"""The captive portal's fixed-argument sudo calls must be granted. The installers write two allow-lists, /etc/sudoers.d/ledmatrix_web and ledmatrix_wifi. A sudo call absent from both needs a password, which a service cannot supply, so it fails. Four such calls were ungranted, all of them captive-portal teardown/setup: sysctl -w net.ipv4.ip_forward=0|1 wifi_manager.py:788, 883 nft add|delete table ip ledmatrix wifi_manager.py:835, 895 rfkill unblock wifi wifi_manager.py:1811 mkdir -p .../dnsmasq-shared.d wifi_manager.py:922 It goes unnoticed because a stock Raspberry Pi image ships /etc/sudoers.d/010_pi-nopasswd granting the default user `ALL=(ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL`, which satisfies every gap in both files. It only bites once that blanket rule is removed or the service runs as another user. Scope, deliberately narrow: this pins the four commands above, each of which can be written out literally. The portal makes further sudo calls whose arguments are built at runtime -- iptables and nft rules carrying an interface name and a port, `ip addr`, `ip link` -- and those cannot be granted safely here. A rule covering them needs a trailing wildcard, and `iptables --modprobe=/path/to/anything` runs that path as root, so `NOPASSWD: iptables *` is a root shell for the web user by another name. Closing that half needs a privileged helper that builds the rules itself and takes only an interface and a port, granted the way safe_plugin_rm.sh already is. That is a design decision, not a one-line grant, and belongs in its own change. """ import re from pathlib import Path import pytest ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent INSTALLERS = ( ROOT / "first_time_install.sh", ROOT / "scripts" / "install" / "configure_wifi_permissions.sh", ) #: Commands this change grants, each fully literal in the source. REQUIRED = ( ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=0"), ("sysctl", "-w", "net.ipv4.ip_forward=1"), ("nft", "add", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"), ("nft", "delete", "table", "ip", "ledmatrix"), ("rfkill", "unblock", "wifi"), ("mkdir", "-p", "/etc/NetworkManager/dnsmasq-shared.d"), ) #: Tools with an option that executes a program of the caller's choosing. #: A trailing wildcard on any of these is a privilege escalation. EXEC_CAPABLE = ("iptables", "ip6tables", "nft", "tcpdump", "find", "awk", "sed", "perl", "python", "python3", "env") def _grant_lines(): lines = [] for installer in INSTALLERS: if not installer.is_file(): continue for line in installer.read_text(encoding="utf-8", errors="replace").splitlines(): if "NOPASSWD:" in line: lines.append(line.split("NOPASSWD:", 1)[1]) return lines def _normalised_grants(): """Grants with binary-path variables reduced to tool names. Rules are written as `$SYSCTL_PATH -w ...`, so matching the literal "sysctl" finds nothing and every rule looks absent -- which is exactly how an earlier version of this test reported six gaps that did not exist. Only NOPASSWD lines are considered, because taking the whole script let a variable definition such as NFT_PATH=$(command -v nft) satisfy the check on its own while the grant itself had been deleted. """ text = "\n".join(_grant_lines()) text = re.sub(r"\$\{?([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)_PATH\}?", lambda m: m.group(1).lower(), text) return re.sub(r"/usr/(?:s?bin)/", "", text) def test_the_installers_are_present(): missing = [str(p.relative_to(ROOT)) for p in INSTALLERS if not p.is_file()] assert not missing, f"installer(s) missing: {missing}" @pytest.mark.parametrize("command", REQUIRED, ids=lambda c: " ".join(c)) def test_the_command_is_granted(command): """Whole command, not just the binary. Checking only the binary made this far weaker than it looked: with `sysctl` present anywhere, deleting the ip_forward=0 grant still passed, and the portal would then be unable to restore forwarding on teardown. """ pattern = r"\s+".join(re.escape(word) for word in command) assert re.search(pattern, _normalised_grants()), ( f"no installer grants `{' '.join(command)}`") def test_no_wildcard_on_a_tool_that_can_exec(): """`NOPASSWD: iptables *` hands the web user root. iptables --modprobe=/path runs that path as root. This caught a grant added in this very change, which is why it is here. """ offenders = [] for rule in _grant_lines(): rule = rule.strip() if not rule.endswith("*"): continue haystack = rule.replace("_PATH", "").lower() for tool in EXEC_CAPABLE: if re.search(rf"(^|/|\s|\$){tool}(\s|$)", haystack): offenders.append(rule) break assert not offenders, ( "wildcard grant on a tool that can execute another program:\n " + "\n ".join(offenders))