule).lower()
        for tool in EXEC_CAPABLE:
            if re.search(rf"(^|/|\s|\$){tool}(\s|$)", haystack):
                offenders.append(rule)
                break
    assert not offenders, (
        "wildcard grant on a tool that can execute another program:\n  "
        + "\n  ".join(offenders))